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On the occasion of the increase in corporatewars and takeover battles, the author examines the constitutional and conflict of laws issues
involved in choosing the law to govern the internalaffairs aspects of the
defensive and offensive strategiesand tactics used in the variousconfrontations. This leads to a review of recentjudicialand legislative developments, including the antitakeover statutes, to an examination of the
traditionaland the new conflict-of-laws methodologies as they affect internalcorporate affairs, and to an analysisof the implications ofthe due
process, full faith and credit, and, especially, the commerce clauses of
the United States Constitution. Finally, the extraterritorialityof the internal affairs dimension offederal securities regulation and the imposition of controls over multinationalenterprises are explored.
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INTRODUCTION

Corporations are legal "persons" endowed with rights and subject to
obligations, much like human beings. Although the law applicable to
most relationships among persons is unaffected by the nature of the participants, because corporations are man-made their composition, structure, organs, functions, and constituencies are addressed by substantive
and procedural rules of a special kind, codified in statutes and enshrined
and amplified in corporate documents. Not only are these rules more
numerous and complex than those in other fields of law, but they are
strongly interrelated because they control a multifaceted and continuous
relationship rather than just a transaction or a series of transactions. The
choice of a single or at least congruent body of law to regulate that internal relationship is therefore of great importance.
Under the traditional Anglo-American conflicts rule, internal corporate affairs are governed by the law of the state of incorporation-the
"lex incorporationis." European nations apply the law of the designated
corporate seat, which often coincides with that of the state of incorporation. Both of these rules essentially enable the corporate organizers to
select the applicable law at will, in disregard of the realities of corporate
existence and operations. Continental concern over the potential abuses
of such autonomy has led to the qualification that the selected law applies only if the location of the seat is "real." In the United States, critics
of the lex incorporationis have strived to create an exception for "pseudoforeign" corporations, and legislation in New York and California calls
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for the application of a considerable portion of domestic corporation law
to foreign corporations having major local contacts.
The tension between the policies, on the one hand, that validate
party autonomy and recognize the practical utility of certainty, uniformity, and continuity served by the traditional rules, and, on the other, the
need to prevent evasion of the regulatory authority of the state or states
with substantial corporate contacts, has assumed new significance in the
context of the increasingly frequent wars for corporate control, such as
proxy fights and takeovers. Furthermore, the expansion of international
and multinational corporate activities raises again the question of
whether it would be proper for host states to seek to achieve local objectives by internalizing controls of foreign corporations.
This article first assesses the present status of the lex incorporationis
in the United States while adding some information on developments in
Europe.' It then explores the actual and potential alternatives and exceptions to the rule, taking into consideration the "conflicts revolution"
of the last twenty years.2 It is here that I will examine the new antitakeover statutes and inquire into the scope of application of legislation intended to protect shareholders by limiting or controlling management's
antitakeover abuses. 3 Finally, the article will focus on the international
ramifications of corporate choice-of-law questions, with particular emphasis on the so-called "extraterritoriality" of the internal affairs aspects
of federal securities law and on the internal regulation of the multina4
tional corporation.
II. THE CORPORATE WARS
Corporate battles have intensified in recent years. Although in such
struggles internal power is frequently consolidated through negotiation,
it all too often results from confrontations pitching giants against titans
in tender offers, proxy contests, and buy-outs. Corporate law is so flexible
that lawyers have been able to invent and perfect an incredible variety of
intricate devices designed to advance the goals of their clients.
Anticipatory defenses include "shark repellents" such as
supermajority voting provisions for corporate consolidations and share1. See infira notes 24-41 and accompanying text. It has been over a quarter of a century since
the last comprehensive publication in the United States on this subject. See Reese & Kaufman, The
Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58
COLuM. L. REV. 1118 (1958). The most recent major critique dates back to 1968. See Kaplan,
Foreign Corporationsand Local CorporatePolicy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433 (1968).
2. See infra notes 211-391 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 392-442 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 443-93 and accompanying text.
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holder or director consent requirements for controlling stock acquisitions, elimination or installation of cumulative voting and of classified
boards, fair-pricing requirements for second-step consolidations or
mandatory-bid provisions, "poison pill" or "flip-over" preferred stock or
warrants or rights that are triggered by stock accumulations, "golden
parachutes"-long-term high-pay employment contracts-for corporate
executives, reduction of voting rights of large shareholdings, tightening
of provisions on the convocation and agenda of shareholder meetings,
and setting up complex structures involving holding companies or other
affiliations. 5 The 1984 proxy materials of more than 200 corporations
included proposals that erect barriers to unwanted changes of control;
6
most of these were adopted.
When battle is joined, it is not uncommon to resort to such tactics as
disposal of "crown jewels" or "poisoning the well" or other "scorched
earth" action, defensive acquisitions that generate antitrust problems,
submission to "greenmail," lock-ups or leg-ups to "white knights" on
5. For a "glossary" of these and related colorful terms, see SEC Advisory Committee on
140-141, No. 1028 (Extra
Tender Offers, Report ofRecommendations, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Edition, July 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Report]. The report also provides general information
on tender offer developments in recent years. For additional information on offensive and defensive
tactics in tender offers as well as on nomenclature, see, e.g., E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-99 (1977); A.
FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 291-396 (1983); M. LIPTON

& E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS §§ 51.01-.07 (1984); R. WINTER, M. STUMPF &
G. HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTI-

§§ 2.1-.8 (1984); DeMott, Pac-Man Tender Offers, 1983 DUKE L.J. 116, 129-32; Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1165-74 (1981); Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and
PartialTender Offers: The Validity of FairPrice, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions Under
DelawareLaw, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 291-96 (1984); Fleischer & Raymond, Lockups Ease Acquisitions, May ForestallBidding War, Legal Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at 13, col. 1; Freund & Volk, Tender
Offers: Developments on Offense, 11 INST. ON SEC. REG. 1, 2-6 (1980); Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations. The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819,
848-62 (1981); Lang, Block, Barton & Duberstein, The Dramatizationof a Hostile Tender Offer, 70
A.B.A. J.68, 68-73 (1984); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target'sBoardroom: An Update After One
Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017, 1017-22 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target'sBoardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW. 101, 130-31 (1979); Lowenstein, PruningDeadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 249-59 (1983); Nathan & Volk, Developments in Acquisition and
Acquisition Techniques Under the Williams Act, 12 INST. ON SEC. REG. 159, 188-90 (1981); Note,
Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1068, 1069-74 (1983); Note,
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 621, 621-24,
658-60 (1983); Note, Golden Parachutes: Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH.& LEE L.
REv. 1117, 1117-25 (1983); Note, Developments in CorporateTakeover Techniques: CreepingTender
Offers, Lockup Arrangements, and StandstillAgreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1095-99,
1116-19 (1982); Exotic Takeover Tactics Dominate Discussionat Annual PLIInstitute, 16 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 1751-55 (Nov. 9, 1984).
6. See "Large and Mighty" Companies Erect Control Change Barriers,Report Says, 16 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 40, at 1634 (Oct. 12, 1984); see also Vartanian & Ledig, Thrift Instituions Adopting More Shark Repellents, Legal Times, Oct. 1, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
TIONER
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assets or stock, armistices or alliances under "standstill" agreements,
and, if all else fails, competitive tender offers for the target corporation's
own stock or "pac man" or doomsday-machine counter-tender offers for
7
enemy stock.
These are monumental developments. The separation between ownership and control, noted some years ago and discussed at length in various think-pieces, 8 reduces the shareholder to a passive investor and
enables management all too often to dominate and self-perpetuate. This
separation is greatly reinforced by newly installed "protective" provisions and structures that, allegedly in the interests of the corporation and
the shareholders themselves, not only discourage any challenge by the
shareholders but often adversely affect their opportunities as investors to
profit by selling their stock. 9 In the proverbial race-to-the-bottom environment of state enabling legislation, strengthened now by the pressure
of local management, there is only faint hope for legislative action to
curtail-through redefinition of the business judgment rule or otherwise-the most obviously abusive self-serving practices of management.
In the same spirit, a substantial majority of the states in the 1970's enacted "first generation" blue-sky type controls that went beyond the disclosures mandated by federal law and tipped the scale in favor of
incumbent management. Many of these statutes extended to the out-ofstate component of tender offers and applied even to shares of foreign
corporations. When the Supreme Court recently held such extraterritoriality inconsistent with the commerce clause,10 some states abandoned
the blue-sky route and instituted or authorized internal affairs controls,
mostly for domestic corporations, aimed again at the hostile takeover
wherever it takes place.11 This movement is gaining strength and its constitutionality is being tested in the courts, with a final decision likely to be
12
rendered eventually by the Supreme Court.
Two major decisions of the Supreme Court have reduced the role of
federal securities law in this field. In a landmark 1977 ruling the Court
held that corporate breaches of fiduciary duty not involving deception do
7. For definitions and explications, see the materials cited supra note 5.
8. See, eg., A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932); THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY (E. Mason ed. 1959); Manning, Book Review, 67
YALE L.J. 1477, 1485-88 (1958).
9. See Shark Repellents Discourage Takeovers, Reduce Shareholders'Returns, 17 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 195 (Feb. 1, 1985); Combining Shark Repellents Causes Decline in Stock
Prices,SEC StaffSays, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP.(BNA) No. 44, at 1746 (Nov. 9, 1984).
10. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), discussed infra notes 168-209 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 392-442 and accompanying text.
12. Similar questions of constitutionality and choice of law would be raised if one or more
states were to take an opposite view and seek to restrain management interference with takeovers.
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not come within the purview of federal securities law. 13 This retrenchment was reinforced by a 1979 holding that the termination of derivative
actions even for federal securities claims is subject to state corporate

law.

14

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Advisory Commit-

tee on Tender Offers supported the preservation of a major role for state
corporate law in this area. While it opposed state antitakeover securities

regulation for nonlocal companies, it did not favor federal preemption of

the field.1 5 Instead, it left to state law and the business judgment rule

most antitakeover activity, including all defensive actions by management.16 Only when it came to structural "shark repellents," especially
certain supermajority shareholder approval requirements for changes in
control-whether imposed by statute or incorporated in the charter or
by-laws-did the committee propose federal intervention.1 7

Congress has begun taking notice of the committee's recommendations. A House committee approved a Tender Offer Reform Act that

incorporates a good number of the recommendations. 18 Under the Act,

shareholder consent would be required for some issuer tender offers, for
issuance of stock or options to "white knights," and for "greenmail" re-

purchases; golden parachutes would also be limited. But the SEC, 19 the
13. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
14. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). Recent decisions in the Second Circuit that refuse to
treat "lock-up" options granted to "white knights" as manipulative under the Williams Act-thus
leaving them to the state business judgment rules-are consistent with this trend. See eg., Data
Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datalab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4-7 (2d Cir. 1983) (fairness or unfairness of
"lock-up" options is irrelevant under Williams Act), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1320 (1984); Buffalo
Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 759-60 (2nd Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983); see
also Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84 COLuM. L. REv. 228,
252-62 (1984). But see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1981)
(management's grant to competing bidder of option to purchase large number of shares was manipulative and hence violated Williams Act).
15. Report, supra note 5, Recommendations 9(a), (b).
16. Id., Recommendation 33. It also relegated to state law such matters as fairness of price and
appraisal rights, approval of the offer by shareholders of the offeror, id, Recommendation 31, selftenders, id., Recommendation 39(a), counter tender offers when the main offer is for less than all the
stock, id., Recommendation 40, contracts for the sale of stock or assets to "white knights," id,
Recommendation 41, and sales of significant assets, id, Recommendation 42.
17. Id., Recommendations 34-35. If such practices were not to be prohibited, the Committee
recommended that supermajority provisions should require an equal supermajority vote, and that
these matters, as well as disenfranchising provisions, standstill agreements and "golden parachutes,"
should be reviewed at each annual meeting and voted upon by the shareholders on an "advisory"
basis. Id., Recommendations 37-3 8. Only defensive buyouts of its own stock at a premium by the
target would require shareholder approval. Id, Recommendation 43.
18. H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (also known as the Wirth Bill); see also 16 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1279 (Aug. 3, 1984).
19. See SEC Says it Opposes House Measure to RestrictAbusive Takeover Tactics 16 SEC. REG.
& L. REP.(BNA) No. 36, at 1473-74 (Sept. 14, 1984); SEC Should Have Power to BarExecutivesfor
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White House2 ° and others 21 expressed their opposition and the Act has
been provisionally withdrawn. 22 Other proposals have also surfaced: a
more limited Senate version of the House bill, 23 and a House bill for a
federal business judgment rule placing on a board of directors the burden
of justifying its antitakeover actions. 24 In the opposite direction, other
bills would require tender offerors seeking a certain percentage to extend
the offer to all the shares of the target. 25 The issue is likely to receive
major attention in Congress this year with final action likely to emerge in
1986.26

Securities Violations Treadway Says, id at 1492. On the undesirability of intrusion into a state law
domain, see the comments of Commissioner Marinaccio, ProtectBusiness Judgment Rule, Restrict
RICO, Marinaccio Urges 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 37, at 1517-18 (Sept. 21, 1984). It
appears that the SEC opposition reflects mostly a disagreement with some aspects of the proposals,
especially their breadth, rather than with the need to curb certain tactics. See Block & Hoff, Legislators Focusing on Takeover Regs, Legal Times, Nov. 19, 1984, at 16, col. 20.
20. See Reagan Administration Formally Opposes House Bill to Limit Tender Offer Abuses, 16
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 38, at 1546 (Sept. 28, 1984); see also White House Begs Off on
Tender Offer Package, Legal Times, Sept. 10, 1984, at 3, col. 1. The thrust of the White House
opposition is deregulation. White House Economists Say No Need for Additional Takeover Regulations, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 6, at 247 (Feb. 8, 1985).
21. They include a group of investment bankers, see Easton, Interest in Takeover Reform Picks
Up, Legal Times, Nov. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 17, the National Association of Manufacturers, see id., the
National American Securities Administrators Association, see NASAA Reiterates Positionon Tender
Offer Legislation to House Committee, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1292 (Aug. 3,
1984) [hereinafter cited as NASAA], and the American Bar Association, ABA Votes Against Federal
CorporateLegislation, Legal Times, Feb. 25, 1985, at 4, col. 2.
22. The reasons for opposition, in addition to disagreement on certain particulars, see supra
notes 17, & 19-20, are mainly intrusion into a field reserved for state law, patchwork reform and
interference with the freedom of the market.
23. This version would restrict only greenmail and "golden parachutes." See Block & Hoff,
supra note 19, at 16; Easton, supra note 21, at 18.
24. H.R. 5695, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (proposed again by Representative Wirth). See
Block & Hoff, supra note 19, at 21; Sommer, Hostile Tender Offer Is CriticalIssue for Congress,
Legal Times, Jan. 21, 1985, at 19, col. 2; Wirth Introduces Bills to Limit Tender Offer Abuses, 16
SEc. RG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 24, at 913 (May 5, 1984). Similar bills were introduced in the
Senate: S. 2779, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) by Senator Chafee and S. 2777, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) by Senator Heinz. The SEC opposes this kind of bill, but the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASSA) supports it. See Block & Hoff, supra note 19, at 21; NASAA,
supra note 21, at 1293. Representative Rodino introduced a bill, H.R. 5137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984), which would have placed the target's decision on the tender offer solely in the hands of its
"independent" directors. See Longstreth, Change-of-Control Issues Spark Lively Debate, Legal
Times, Oct. 8, 1984, at A-11, col. 2; Sommer, supra, at 26.
25. H.R. 5694, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (another Wirth bill). Noted antitakeover lawyer M.
Lipton has proposed the Shareholder Protection and Elimination of Takeover Abuses Act of 1985,
which is even stricter than the Wirth version. See Lawyer Proposes 5 Percent Rule to Curb Greenmail, Two-Tier Tender Offer Abuses, 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 47, at 1879 (Nov. 30,
1984). A similar proposal has been made by Senator Metzenbaum and the concept is supported by
the NASAA. NASAA, supra note 21, at 1293; see also Block & Hoff, supra note 19, at 21.
26. See SEC Enforcement, FinancialServices, Accounting Issues Dominate SRI Meeting, 17
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 210, 217 (Feb. 1, 1985).
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III.

THE DIFFERENCES IN STATE CORPORATE LAWS AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF CHOICE

If corporate laws were uniform, or at least basically similar, there
would be no practical need to address the choice-of-law question. But
this is not the case. Not only are there some notable exceptions to the
wide scope of the enabling legislation that prevails in most states, but
significant differences in the amount of flexibility granted corporations
also exist. The unification of the Law Merchant in the United States,
which culminated in the Uniform Commercial Code, has not carried
over into corporate law. The Model Business Corporation Act influenced a number of states, but major commercial centers such as New
York, California, and Ohio and incorporation states such as Delaware
still follow their own separate paths. The American Law Institute project that seeks to unify the basic standards of corporate governance and
structure27 is a controversial long-term venture with an uncertain future.28 In addition, the drive for federal minimum standards has
stalled. 29 Thus, if anything, the trend is away from, rather than toward,
30

uniformity.

The American Bar Association (ABA) and the Business Roundtable are reportedly engaged in a
comprehensive review of the entire takeover field. See Easton, supra note 21, at 17.
It goes without saying that the takeover stakes are quite high. During the first nine months of
1984, 1899 merger deals-hostile and friendly-were announced, totaling $103.2 billion, compared
with figures of 1812 deals and $53.3 billion during the same period in 1983. See id.
27. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Drafts Nos. 2 & 3 (1984)) [hereinafter cited as ALI DRAFT RESTATEMENT Nos. 2 & 3]. For an analysis and evaluation of these drafts, see Symposium on the ALl Corporate Governance Project, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169, 169-349 (1983); Weiss, Economic Analysis,

CorporateLaw and the ALl Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3-37 (1984).
28. See Scott, CorporationLaw and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project,
35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 946-48 (1983); ALl Project Will Increase Litigation, Hurt Board, Business
Roundtable Says, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1720-21 (Nov. 2, 1984); ABA Group
Seeks BroaderInsider TradingBill, Legal Times, May 7, 1983, at 13, col.1; CorporateGovernance, 50
U.S.L.W. 2705, 2706 (May 1, 1982).

29. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware'sCorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 914-15 (1982); Williams Says Bill on Corporate Governance Standards Would be Counterproductive,Stifles BoardReforms, 12 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 580, at Al (Nov. 26, 1980).
30. According to President Perkins of the American Law Institute:
There can be no doubt that there has been in the last decade an extraordinary ferment of
activity in the field of corporate governance ....
Accompanying the ferment, there has
been a degree of uncertainty and inconsistency in the law which cries out for dispassionate
analysis and the development of guiding principles.
Letter from Roswell B. Perkins to Members of The American Law Institute (January 1982), quoted
in Wechsler, Forewordto PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (rent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as ALI DRAFT RESTATEMENT No. 1].

See also Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: MBCA, British Company Law Reform
and ALI's Principlesof Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 53-72 (1983).
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The greater the diversity of corporate law, the more important be-

comes the choice of the law to apply, especially in the context of the
novel and difficult questions raised by the many new devices used in takeover battles. Differences in substantive law have also affected other controversial areas of corporate structure and governance not directly
involving control. These include the standards by which waste and con-

fficts of interest are determined, management indemnification and insurance, the protection of minority shareholders in dissolution or against

oppression, freeze-out, or sale of control at a premium, abuse of inside
information in securities trading, and, last but not least, the demand requirement and the scope of the business judgment rule, especially in de-

rivative suits implicating management. That differences in the rules may
well be outcome- determinative is illustrated by three of the most controversial corporate confrontations of the recent past.

To prevent T. Boone Pickens, Jr., from gaining control, the management of Gulf Oil fought and won a proxy fight to move the company's

situs of incorporation from Pennsylvania to Delaware. The principal
reason for this reincorporation was to dispense with cumulative voting,
increase the percentages necessary to call special meetings of shareholders, and install a variety of "shark repellents" by charter and by-law
1
amendments. 3
For a summary of the significant differences between Delaware and California law, see Comment,
Choice of CorporateDomicile" Californiaor Delaware, 13 U.S.F.L. Rv. 103, 105-08 (1978). It must
also be noted that foreign corporate law not only is substantially different from United States law but
is diverse as well. For a description and evaluation of the differences between, for example, American and continental law, see Tunc, A French LawyerLooks at American CorporationLaw and Securities Regulation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 757-74 (1982). Even within the European Economic
Community (EEC), the momentum toward limited harmonization of certain features of internal
corporate rules is slowing down. See Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of
the European Community, 14 LAW & POL. INT'L. Bus. 293, 300-21 (1982); Silkenat, Efforts Toward
HarmonizationofBusiness Laws Within the EEC 12 INT'L. LAW. 835, 837-41 (1978). The attempt
to adopt some kind of a "supranational" statute for a Societas Europa has not gotten anywhere as of
yet. See A. CONARD, CoRPoRAIoN LAW IN PERSPEC'tVE 88-90 (1976); Schneebaum, supra at
329-31.
31. See Future of Gulf Oil Hinges on Proxy Fight Led by Mesa Chairman, Wall St. J., Nov. 2,
1983, at 1, col. 6; Gulf OilBoard Seeks Changes in Voting, Charterto Block Possible Takeover Moves,
Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1983, at 9, col. 2. In February 1984, Pickens announced a takeover plan for
Gulf. Gulf's new defensive strategies included a counter tender offer and "poisoning" the well
through senior bank credit. See Gulf Oil Unveils a Two-Pronged Defense to Thwart Pickens Group
Takeover Plan, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1984, at 3, col. 1. Eventually, Gulf was "saved" by a "white
knight" merger with Chevron.
Similarly, Kaiser Cement is reported to have planned to move its incorporation from California
to Delaware to take advantage of the latter's liberality with respect to antitakeover charter provisions and "golden parachute" contracts for management. See Kaiser Cement Signs Pay Accords,
Seeks Incorporation Change to Foil a Takeover, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 10, col. 2. Baker
International changed its incorporation from California to Delaware principally to avoid cumulative
voting and to adopt voting provisions intended to discourage a takeover. See 60 CORP. REP. BULL.
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When two big defense contractors, Bendix and Martin Marietta,
aided eventually by corporate giants Allied and United Technologies,
tried to gobble each other up through reciprocal tender offers in what has
been called a "Pac Man" takeover, 32 it all came down to a question of
timing. The spoils were to go to the company first able to control the
board of its target. Under the tender offers, Bendix acquired seventy percent of Martin Marietta's stock six days before Martin Marietta could
buy any Bendix stock.3 3 But how soon could this advantage be translated into board control? Martin Marietta had been incorporated in
Maryland where corporate directors cannot be removed by the shareholders without a meeting on ten days notice. 34 Bendix, however, was a
Delaware corporation, and a majority shareholder could remove the
board immediately and without a meeting. 35 Thus, Martin Marietta's
six-day lag would become a four-day edge upon acquisition of a majority
of the stock of Bendix.
But could Martin Marietta exercise its voting power in Bendix,
which had already acquired seventy percent of the Martin Marietta
shares? Under both Maryland and Delaware law, corporate shares
owned by a majority subsidiary cannot be voted. 36 Presumably the Dela(PH) No. 7, at 8 (Feb. 1, 1983). Friggie International has reportedly been seeking to reincorporate
in Delaware from Ohio and to adopt a charter provision to the effect that a shareholder of more than
10% shall have only 1/100th of a vote for each share held in excess of 10%. See Friggie AntiTakeover Plan May Threaten Listing on Big Board,Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1983, at 24, cols. 5-6. MCI
has already adopted such a provision, relying on the unique Delaware precedent of Providence &
Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 122-24 (Del. 1977) (corporate charter provision for voting
power based upon size of individual shareholder's holding is not invalid). See MCI Limits Shareholder Powers in the British Fashion, Legal Times, Feb. 18, 1983, at 10, col. 1.
On "migratory mergers" into Delaware corporations to obstruct cash-outs under Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977) and Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969
(Del. 1977), and before Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), see Sanders v. Thrall
Car Mfg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
32. This takeover battle is probably the most celebrated and controversial ever. Books have
been written recounting the blows step by step, in docudrama style. See, eg., H. LAMPERT, TILL
DEATH Do Us PART (1983); A. SLOAN, THREE PLUS ONE EQUALS BILLIONS: THE BENDIX-MARTIN MARIETrA WAR (1983). For a drier, chronological summary of the saga, see 1 PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 739-48 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE]; see also Herzel & Schmidt, SEC is Probing
DoublePac-Man Takeover Defense, Legal Times, Apr. 18, 1983 at 1, col. 2; Masters, Lawyers Debate
Best and Worst of Bendix Takeover Maneuvers, Legal Times, Oct. 11, 1982 at 2, col. 1. Schmidt,
SEC is ProbingDouble Pac-Man Takeover Defense, Legal Times, Apr. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
33. 1 PRACTICING LAW INsTrrTUTE, supra note 32, at 744-46.
34. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 2-406(a), 2-504(a), 2-505 (1975 & Supp. 1984).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 228(a), 141(k) (1983).
36. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-509(b)(2) (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(c)
(1983). It would appear that a subsidiary may vote the shares that it owns in its parent only if this is

permissible under the law governing the internal affairs of both corporations. Cf Norlin Hostile
Holders Say They RaisedStake in Company to 4Z6%, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1984, at 43, col. 3 (voting
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ware rule would extend to shareholder action to remove directors without a meeting. Nevertheless, does the disenfranchising rule apply to this

strange mutual parent-subsidiary situation? The Delaware Chancery
Court so held and enjoined Martin Marietta from exercising its voting
rights in Bendix. 37 Of course, had Martin Marietta been successful in

buying enough Bendix stock to exceed fifty percent, both corporations
would have been locked in a voting stalemate, with the outcome of the
struggle to be decided by the minority shareholders of each in a dual
proxy contest. The complex litigation that arose in the federal and state

courts in New York, Maryland, Delaware and Michigan involved not
only corporate but also antitrust and securities law questions. But the
differences in the state laws on removal of directors and voting-as well
measures-could have proven cruas on the validity of certain defensive
38

cial given the circumstances.

of "poison pill" preferred shares issued to target's Panamanian subsidiary is authorized under Pana-

manian law).
37. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., No. 6942 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1982) (available on
LEXIS, States library, Del file), afid, No. 298 (Del. Sept. 21, 1982).
38. The conflict also involved a host of other significant internal corporate affairs issues relating
to the various defensive measures taken against the takeovers:
(a) As a Martin Marietta shareholder, Bendix went to federal court to ask that a special meeting
be held on 10-day notice for the purpose of removing the directors. Id. But the same directors
rushed to amend the bylaws to require a 30-day notice. Was the amendment valid?
(b) While the hostile tender offers were pending, Bendix called a meeting of its own shareholders to amend its certificates to include two "shark repellent" provisions: (1) supermajority requirements for any merger with a shareholder corporation owning 20% or more, unless the directors
approved it or the second-step price was equal to the tender offer, and (2) elimination of direct
shareholder action without a meeting in director removals and mergers. Id. Were these hurried
defensive amendments invalid under the rationale of Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437
(Del. 1971) (management's use of Delaware law to perpetuate itself in office and to obstruct legitimate efforts of stockholders to undertake a proxy contest against management constituted inequitable conduct)? Were they technically void because the exact language of the amendments was not
included in the notice of meeting? The Delaware Court of Chancery was not persuaded that a strong
case of invalidity had been made out, and denied a preliminary injunction against holding the meeting to vote on the amendments, Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., No. 6942 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21,
1982) (available on LEXIS, States library, Del. file) afd, No. 298 (Del. Sept. 21, 1982).
(c) Was the adjournment of the shareholders' meeting of Bendix valid when the management
decided not to put the amendments to a vote, but a group of shareholders reconvened and voted
them down? See MariettaBuys Big Hunk of Bendi, Honolulu Advertiser, Sept. 23, 1982, at B-3,
cols. 5-6.
(d) By making a counter tender offer for Bendix stock, did the directors of Martin Marietta
breach their fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its majority shareholder? Was this defensive
counter tender offer protected by the business judgment rule or was it to be scrutinized for fairness
under a conflict-of-interest analysis? See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., No. Y-82-2560 (D.
Md. Sept. 22, 1982) (available on LEXIS, States library, Md file).
(e) Did Bendix violate the inspection rights of its shareholders when it initially refused to give a
copy of its shareholder list to Martin Marietta, allowing instead only photographic reproduction of a
ledger 10,000 pages long and containing only three names to a page? See Dirty Tricks Abound in
Takeover Business as Well as in Politics,Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
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Finally, there were celebrated derivative suits in New York, Delaware and Texas by different shareholders against the management of the
Zapata Corporation, charging breaches of fiduciary duty and nondisclosures concerning the acceleration of certain stock options. 39 The crucial
issue in these cases turned out to be whether the board could terminate
the suits. 4 Should a decision to terminate reached by "disinterested"
(f) Did the directors of Bendix breach their fiduciary duty to the corporation by entering into a
defensive agreement with Allied for the sale to Allied of Bendix's aerospace electronics group-its
"crown jewel"-in the event that Allied's bid for Bendix stock was topped by another company?
Was this action protected by the business judgment rule or was it to be subjected to a conflict-ofinterest scrutiny? See Martin MariettaPurchased42.4% ofBendix Common Stock for 754.5 Million,
or $75 a Share, Despite Attempt by Bendix to Thwart Move with $2.3 Million Plan to Merge into
Allied Corp.;MergerAgreement with Allied TriggeredResignation ofFourBendix Directors,Wall St.
J., Sept. 23, 1982, at 1, cols. 1-3.
(g) Did the directors of Martin Marietta breach their fiduciary duty to their minority shareholders by turning down a new offer by Bendix to buy the remaining 30% stock at a premium over the
original tender offer price?
The supervening agreement whereby Allied took over Bendix and made peace with Martin
Marietta mooted these issues. But there were other matters as well where the choice of applicable
law might have proven crucial. For example, that portion of the agreement where Allied as 39%
shareholder of Martin Marietta promised not to acquire more stock or attempt a takeover, and gave
the company not only a right of first refusal but also an option to purchase at fixed prices over a ten
year period all the stock owned by Allied, was questionable as leading to an unlawful self-perpetuation of Martin Marietta's management. Other terms of the settlement-the price paid by Allied for
Bendix stock and the value of exchange for Martin Marietta stock-were vulnerable to waste and
conflict-of-interest charges. Bendix shareholders later unsuccessfully sought to include a proposal in
the Bendix-Allied merger proxy statement requiring shareholder approval for future tender offers by
management. See Proxy ProposalNot ProperSubjectfor Action at Bendix Special Meeting, 15 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 24 (Jan. 7, 1983).
The conflict between Coastal Corporation and Houston Natural Gas Corporation, including not
only a "Pac Man" defense but also a competing self-tender offer, promised to match or surpass the
Bendix-Martin Marietta saga before it was abruptly settled. See Houston NaturalGas Sues Coastal,
Seeking to Vold Series of Antitakeover Steps, Wall. St. J., Feb. 2, 1984, at 14, cols. 3-4; Houston
NaturalGas Moves to Block Offer by CoastalCorp. to Buy Own Shares, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 3,
col. 2; Houston Natural'sLenders Could Gain Control Under Plan, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 7, 1984, at 16,
col. 6; Coastal's Wyatt Says He'llSell to Anyone But Wants Much More Than $50 a Share, Wall St.
J., Feb. 8, 1984, at 7, cols. 1-2.
For other recent battles, see, e.g., Shell Oil HoldersSue to Block Buyout Bid by Royal Dutch!
Shell, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1984, at 14, col. 3; Murdoch Bid to Block Chris-CraftSwap With Warneris
Denied by Delaware Court, wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
The two major takeover battles in the second half of 1984, Limited and Carter Hawley, and
Pickens and Phillips Petroleum, involved a host of similar issues.
39. See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436,465 (5th Cir. 1983); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.
Supp. 274, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd per curiom, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); Maldonado v.
Flynn, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,553 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1983); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F.
Supp. 348, 349 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 448 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
affld in part, rev'd in part, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,
780-81 (Del. 1981).
40. [A]fter a century of development in the law of derivative action in this country, many
of the critical issues posed by suits against directors remained unresolved. Despite the
current judicial trend to conclude that disinterested directors do have the power to dismiss
such suits, in fact even that basic issue has been squarely addressed by the highest courts in

14
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directors be scrutinized under conflict-of-interest criteria or does it enjoy
the protection of the business judgment rule? How is "disinterest" to be
assessed? Who has the burden of proof? More particularly, can the decision be insulated from a conflict-of-interest challenge through the delegation to an "independent" litigation commitee? To what extent, if any, is
the decision of such a committee reviewable on the merits by the court?
Under the authority of Santa Fe Industries v. Green4 and Burks v.

Lasker,42 courts have applied state corporate law to such termination
power even where a federal securities claim is asserted. The only exception is where federal interest is deemed to be frustrated by the application
of a lax state standard.4 3 State law on termination power varies greatly, 44
only two states, New York and Delaware. Further, as we have seen, even where the power

to terminate is recognized, there is no consensus as to who is sufficiently disinterested to be
entitled to make such a determination for the corporation, or as to the nature and scope of
the judicial review of such determinations. Indeed, Auerbach and Zapata, far from resolving the latter crucial issue, have highlighted the vast differences of opinion which exist
within the judiciary.
Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and ShareholderDerivativeActions: Viva Zapata?, 37
Bus. LAW. 27, 63-64 (1981). See also Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interests Statutes and the Need for a
Demand on Directorsin DerivativeSuits, 68 CALiF. L. REv. 1122, 1123 (1980) (discussing the importance of demand requirement); Coffee & Schwartz, The Survivalof the DerivativeSuit: An Evaluation
and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. Rv. 261, 262 (1981) (demand requirement
viewed as major threat to derivative suits).
41. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
42. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
43. Such a rare situation was Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) ("federal
policy prevents the summary dismissal of those [section 14(a)] claims pursuant to the business judgment of those defendant directors"). In another section 14(a) case, the court reached a different
conclusion because there was "no causal link between the challenged nondisclosures. . . and [the]
election." In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1077 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 187 (1984).
44. New York leads the way in maximizing termination power. See Stein v. Bailey, 531 F.
Supp. 684, 693-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d 98, 106, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87
(1978), modified, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633-34, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). Cases
demonstrating that other states have been strengthening termination power include Gaines v.
Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 770-79 (9th Cir. 1981) (California law); Greenspun v. Del. E. Webb Corp.,
634 F.2d 1204, 1208-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (Arizona law); Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625
F.2d 49, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1980) (Texas law), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Abbey v. Control
Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 729-30 (8th Cir. 1979) (Delaware law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017
(1980); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %98,836 (E.D. Va. Sept. 7,
1982); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 687-97 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Siegal v. Merrick, 84
F.R.D. 106, 108-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Rosengarten v. ITT, 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gall v.
Exxon, 418 F. Supp. 508, 517-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Klotz v. Consolidated Edison, 386 F. Supp. 577,
581-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
While Delaware started at the opposite end of the spectrum, see, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 413
A.2d 1251, 1252 (Del. Ch. 1980) (directors may not terminate derivative suit once demand excused),
rev'd, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (court should exercise independent business judgment), it
has finally espoused a moderate position which allows for court review of the merits of the termination decision, but only when the board which appointed the committee is clearly implicated. See
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981) (where demand on the board is
excused due to futility, terminations will be upheld only if (a) the corporation shows that the deci-
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and these diverse responses underscore the importance of choosing which

law to apply.
IV.

THE CONTINUING PREVALENCE OF THE LAW OF THE STATE OF
INCORPORATION FOR DETERMINING INTERNAL
CORPORATE AFFAIRS: THE MINIMAL IMPACT OF
THE CONFLICTS REVOLUTION

A.

JudicialPractice.
1. The TraditionalRule. An established rule of traditional conflicts-developed by the courts in the absence of legislative intervention-is that the internal corporate relationship is governed by the law of
the state of incorporation.4 5 While the scope of "internal affairs" has not
been defined with mathematical precision, the subject is not controversial. There is little doubt that internal affairs include the corporate organizational structure and the relationships between shareholders and
managers and among shareholders inter se. There is a general consensus
46
on most issues that come within the term.
sion makers were independent and acted in good faith after reasonable investigation, and (b) the
court, applying its own independent business judgment, is satisfied that a contrary result is not required by the best interests of the corporation or as a matter of law or public policy). The applicability of this intermediate standard has been adversely affected by recent ambiguous decisions in
Delaware on the question of when demand is excused. See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 622 (Del.
1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
The Zapata position received a major boost by the Second Circuit's conclusion that, in the
absence of any meaningful precedent, Connecticut is likely to follow it because it is more consistent
with the concept of fiduciary responsibility. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888-93 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
Section 7.03(c) of the ALl DRAFT RESTATEMENT No. 1, supra note 30, adopts a refined ver-

sion of the Maldonado standard. Cf. Hasan v. Cleve-Trust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.
1984); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1329 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(defendants must show reasonable basis for special litigation committee's decision to terminate). On
the desirability of an intermediate standard, see Block & Prussin, supra note 40, at 72. The Iowa
Supreme Court recently adopted a stricter approach by holding that where a majority of the directors are defendants, the board has no authority to delegate the termination decision to a committee;
it may, however, petition the court for the appointment of a special panel. See Miller v. The Register
& Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 716-18 (Iowa 1983).
45. See RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 152-161, 163, 182-185, 187 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as FiRST RESTATEMENT]; 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 893-98 (1935); P.
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 255 (3d ed. 1977); see also Hadari, The Choice of National

Law Applicable to the MultinationalEnterpriseand the Nationalityof Such Enterprises, 1974 Duke
L.J. 1, 20.
46. The Restatement (Second) ofthe Conflict ofLaws (1971) contains perhaps the most comprehensive listing of "internal affairs" matters. The listing includes, in particular: (1) "the original
incorporation, the election or appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-laws, the
issuance of corporate shares, preemptive rights, the holding of directors' and shareholders' meetings,
methods of voting including any requirement for cumulative voting, shareholders' rights to examine
corporate records, charter and by-law amendments, mergers, consolidations and reorganizations and
the reclassification of shares," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 com-
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The last comprehensive review of the status of the lex incorporationis in the courts was done in 1958 by Professors Reese and Kaufman
who, in a lengthy article, documented its general prevalence and ex-

plored its rationale. 47 The article was prompted by the famous case of
Western Air Lines v. Sobieski,48 where the California courts eventually

upheld an order of the Commissioner of Corporations which in effect
required a Delaware corporation having major California contacts to
adopt cumulative voting as mandated by California law. Although there
were ambiguities in the case and the result reached could have been justified on the alternate ground that Western Air Lines was a pseudo-foreign

corporation, Reese and Kaufman not only disagreed with the decision on
conflicts grounds but also raised doubts about whether it was consistent
49
with the full faith and credit clause.

2. The Implications of the Conflicts Revolution. Then came the
"conflicts revolution," which profoundly affected conflicts theory and
practice in a majority of the states,50 and whose premises and methods
have major implications for choice of law in all fields, including corpora-

tions. The common denominator of the new conflicts theory is the abandonment of choice-of-law rules in favor of methodologies that examine
all the circumstances of each case in light of all potentially relevant considerations. In the new conflicts calculus, the interests and policies of the

forum state, especially the protection of forum domiciliaries, weigh heavily in favor of applying its law-the "lex fori." Fixed, single-factor, content-blind, forum-neutral rules are supposed to be particularly obnoxious
because they defer automatically and totally to one legal system in disrement a (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; (2) "the declaration and payment of
dividends and other distributions. . . and the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of its own stock," id., at comment e; (3) "who are shareholders," id., § 303; (4) the
"right of a shareholder to participate in the administration of the affairs of the corporation, in the
division of profits and in the distribution of assets on dissolution and his rights on the issuance of
new shares," id., § 304; (5) "whether shares in a voting trust may be voted by the trustees," Id.,
§ 305; (6) "[t]he obligations owed by a majority shareholder to the corporation and to the minority
shareholders," id., § 306; (7) "the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability to the corporation
. . . and to its creditors for corporate debts," id., § 307; (8) and "the existence and extent of a
director's or officer's liability to the corporation, its creditors and shareholders," Id., § 309. For
other enumerations, see Hadari, supra note 45, at 15-17; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1124.
47. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1124-28.
48. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
49. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1141, 1144.
50. Professor Sedler recently counted 31 states in the new conflicts camp. See Sedler, Interest
Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics', 34 MERCER
L. REv. 593, 593 n.4 (1983). Professor Kay's count is 29. See Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of
Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521, 591-92 (1983) (appendix).
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gard of the interests and policies of the other states of contact.5 ' The lex
incorporationis is precisely such a rule.
The Western Air Lines case was to be the harbinger of a new confficts approach in corporate law that would limit or perhaps discard the
lex incorporationis. The wisdom of Professor Latty's writings on
"pseudo-foreign" corporations 52 was rediscovered and the primacy of local corporate policy over the lex incorporationis was vigorously stressed
by such authors as Kaplan 53 and Baraf.54 Bellwether states such as California and New York enacted or redefined significant deviations from
it. 5s The Restatement (Second) extends an open invitation to depart from
the lex incorporationis principle on issues with respect to which another
state has a "more significant relationship" to the corporation, the transaction, the shareholders, or the parties. 56 Because corporate shareholders, assets, business, and management are often located in, and
transactions often take place in, states other than that of incorporation,
the exaltation of local corporate policy and local interests could have
severely undermined the traditional system based on the lex
incorporationis.
3. The Actual Impact of the Conflicts Revolution Upon Choice of
Law for Internal CorporateAffairs. It should be noted at the outset that
a substantial percentage of all corporate law cases are potentially confficts cases in the sense that the corporation, parties, or transactions have
contacts with more than one state. Yet a review of cases decided over the
last twenty-five years reveals that, despite the conflicts revolution, in all
but a handful of these the law of the state of incorporation was applied
51. For a fuller exploration of the implications of the new conflicts for corporate choice of law,

see infra notes 221-31 and accompanying text. The literature on the new conflicts methodologies is
voluminous. For a summary review of their fundamentals and common elements, see 1 E. SCOLES &
P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-46 (1983); Leflar, Choice ofLaw: A Well-Watered Plateau,LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1977, 1, at 10-26; Resolved that InterestAnalysis is a Proper (Just?Rational?), Adequate (Sufficient?) and Practical(Efficient?)Method (Perhapsthe Best? Perhaps Constitutionally Required?) to Choose the Applicable Law, 46 Ohio St. L. J. - (forthcoming 1985).
52. See, eg., Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
53. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 476-81. More recently, Professor Sargent appears receptive to
a more open-ended approach to corporate choice of law, at least in the context of the antitakeover
statutes. See Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce
Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REv. 3, 16-22 (1985).

54. See Baraf, The Foreign Corporation: A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33 BROOKLYN
L. Rtv. 219, 251-52 (1967).

55. See infra notes 275-79, 325-29 and accompanying text.
56. RESTATEMENT

SECOND,

supranote 46, §§ 302-306, 309 (allowing state other than the state

of incorporation to apply its laws if it "has the more significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties").
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without any discussion. What Professor Kaplan observed fifteen years
ago is, if anything, even more true today:
The umbilical tie of the foreign corporation to the state of its charter is
usually still religiously regarded as conclusive in determining the law
to be applied in intracorporate disputes. The fundamental reexamination of the nature of conflict of laws over the past few years has virtually left foreign corporation matters remaining as a pocket of the past
in a subject area which57has otherwise been characterized by free inquiry, change and flux.
Let us briefly illustrate the continuing supremacy of the lex incorporationis in the courts by visiting some of the most controversial areas of
recent times. The New York and California experiences, where there is
substantial statutory regulation of the internal affairs of certain foreign
corporations, will be addressed separately later on.
a. Takeover battles. It is quite remarkable that in the legendary
Bendix/Martin Marietta/United Technologies/Allied conflict, 5s it was
taken for granted that the various internal affairs issues involved were
subject to Delaware and Maryland law, respectively, simply because Bendix and Martin Marietta had incorporated there. There was no inquiry
whatsoever into whether these corporations had any real connections to
their states of incorporation or to other states. In particular, no attention
was paid to the well-known facts that the business of both corporations
was national in scope and that while Martin Marietta had some contacts
with Maryland, Bendix had no significant relationship with Delaware. Its
principal place of business and headquarters were in fact located in
59
Michigan.
In the famous case of Panterv. MarshallField Co., 60 which takes a
most permissive view of the availability of the "business judgment" rule
to legitimize all sorts of aggressive defensive tactics in tender offers, the
court applied the law of Delaware as a matter of course even though the
company's headquarters were located in Illinois and it did business in
Washington, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, but not in Delaware. 6 1 In another
takeover shoot-out, Lewis v. Knutson, 62 the court again applied Dela57. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 464.
58. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.

59. It was by virtue of this Michigan connection that Bendix was able to obtain a cease-anddesist order from the Michigan Department of Commerce and, later, a court order against the Martin Marietta and United Technologies tender offers. The Michigan statute was eventually declared
to be unconstitutional. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565-68 (6th Cir.
1982).
60. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
61. Id. at 277-78, 293.
62. 669 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983) (shareholder charged management and certain controlling
shareholders with waste in taking certain defensive and later collaborationist actions-proxy fight,
then purchase of stock-and in seeking unlawfully to freeze him out by a reverse stock split).
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ware law merely because of the company's incorporation there, despite
the location of its principal place of business in Texas.6 3 In a recent case

involving notorious "raider" Carl C. Icahn's potential looting of Dan
River, Inc.-a Virginia corporation engaged in national business and
listed on the New York Stock Exchange-the court assessed the justifica-

tion of defensive actions under the corporate law of Virginia without any
conflicts discussion."

In addition, several corporate defensive "migra-

tions" to Delaware by Gulf and other companies, motivated by law shop65
ping in reliance on the lex incorporationis, have recently occurred.

Not a single takeover case has been identified where, in the absence
of a relevant statute, the application of a corporate law other than that of
the state of incorporation was ever seriously considered. Furthermore,
the lex incorporationis principle is generally treated as axiomatic. In one
case concerning the constitutionality of the Delaware tender offer statute,

some explanation was attempted by way of dicta.66 The court referred to
Delaware's primary interest in attracting investors to its corporations

and in protecting their expectations that Delaware law would apply. The
court also pointed to the tri-contractual choice of Delaware law by the
parties-corporation/ state, corporation/shareholders, and shareholders
inter se-and stressed the importance of giving effect to the contract not
67
only within but also outside of the Delaware boundaries.

b. Termination of derivative suits. In another controversial and
nuanced area of internal affairs, the termination of derivative suits by

directors, the applicable rules have again been chosen, without exception,
from the law of the state of incorporation.6 8 Again, the courts have usu63. Id. at 235. The only support cited was the old case of Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288
U.S. 123, 130 (1933) (involving assessments on stock; stockholders implicitly agreed that internal
affairs of company were to be governed by laws of state of incorporation).
64. See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 280-83, 291-92 (4th Cir. 1983). Other takeover
cases applying the lex incorporationis without elaboration include Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln
Savings & Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 377 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying rule to antitakeover bylaw changes);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 374-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying rule to issuance of
shares to friendly suitor, sale of controlling shares at premium, and corporate opportunity); CrouseHinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 390, 402 n.15, 406-10 (S.D.N.Y.) (applying rule to
issuance of stock, standing to sue, and business purpose of defensive merger), affid, 634 F.2d 690 (2d
Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3rd Cir. 1980) (applying rule to breach of
fiduciary duty of directors and majority shareholders).
65. See supra note 31.
66. See Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338, 344 (Del. Ch. 1980).
67. Id. at 344.
68. See infra notes 69-75. This is confirmed in the ALI DRAFr RESTATEMENT No. 1, supra
note 30, § 7.03 comment a: "The great majority of the recent decisions have been federal court
decisions interpreting the substantive corporatelaw of the state ofincorporation." (Emphasis added).
The lav of incorporation was chosen as such, without regard to whether it coincided with the law of
the forum. But see Carter, The Statutory Basisfor Dismissal of Stockholder Derivative Actions by
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ally supplied no explanation for this choice. 69 In some cases, the court

mentioned that the parties conceded the applicability of the lex incorporationis or did not suggest any other law.70 In others 71 the court
has simply cited Cort v. Ash, 72 Santa Fe Industries v. Green,7 3 or Burks v.
Lasker74 for the proposition that it is the law of the state of incorporation
that determines whether directors have the power to dismiss a pending

derivative suit by invoking the business judgment rule. It is true that in
each of these three cases the law that was chosen was that of the state of
incorporation; in Cort there was some reference to the corporation being
a "creature" of state law.7 5 The question of choice, however, was neither
at issue nor addressed by the Supreme Court in any way.
The only case involving some discussion of choice of law is Hasan v.
CleveTrust Realty Investors.76 This is a special case because the plaintiff

forced the new conflicts question: He argued that a jurisdiction like Ohio
Directors,9 J. CORP. L. 199, 213-14 (1984) (arguing, rather unpersuasively, for the application of the
lex fori, by analogizing from the "security-for-expenses" cases-the issues are significantly different).
69. See, e.g., In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1080 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 187 (1984); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1026 (2d Cir. 1982) (Delaware
law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729, 731 (2d Cir. 1982) (Delaware law); Gaines v. Haughton,
645 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1981) (California law); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir.
1979) (California law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275,
1281-82 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Delaware law); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(Delaware law); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,836, at
94,297 (E.D. Va. 1982) (Virginia law); Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D. 656, 662 (D. Mass. 1981)
(Maryland law), affld, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1138 (1982); Watts v. Des
Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (Iowa law); Joy v. North, 519
F. Supp. 1312, 1316 (D. Conn. 1981) (Connecticut law), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 880 (2d
Cir. 1982); Crane v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 304-05 (D. Del. 1981) (Delaware law); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 278 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Delaware law); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418
F. Supp. 508, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (New Jersey law); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 700 n.I
(D. Del. 1966) (Virginia law); Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So.2d 629, 631-32 (Ala. 1981)
(Alabama law); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (Delaware law);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 999-1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 931 (1979)
(New York law); Swenson v. Thibault, 39 N.C. App. 77, 98-102, 250 S.E.2d 279, 293-95 (1978)
(North Carolina law), appealdismissed, 296 N.C. 740, 254 S.E.2d 181 (1979).
70. See Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (Texas law),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728-29 (8th Cir,
1979) (Delaware law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d
Cir. 1978) (New York law), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp.
120, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Delaware law), aftd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Michigan law).
71. See, eg., Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd on othergrounds,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
72. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
73. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
74. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
75. 422 U.S. at 84.
76. 548 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ohio 1982), vacated on other grounds, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.
1984).
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penses of opposing the action, 6 pro-rata recovery directly to the shareholders,8 7 security for expenses8 8 and, last but not least, demand
requirements on directors89 and shareholders. 90
The manner in which the demand-on-directors and demand-onshareholders requirements of Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied by the federal courts-in both federal question and

diversity cases where they differ from those of the state law applicable to
the corporation-is too tangential and complex an issue to be considered
here. While these requirements could also serve a procedural purposethat is, closing the federal courts to certain types of derivative claimsthe history and language of the Rule and the internal-affairs nature of
these requirements strongly support the application of state law. 91
incorporation state governs standing to sue); Lowell & Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shops, Inc., 235
F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (law of Tennessee governs standing of pledgee to sue); see also 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1826 (1972) ("Under prevailing conflicts principles, state law typically will direct that a plaintiffs status be tested by the law of the
corporation's state of incorporation." (citation omitted)).
85. See Saylor v. Bastedo, 82 F.R.D. 440, 442 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (law of incorporation state
governs proof of ownership of stock), aff'd in part, 623 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 218 F. Supp. 164, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (New York conflicts
rule-law of incorporation state).
87. For discussion and authorities, see Grenier, ProrataRecovery by Shareholderson Corporate
Causes of Action as a Means of Achieving CorporateJustice, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 194-97
(1962).
88. See Fielding v. Allen, 181 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950). See
also 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 84, at § 1826. Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1949) (fact that corporation incorporated in Delaware is subject to
shareholder's derivative action in New Jersey does not make applicable New Jersey statute providing
plaintiff with security for expenses); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co. 292 F.2d 824, 831 (3rd Cir. 1961)
(reference to federal law to determine need for security for expenses).
89. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 78487 (3d Cir.) (Pennsylvania law applied to Pennsylvania corporations), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Cramer v. GTE, 582 F.2d 259, 275-76 (3d
Cir. 1978) (both counsel concede applicability of law of state of incorporation), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1129 (1979); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 855 (7th Cir. 1957) (Illinois law of demand applied to
Illinois corporation).
90. See Jacobs v. Adams, 601 F.2d 176, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying Florida law as the law
of state of incorporation); Rosengarten v. Buckley, 565 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1983) (applying Maryland law as law of state of incorporation); Wolgin v. Simon, 552 F. Supp. 308, 310 (E.D. Mo. 1982)
(applying Missouri law as law of state of incorporation), afid, 722 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983); Leffv.
CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857, 869 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (applying Ohio law as law of state of incorporation); Jones v. Equitable Life Ass'n, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (applying Massachusetts law
as law of state of incorporation).
91. In his concurrence in Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831, 842 (1984), Justice
Stevens read the demand-on-directors language of Rule 23.1 to require merely a factual statement by
plaintiff whether he had made a demand or why he had failed to do so. The issue itself was subject
to state law: "It cannot be doubted that [the demand-on-directors] requirement, designed to improve corporate governance, is of substantive law." Id. at 843 n.2. The majority appeared to agree,
but felt that it was not necessary to decide the issue in view of its holding that the action, under The
Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1413, 1428 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1982)) was not "derivative." Id. at 837 n.8. See also Weiss v. Temporary
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which has adopted the modern "balancing of interests" conflicts methodology must necessarily have extended it to internal corporate affairs and
must, therefore, have abandoned the rigid lex incorporationis. 77 The

plaintiff's position was that the law of Ohio should govern because CleveTrust, while organized as a business trust under the law of Massachu-

setts, had its principal, if not exclusive, place of business in Ohio and had
no apparent connection to Massachusetts. The court, however, gave
short shrift to this argument. It shrugged off the importance of the con-

flicts revolution, pointing out that the new conflicts cases dealt with the
lex loci delicti-the place of the wrong-and "are simply not applicable
to the present case." 78 The court reiterated the axiom that choice of law
dictates that "[q]uestions of corporate governance are to be decided
'79
under the law of the state of incorporation.

c. Other aspects of derivative suits. The application of the lex incorporationis is also generally consistent with the practice of courts in
deciding substantive aspects of derivative actions. The landmark case is

Hausman v. Buckley, 80 a decision that in recent years has been cited in
all contexts, perhaps more often than any other, in support of the lex
incorporationis. This and subsequent New York cases will be discussed
at length in the context of the special New York regime. 8 1
Outside New York, the courts continue routinely to choose the law
of incorporation-whenever state law is applicable-to resolve almost
every major derivative suit issue, such as: the availability of the derivative action,8 2 whether the action is direct or derivative,8 3 standing to
sue, 84 proof of stock ownership,8 5 charging to the corporation the ex77. Id. at 1149. The substantive issues in the case concerned the termination, by a disinterested
committee, of a derivative suit charging waste in the defensive purchase and sale of shares to oppose
a takeover.
78. Id. at 1148.
79. Id. (citing REsTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 46, § 302). The Court of Appeals was
equally axiomatic on this question: "Because Cleve-Trust is a Massachusetts Corporation, the law of
that state governs this action." 729 F.2d at 375. A similar approach has been taken, under New
York law, in Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1980), discussed infra note 370.
80. 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
81. See infra notes 350-91 and accompanying text.
82. See Levine v. Milton, 42 Del. Ch. 597, 599-600, 219 A.2d 145, 147 (1966). (Delaware
rejects "center of gravity"; Panamanian law applicable to Panamanian company, citing Hausman).
83. See Downey v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1081, 1086-87 (D. Mass. 1982) (Massachusetts applies law of incorporation state); Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895, 901-02 (M.D. Fla. 1972)
(Florida conflicts rule stated in traditional terms; Bahamian law governs nature of action as direct or
derivative).
84. See Fleeger v. Clarkson Co., 86 F.R.D. 388, 394 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (Canadian law governs);
Kreindler v. Marx, 85 F.R.D. 612, 616 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (Delaware law as law of incorpdration state
applies to contemporaneous ownership requirement); Brooks v. Weiser, 57 F.R.D. 491, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (federal courts look to law of incorporation state-here, Delaware-to determine
status of shareholders); Rosenfeld v. Schwitzer Corp., 251 F. Supp. 758, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (law of
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d. Freezeouts and squeezeouts. The abusive elimination of minority shareholders through mergers, reverse stock splits, or a combination
thereof has recently received substantial attention. What are the fiduciary duties of management and controlling shareholders in these situations? Is there a "business purpose" requirement and, if so, who has the
burden of proof? What price is "fair"? 92 In the absence of express statutory provisions, the courts in the various states have been moving in different directions and, even in Delaware, 93 charting a course has not been
easy. Whatever authority exists supports the applicability of the law of
94
the state of incorporation to these issues.
Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 946 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, J., dissenting on other grounds) (demand requirement is substantive rule, constitutionally requiring application of state law as long as
state law does not contravene policies of federal law regarding business judgment rule). The language of the Rule--"if necessary"--would a fortiori extend the Stevens-Gibbons analysis to the
demand-on-shareholders requirement. A different interpretation of Rule 23.1 would be of dubious
constitutionality under Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965) (implying that neither Congress nor federal courts can formulate substantive rules in guise of providing procedural rules for
federal courts). See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831, 842 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, Inc., 692 F.2d 928, 946 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, J., dissenting
on other grounds).
A similar question has been raised regarding the validity of the "contemporary ownership"
requirement of Rule 23.1. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 84, at § 1829; 3B J. MOORE
& J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.15 (2d ed. 1982); see also Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91, 95 (1957) (local law governs in stockholder derivative actions). Professor Kessler in
1973 proposed an amendment of the Rule to require contemporary ownership only "if necessary
under the law of the forum state." See Kessler, ShareholderDerivativeActions: A Modest Proposalto
Revise FederalRule 23.1, 7 J. LAW REF. 90, 91 (1973). In his view, such an amendment not only
was consistent with Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), but perhaps was constitutionally
required to save Rule 23.1. Kessler, supra, at 91. By "law of the forum state," Kessler apparently
meant to include also the choice-of-law rules of the forum. Id. at 118 n.99.
92. For a discussion of freezeouts, see Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholdersin Corporate
Distributionsand Reorganizations,71 CALIF. L. REv. 1073, 1115-18 (1983); Brudney & Chirelstein,
FairSharesin CorporateMergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297, 307-13 (1974); Easterbrook
& Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698, 705-08 (1982). Also of interest is a
recent short but thoughtful piece by SEC Commissioner Longstreth, Fairness of Management
Buyouts Needs Evaluation, Legal Times, Oct. 10, 1983, at 15, col. I (arguing that market forces
rather than court intervention should be maximized to protect small shareholders); see also Mallenbaum, Helping a Company Go Private,Nat'l L. J., Jan. 16, 1984, at 15, col. 2 (discussing benefits
and legal formalities of going private).
93. See Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Singer v. Magnavox, 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
94. See, e.g., Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 972-73 (8th Cir. 1983) (New
Jersey corporation; New Jersey law governs short-form merger freezeout; "fairness" of price determined other than through appraisal); Shivers v. Amerco, 670 F.2d 825, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982)
(100:1 reverse stock split; destruction of market in stock; fiduciary duty of majority governed by law
of incorporation state-Nevada); Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Pennsylvania corporation; Pennsylvania law on fiducuary duty of controlling parent in freezeout
merger); Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 629 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981) (corporate law of Delaware governs
effect of buyout contract on fiduciary duties of directors in freezeout merger); Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 571 (5th Cir.) (freezeout merger; Georgia law applied where company
was incorporated and had its principal place of business there), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974);
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e. Other issues. The law of the state of incorporation has also been
applied, either automatically or with a cursory justification, to a great
many other internal affairs issues. These include: fiduciary duties of
management 95 or of controlling shareholders 96 (including duties related
to securities trading), 97 sale of control, 98 indemnification of manageTanzer v. Turbodyne Corp., 68 A.D.2d 614, 618, 417 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (1981) (cashout merger
challenged on fraud and inadequate price; Delaware corporate law applied).
95. See, eg., Cowin v. Brester, 741 F.2d 410, 414 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (manipulation of business by management for personal profit; applied law of incorporation state-Delaware); Gregg v.
U.S. Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 1522, 1537 (11th Cir. 1983) (New York conflicts rule; Delaware law
regarding declared dividends); Walton v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 798 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980)
(takeover conflict; disclosure of confidential information obtained from target; New York conflicts
rule "dictates" law of state of incorporation); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir.
1980) (Pennsylvania conflicts rule; Delaware law on waste in issuing stock), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981); Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1974) (New York law on fiduciary duties
of directors); Polon v. Huffines, 446 F.2d 384, 386 n.6 (7th Cir. 1971) (breach of duty in causing
corporation to buy overvalued stock in another company for "bail-out" of defendants; Ohio law);
Republic Systems & Programming, Inc. v. Computer Assistance, Inc., 440 F.2d 996, 997 (2d Cir.
1971) (Medina, J., dissenting) (fiduciary obligations and tenure of officers; illogical to vary them with
location; apply law of state of incorporation-Texas); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d
Cir. 1955) (New York conflicts rule; Indiana law on sale of control); Burton v. Exxon Corp., 583 F.
Supp. 405, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (declaration of dividends on preferred stock favoring parent company; New York conflicts rule apply law of state of incorporation-Delaware); Massaro v. Vernitron
Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Mass. 1983) (Massachusetts conflicts rule; Delaware law on
liability for misrepresentations involving products, even though principal place of business in New
York); B. J. McAdams, Inc. v. Boggs, 439 F. Supp. 738, 743 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Pennsylvania conflicts
rule; Arkansas state of incorporation as well as principal place of business, headquarters, place of
employment); Lachman v. Bell, 353 F. Supp. 37, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (New York conflicts rule;
Delaware law on fiduciary duties relating to share transactions); Singer v. Creole Petroleum, 297
A.2d 440, 443 (Del. Ch. 1972) (Delaware law); Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971)
(Delaware law).
96. See, eg., Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 239 (5th Cir. 1983) (Texas conflicts rule; Delaware law controls even though principal place of business in Texas); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.,
162 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1947) (Delaware conflicts; duty of controlling parent to minority shareholders involving redemption and conversion of stock; existence and scope of duty subject to law of state
of incorporation; "quantum" of breach subject to lex loci delicti); In re Reading Co., 551 F. Supp.
1205, 1214 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Pennsylvania conflicts rule; Delaware law on duty to minority
involving self-dealing and sale of control; parties stipulated); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F.
Supp. 176, 198 (D. Del. 1955) (referring to law of incorporation-Kentucky-for all issues, including "quantum"), affd. as modified, 2.35 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); cf Haberman v. Tobin, 446 F.Supp.
447, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (New York conflicts; proxy rule violations in context of tender offer;
for statute of limitations purposes, claim accrues where actions took place, not at state of
incorporation).
97. See, eg., Thomas v. Roblin Indus., 520 F.2d 1393, 1397 (3d Cir. 1975) (Pennsylvania conflicts rule; Delaware law on misuse of inside information by controlling shareholders); Schein v.
Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 820 n.3 (2d Cir. 1973) (parties agreed that Florida law applied regarding
disgorgement of profits from trading on inside information); Sanders v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %99,500, at 96,918 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (trading on inside information, manipulating price of stock in context of tender offer; parties agreed on law of incorporation state-Iowa);
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969)
(law of incorporation state-New York-remains primary source).
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ment,99 business judgment,
shareholder meetings,

agreements, 104

10

2

°°

delegation of management functions,10 1

inspection of shareholder lists, 10 3 shareholder

issuance of securities,1 0 5 stock transfer restrictions, 106 cap-

ital impairment, 10 7 dividends,108 requirements for mergers,10 9 sales of as98. See, e.g., Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305, 1314 (2d Cir. 1972) (sale of shares at
premium reflecting transfer of control; "it is not controverted that the governing law. . . is the law
of Maryland [state of incorporation]"); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955)
(New York conflicts rule; sale of control subject to law where incorporated-Indiana).
99. See, e.g., Davist Cox v. Summa, 751 F.2d 1507, 1527 (9th Cir. 1985) (indemnification rights
involve issues peculiar to the affairs of corporations; governed by law of incorporation-Delaware);
Gross v. Texas Plastics, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 564, 566 n.2 (D.N.J. 1972) (law of state of incorporation-Texas-applies; states have no interest in regulating internal affairs of foreign corporations;
by-laws are contracts between corporation and shareholders, therefore construction governed by law
of place where made).
100. See, e.g., Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980)
(settlement by directors of proxy violation claim; law of incorporation-Texas-applies "in absence
of any contrary suggestion by either party").
101. See, e.g., Long Park v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 180-82, 77
N.E.2d 633, 635-36 (1948) (Fuld, J., dissenting) (management agreement violates law of incorporation-New Jersey-as well as that of New York, where made).
102. See, e.g., Fairmont Foods Co. v. Manganello, 301 F. Supp. 832, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (New
York conflicts rule; Ontario incorporation law governs enforcement of voting agreement and shareholders meetings; however, "sale of vote" in New York requires application of New York law if
contract made in New York, under "contacts" and "intimate concern" theories); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 907 (Del. Ch. 1980) (Delaware law governs meeting dates).
103. See, e.g., Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 786, 788 (4th Cir.
1983) (Maryland law, where it is law of incorporation state, governs percentage requirements.).
104. See, e.g., Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 101-02, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203
(1980) (major New York case applying Delaware law to Delaware corporation, involving agreement
limiting corporate activities).
105. See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 735 (Del. 1960) (validity of issuance of options
involves corporate internal affairs, it is not a contract question and is governed by law of incorporation state); Elster v. American Airlines, 100 A.2d 219, 225 (Del. Ch. 1958) (by acquiring stock,
shareholders consent to application of law of state of incorporation). Cf U.C.C. § 8-106 (1977):
The validity of a security and the rights and duties of the issues with respect to registration of
transfer are governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction of the
organization of the issuer.
106. See, e.g., B & H Warehouse v. Atlas Van Lines, 490 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1974) ("validity
of any restriction is to be determined according to the law of the state of incorporation"); cf Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, 450 F. Supp. 639, 644 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying law of incorporation
state because plaintiffs asserted no rights under any other law); St. Louis v. Merrill Lynch, 412 F.
Supp. 45, 56 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
107. See, e.g., Libco Corp. v. Leigh, 703 F.2d 996, 1000 n.3 (7th Cir. 1983) (acquisition of stock
by corporation impairing capital).
108. See, e.g., Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 765 (3d Cir. 1950) (Pennsylvania conflicts rule; Delaware law on preferred dividends); Kern v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 6 Ill.
App. 3d 247, 250, 285 N.E.2d 501, 503 (1972) (Illinois conflicts rule; Indiana law on preferred
dividends).
109. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Ave. Life Ins., 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 225,
226 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1984); Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., 380 Mass. 656, 657, 405 N.E.2d 131, 132
(1980) (Massachusetts law); Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 5631, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. June 21,
1979) (Delaware law), aft'd, 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980).
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sets, 110 acquisitions,1 11 and recapitalizations.1 12
B.

Statutory Support for the Rule of Lex Incorporationis.
It is remarkable and puzzling that neither the courts nor the com-

mentators show any awareness of the fact that many state statutes contain explicit language limiting the applicability of their law solely to
corporations organized under their statute, thereby adopting a unilateral
lex incorporationis rule. For example, section 1701.98 of the Ohio General Corporation law provides that: "Except as [otherwise] provided in
Sections 1701.01 to 1701.98, inclusive, of the Revised Code the provisions
of said Sections shall apply only to domestic corporations. .... 113 Section 1701(A) defines domestic corporations as corporations "for profit
formed under the laws of this state." Yet in a case just decided, the
Supreme Court of Ohio applied the Ohio statute to validate a shareholder
agreement of a Delaware corporation, on a "most significant relationship" theory, because the agreement and the shareholders had major
Ohio contacts. Neither the majority nor the dissent referred to section
1701.98, which would have prevented application of Ohio law, or to section 1701.49(G), which would have arguably invalated it if the agreement
1 14
were deemed to be an Ohio voting trust..
In the new Business Corporation Act of Minnesota, the key word
"corporation" is defined as "a corporation, other than a foreign corporation,. . . incorporated under or governed by this chapter"; "foreign corporation" means "a corporation. . . incorporated under laws other than
the laws of this state. .. ."115 The Pennsylvania statute applies to all
110. See eg., Great W. Producers Corp. v. Great W. United Corp., 200 Colo. 180, 182 n.2, 613
P.2d 873, 875 n.2 (1980).
111. See, eg., Jordan v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 59, 62 n.1 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (English law regarding shareholder approval of acquisition by acquiring company).
112. See, eg.. O'Brien v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 44 N.J. 25, 39, 206 A.2d 878, 885
(1965) (effect of recapitalization on preferred dividend arrearage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1967).
113. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.98 (Page 1978) (emphasis supplied). Only a few sections
fall within the exception. For examples, see, section 1701.13(H) (Ohio limitations on ultra vires
defense apply to foreign corporations if contract was made in the state) and section 1701.49(G)
(shares of foreign corporation may be subject to an Ohio voting trust). The sections dealing with
mergers require that the transaction comply with the laws of the states of incorporation of each
corporation. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.78(A), (B)(1), (B)(4), 1701.79(A), (B)(1), (C) & (F)
(Page 1978). Dissenters' rights are granted only to shareholders of the domestic corporations. OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.84, 1701.85 (Page 1978).
Quo warranto actions are not available to oust officers of foreign corporations. OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2733.01(A) (Page 1981). In State ex rel. Corrigan v. Great Northern-Chan Restaurant, 3 Ohio App. 3d 355, 357, 445 N.E.2d 732, 733-34 (1982), the court referred to the lex incorporationis as the quo warranto rule prevailing in Ohio.
114. Gries Sports Enterprises v. Model, 15 Ohio St. 3d 284 (1984).
115. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.011(8), (12) (West 1985). Under prior Minnesota law the definitions were not as clear. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.02(2), (5), (6) (West 1969). In 1983, Minne-
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"domestic corporations"-i.e., those that are "incorporated or domesticated in this Commonwealth." 116 A "foreign business corporation" is
one "incorporated under any laws other than those of this Commonwealth.""17 A foreign corporation may "domesticate" by filing for local
incorporation and renouncing its original incorporation. 1 8 Only in certain rare instances-such as the ultra vires defense against contracts and
conveyances in Pennsylvania, or cases involving local property-does the
Pennsylvania act apply to foreign corporations. 19
The lex incorporationis rule also finds statutory support in section
106 of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), adopted in many
states, which provides that:
A foreign corporation shall not be denied a certificate of authority by
reason of the fact that the laws of the state or country under which
such corporation is organized governing its organization and internal
affairs differ from the laws of this state, and nothing in this Act conthe organitained shall be construed to authorize this state to regulate
20
zation or the internal affairs of such corporations.1
This section conveys a clear message. First, it assumes that the law of
the state of incorporation "governs" corporate organization and internal
2
affairs. Second, it disclaims any intention to intervene in such affairs.' '
In Texas, the language in section 106 on "internal affairs"-not organization-is qualified by the words "not intrastate in Texas."' 22 It has
been suggested that this cryptic variation invites the courts to develop
sota also adopted a separate "Foreign Corporation Act" which regulates the conditions of doing

intrastate business in Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 303.01-303.25 (West 1984).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1002(6) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1002(8) (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1909 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1303(c) (Purdon 1967). Other examples abound. The Florida
statute provides that "unless the context otherwise requires, the term. . . 'corporation'.. . means a
corporation subject to the provisions of [the Florida General Corporation Act] except a foreign
corporation." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.004 (West 1977). See also Padovano v. Wotitzky, 355 So.2d
873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Similar language is also used in the South Dakota Corporation Law.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-1(1) (1983). See also Cargill, Inc. v. American Pork Prod., 415
F. Supp. 876, 878-79 (D.S.D. 1978). Most "internal affairs" sections of the Corporation Law of
Hawaii are addressed only to corporations "created" or "incorporated" or "organized" under the
law of Hawaii or to "domestic" corporations. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 416-32, 416-51, 416-58, 41659, 416-64, 416-75 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
120. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 106 (1971) (emphasis added).

121. See Preface, MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1953 rev.), at xi. Comment 4 to the 1964 version of § 99, the predecessor to § 106, which somewhat diluted its import by clarifying that while no
power to regulate was conferred there was no preclusion either, MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.

§ 99 comment 4 (1960 & Supp. 1966); that comment has been dropped from § 106. Comment 2 now
contains only some general language on the lack of visitorial powers over foreign corporations as a
matter of jurisdiction and refers to possible exceptions based on convenience, expediency, public
policy, and substantial justice. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 106 comment 2 (1971).

122. TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 8.01(A) (Vernon 1980).
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appropriate exceptions to the lex incorporationis rule, 123 but there is no
indication that such invitation has ever been accepted. Texas also sub-

jects foreign corporations to the Texas law pertaining to the duties, restrictions, penalties, and liabilities of corporate directors and officers but

only as to "matters affecting the transaction of intrastate business in this
State."' 124 The only case to consider the meaning of this language is
Maher v. Zapata Corp., 125 which involved the liability of corporate fidu-

ciaries of a Texas-headquartered Delaware corporation for loans made to
officers in Texas to enable them to exercise certain stock options. The

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that such loans were subject
to Delaware law, which permitted the loans, rather than to Texas law,

which made them ultra vires.' 2 6 The court ruled that the internal affairs
aspects of such loans, as distinguished from questions relating to the
rights of third parties, continue to be subject to the law of incorporation,
at least where the company is not purely local. 127 This constitutes an
extraordinarily strong reaffirmation of the lex incorporationis in the face
128
of an ambiguous state statute.
A new Revised Model Business Corporation Act was approved in

June 1984, and is intended to replace the current one. The official commentary to section 15.05 reiterates and reinforces the non-interference

language appearing in the present section 106 by explaining that section
15.05(c) "preserves the judicially developed doctrine that internal corporate affairs are governed by the state of incorporation even when the cor-

poration's business and assets are located primarily in other states."' 129

123. See Latty, Some MiscellaneousNovelties in the New CorporationStatutes, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 363, 397-98 (1958) (questioning whether directors of foreign corporation would be
liable under this language if they hold meetings in Texas and declare dividend that would be illegal
for Texas corporation but not under law of state of incorporation).
124. Tax. STAT. ANN. art. 8.02(A) (Vernon 1980).
125. 714 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 439.
127. Id. at 441.
128. In support of the lex incorporationis, the court cited several old Texas cases, the Supreme
Court cases of Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933), and Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1935), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, § 302. Maher, 714 F.2d
at 464. The court distinguished its own celebrated precedent of Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Johnson, 268 F. 2d 317, 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959), as involving a pseudoforeign corporation and largely an external affairs issue. Id. at 465.
In an earlier case decided by a different panel of the same court, Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d
1196 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 287 (1983) (involving a multistate corporation and
multistate transactions), there are dicta that sections 8.01 and 8.02 of the Texas statute call for the
application of Texas law to the duty of care of officers and directors of "foreign corporations doing
business in the state" without reference to intrastate business. 693 F.2d at 1209. The holding in
Meyers is of limited significance because it is based on a specific provision which calls for the application of the law of Texas to insurance companies doing business in Texas. See 693 F.2d at 1208.
129. REVISED MODEL BusmEss CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) (1984).
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The discussion of the MBCA would not be complete without reference to section 107, entitled "Powers of Foreign Corporations," which

provides that a qualified foreign corporation enjoys rights and privileges
which are the same as, and no greater than, those enjoyed by a domestic

corporation, and is subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and
liabilities. This section was intended to grant foreign corporations "a
status of substantial equality with like domestic corporations insofar as

permissible corporate powers are concerned," 1 30 not to authorize backdoor interference in their internal affairs.13 1 This can also be seen in the

Revised Model Business Corporation Act's section 15.05(b),1 32 which replaces current section 107. The comments clearly indicate that it is not
33
its purpose to subject internal affairs matters to local law.'

In their proposal to amend section 49 of the Model Business Corporation Act to include explicit rules on the termination of derivative litigation, Professors Coffee and Schwartz also choose the law of the state of
incorporation. They do recognize that the forum state may decide to

override it, but only through an express and specific statute and only
130. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 107 comment 2 (1971).
131. There is, however, some ambiguous authority suggesting otherwise. In Houck v. Martin,
82 111. App. 3d 205, 402 N.E.2d 421 (1980), there are dicta to the effect that the Illinois equivalent of
§ 107-ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.103 (Smith-Hurd 1970)-applies the Illinois prohibitions
against loans to officers and directors to a Delaware corporation with some Illinois contacts. The
court did not analyze or weigh the multistate contacts and did not offer any explanation or justification for its interpretation other than to cite Vinylwed, Inc. v. Metropolitan Greetings, Inc., 360 F.
Supp. 1360 (N.D. 11. 1973), afid, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1974). This citation is puzzling because
Vinylwed dealt with an entirely different issue-the conditions under which the property of a foreign
corporation is subject to attachment. The Houck court must have been concerned with the protection of creditors in bankruptcy in an external affairs context. This explanation is supported by concurring Judge Green's clarification that § 107 does not place "all of the same restrictions on foreign
corporations doing business in Illinois as upon domestic corporations when the internalaffairs of the
App. 3d at 216, 402 N.E.2d at 429-30 (Green,
corporation are involved." Houck v. Martin, 82 Ill.
J., concurring). Cf Katz, The Illinois Business Comporation Act, 12 Wis. L. REV. 472, 482-84
(1937). The Houck approach stands in direct contrast to the limiting position taken in Maher v.
Zapata, 714 F.2d 436, 439-41 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. But
some support for the decision can be found in certain older cases applying Illinois law to the inspection rights of shareholders of foreign corporations on the theory that this is a reasonable condition of
2d 86, 89, 195
doing business in Illinois. See McCormick v. Statler Hotels Delaware Corp., 30 Ill.
N.E.2d 172, 174-75 (1963). The court in Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 74
A.2d 160 (1950), read the stronger language contained in PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2010 (Purdon
1967) ("to the same extent as if it had been incorporated under this act to transact the business set
forth in its certificate of authority"), to impose on qualified foreign corporations the Pennsylvania
rules on inspection of shareholder lists under § 308(A). The court apparently ignored the fact that
§ 308(A) applies only to "business corporations," which are defined in § 2(6) not to include foreign
corporations. See also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
132. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 15.05(b) (1984).
133. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 15.05 commentary at 15.20 (1984).
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when the corporation has major contacts with the state. 134
In addition, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of
1976,135 which is gradually replacing the old ULPA, adopts more
clearly than any other piece of legislation the lex incorporationis as a
conflicts rule, rather than merely as a unilateral presumption or assumption of non-interference:
Section 901 [Law governing].
Subject to the Constitution of this State, (1) the laws of the state
under which a foreign limited partnership is organized govern its organization and internal affairs and the liability of its limited partners
of any difference
and (2) [it] may not be denied registration by reason
1 36
between those laws and the laws of this state."
Finally, there are many instances where federal law assumes and
reinforces the applicability of the law of incorporation. For example,
Rule 14a-8(c)(1), 137 promulgated by the SEC under section 14(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,138 enables corporations to exclude
from their proxy statements any shareholder proposal that is, "under the
laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper subject for action by security
holders." 139 In addition, Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure, now duplicated in many states, looks to the law of the state of
incorporation to determine the capacity of the corporation to sue or be
sued and the authority of the directors to institute suit.
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE

INCORPORATIONIS:

LEX

FROM FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A.

Choice of Law and the Constitution.

There was a time when the Supreme Court drew heavily on full faith
and credit and, to a lesser extent, due process in order to determine the
134. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival ofthe Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor
Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 332-33 (1981).
135. REViSED UNiV. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT (1976), 6 U.L.A. 189 (Supp. 1984).
136. Id. at § 901, 6 U.L.A. at 244.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1984).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1984). The term "laws of the issuer's domicile" means the law
of the state of incorporation. See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947) (in
determining whether proposals were proper subjects for action by securities holders, court applied
law of state of incorporation); Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466 A.2d 478, 481 (Me. 1983) ("It
has long been established that a corporation is a resident of that state in which it is incorporated.").
See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.36-4(c) (1984) (distinguishes between domestic and foreign corporations on
basis of their place of incorporation).
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basic conflicts choices. 14 0 This coincided with the heyday of conflicts
territorialism and the use of single, neutral, event-related connecting factors-such as place of the wrong-to select one proper law, regardless of
forum, to govern particular transactions and relations.' 4 ' Among the
rules deemed to have some constitutional underpinnings was the rule applying the law of the state of incorporation to the internal affairs of
corporations. 14 2
A countertrend began as early as 1935 when, in Alaska PackersAssociation v. Industrial Accident Commission,14 3 Justice Stone watered
down the full faith and credit obligation. That case held that, prima facie, a state is entitled to enforce its statutes in its own courts; whoever

makes a full faith and credit claim has the burden of showing that the
conflicting interests of another state are superior to those of the forum. 44
The increasing deference given by the federal courts to state law after

Erie Railroadv. Tompkins145 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing14 6 should have accentuated the full faith and credit obligation;
instead, the Alaska Packers rationale continued to expand to the point
that if a state were able to justify the applicability of its law under due
process on the basis of some local contacts, it was no longer required to

give any credit to the conflicting laws of other states.147 The constitu-

140. See, eg., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 256 U.S. 357 (1918); Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936). See also
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict ofLaws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581 (1953); Dodd, The Power of
the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Fieldof Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REv. 533
(1926); Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of ConstitutionalLaw?, 15 MiNN. L. REv.
161 (1931).
141. The FIRST REsTATEMENT, supra note 45, the embodiment of the traditional conflicts approaches, was adopted in 1934 after eleven years of preparation under the leadership of Professor
Beale. At least until the sixties, its influence on state practice was widespread and pervasive.
142. See, eg., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (application of law of state of
incorporation to contractual liability of stockholders for tax assessments is supported by full faith
and credit clause); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 256-57 (1912) (full faith and credit clause
provides right of receiver to sue in state other than that of incorporation to recover double liability
imposed on stockholders, and courts of that state are bound to give full faith and credit to laws of
state of incorporation).
143. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
144. Id at 547.
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
147. See, eg., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964); Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 10 (1962); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1955); see also Kirgis, The
Roles ofDue Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice ofLaw, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94, 102-10
(1976); Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185, 186-201
(1976); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1589-94 (1978); Weintraub, Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REv. 449
(1959).
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tional quest for the most appropriate law was thus abandoned.

Whatever restraints existed under due process were further lessened
in the recent case ofAllstate Insurance Co. v. Hague148 in which the plurality of the Supreme Court held that any "significant" contact or aggregation of contacts generating state interests satisfies due process and
dispenses with the full faith and credit obligation.1 49 This test is vague

enough and flexible enough to accept virtually any claim of interest.
Some hope for the development of reasonable limitations may be found
in the fact that the Allstate result has been criticized on the ground that

the Minnesota contacts in that case were trivial or specious and bore no
appropriate relationship to the state interests asserted.1 50 Nevertheless, it

must be conceded that Allstate lends some constitutional legitimacy to
the proliferating new conflicts theories that, despite their doctrinal and

methodological differences, encourage the maximum application of forum law-especially if it also favors forum residents, as it did in
Allstate.1 5 1
148. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
149. Id. at 312-13. The dissent apparently agreed with the plurality on this issue. Id. at 332
(Powell, J., dissenting).
150. See Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14
U.C.D. L. REv. 889, 897-903 (1981). See also Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate
Problems: AsBetween State and FederalLaw, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1315, 1341-49 (1981); Hill, Choice
of Law and Jurisdictionin the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 960, 968-74 (1981).
The precedential value of Allstate--decided by a plurality of four against three-is diminished
not only because of its questionable application of the "significant contacts" test but also by the
nature of its subject matter. The tendency to give insurance policyholders all possible advantages,
including the benefit of any favorable law, is well known. Cf Martin, The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 133, 148 n.6 (1982) (traditionally insurance companies get
"short end of the stick" in difficult choice-of-law issues). Furthermore, it appears that the Supreme
Court was concerned that a reversal would have opened the floodgates of conflicts litigation. See
Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation? Federal Choice of Law ConstraintsAfter
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HoFsrTRA L. REV. 103, 104 n.6 (1982); von Mehren & Trautman, ConstitutionalControlon Choice ofLaw: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 35,
37-38 (1982). But as Professors von Mehren and Trautman persuasively demonstrate, Allstate could
have been reversed under a principle against state overreaching that would not have brought about a
nightmare of litigation.
151. For examples of these theories, see B. CURRIE, On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 61 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED
ESSAYS]; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 346 (1980); Leflar, Choice of
Law: States' Rights, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 203, 207-08 (1982); Reese, American Trends in Private
InternationalLaw: Academic and JudicialManipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33
VAND. L. REv. 717, 734-37 (1980); Silberman, supra note 150, at 112, 114; Sedler, Constitutional
Limitations on Choice ofLaw: The Perspective of ConstitutionalGeneralism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV.
59, 73 (1982); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 150, at 49-50.
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Choice of Law for CorporateInternalAffairs Under Full Faith and

Credit and Due Process.
Does the attenuation of full faith and credit and due process mean
that the rule of lex incorporationis has lost its constitutional underpin-

nings and now is at most a conflicts rule? May the states instead apply
their own internal affairs law to foreign corporations on the basis of some

"significant" contacts generating state interests in the corporation, in

particular parties, or in transactions? More specifically, what is the cur-

rent status of Order of United Commercial Travellers v. Wolfe, 15 2 the last
Supreme Court case to mandate, under full faith and credit, the application of any law which happened to be the law of the state of

incorporation?
Even before Allstate, the authority of Wolfe was in some doubt.15 3
Not only was its persuasiveness questioned (as a five-to-four decision),

but it was also viewed as the last of a line of now-discredited cases that
sought to constitutionalize choice of law.15 4 The dicta in Shaffer v. Heit-

ner,155 a landmark jurisdictional case, on the applicability of the law of

the state of incorporation to internal corporate affairs did not even men-

tion Wolfe.' 5 6 Instead, the Court referred to Koster v. Lumbermans Mutual Casuality Co., 5 7 an older forum non conveniens case, to support the
proposition that there is a need for a uniform and certain standard to

govern internal corporate affairs.158

Some commentators have argued that, despite its general language,

Wolfe is limited to the narrow category of fraternal societies and does not
extend to commercial corporations.

59

Nothing in the language of Wolfe

supports the proposed limitation. On the contrary, the Wolfe dissenters
152. 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
153. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1131 n.53. Professor Currie did not address the
merits of the Wolfe choice but criticized it and the earlier fraternal insurance cases on the ground
that the Supreme Court should not engage in the political function of becoming an arbiter of state
interests and should not prevent the application of the law of any interested state in order to give
preference to another law. See also B. CuRIE, The Constitution and Choice of Law, in SELECTED
ESSAYS, supra note 151, at 188, 253-59. If in a particular field there is a need for national uniformity
or for the application of a single state law, he argued, let Congress legislate the choice. Id at 271-82.
154. See Cheatham, supra note 140, at 596 ("With the Supreme Court of the United States so
divided in opinion, it is uncertain to what extent the supposed old special rule as to fraternal insurance companies will be followed.").
155. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
156. Id. at 215 n.44, 225-27.
157. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
158. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215 n.44.
159. See Baraf,supra note 54, at 244; Kaplan, supra note 1, at 445-47. Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964) (Wolfe is a "highly specialized decision dealing with unique facts...
involving the 'indivisible unity' of the fraternal society. . . . We do not extend that rule nor apply it
[in workmen's compensation context]."). See also Pearson v. Northeast Air Lines, 309 F.2d 553, 558
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specifically complained that the majority had "conspicuously refrained
from stating in unmistakable terms that its new doctrine applies only to
fraternal insurance companies" and expressed alarm at its consequences
for commercial corporations. 160 The only case that explicitly tried to
escape Wolfe is Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski,161 whose holding, ex-

cept as it applies to pseudo-foreign corporations, is no longer viable
under the commerce clause. 162 In contrast, in National City Lines v.

LLC Corp., 163 a recent case involving proxy solicitation and voting in a
commercial corporation, Wolfe reappeared to support the application of
the law of Delaware, the state of incorporation.

The basic premise of Wolfe, the need for national uniformity for
internal corporate affairs, remains widely accepted. 164 To paraphrase
Wolfe and its predecessors, shareholders voluntarily associate to pursue

common interests and their interdependence arises from their continuing
relationship with one another. The corporate venture is run by common

institutions through a representative form of government. Elementary
considerations of predictability, practicality, and equality call for both
corporate governance and the common rights and obligations of the
shareholders to be subject to a single law. 165 Full faith and credit gives
primacy to the statute chosen by the parties with the consent of the state

of incorporation. Wolfe recognizes that the forum state's legitimate interests may, in an extraordinary situation, override the obligation to apply
n.12 (2d Cir. 1962) (Wolfe dealt with a "unique situation," the relationship between members of a
fraternal benefit society, and should not be extended to commercial corporations).
160. Wolfe, 331 U.S. at 641-42 (Black, J., dissenting). The real concern of the dissenters was not
corporate governance but insurance practices. They were afraid that, under the guise of the "internal affairs" exclusion, insurance companies would be able to evade the law of the states where they
did business and sign up "members" who in reality were policyholders. Id. at 636-42.
161. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1961).
162. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
163. FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) %98,374 (W.D. Mo. 1981), aU'd, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
164. On the continuing relevance of full faith and credit in fields where there is a need for national uniformity, see Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical
Underpinningsof TakeoverLegislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 733, 754 (1979); Kirgis, The Roles
of Due Process and FullFaith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 120, 139-42
(1976); Oldham, Regulatingthe Regulators: Limitations Upon a State's Ability to Regulate Corporations with Multi-state Contacts, 57 DEN. L.J. 345, 356-68 (1980); Weintraub, supra note 147, at 455,

478-79. See generally I.
UNITED STATES

CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE

541-57 (1953) (discussing the importance of a national system of law in the United

States).
165. Wolfe, 331 U.S. at 592, 601, 605-06. See also Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the
World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 68 (1938) (entry into membership of fraternal society is more than
contract; it is entering into "complex and abiding" relation); Modern Woodmen of America v.
Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1924); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531,
542 (1915) ("intrinsic relationship between each and all of the members . . .and a resulting unity
between them").
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the law of another state-as was permitted in Alaska Packers.166 But the

Court in Wolfe nevertheless concluded that, in the corporate context,
both the need for uniformity and the unity of the bundle of rights and
obligations of corporate membership override the protective interests of
167
the state of residence of particular members.
C.

The Conflicts Implications of Edgar v. MITE Corp. and of the
Revitalized Commerce Clause.

Whatever the status of Wolfe before 1982, there is little question
that Edgar v. MITE Corp.168 gave the single-law and lex incorporationis

principles an indirect but significant boost under the commerce clause.
The context of MITE was not the typical internal affairs situation. At
issue was whether a takeover statute that subjected certain tender offers
to state law controls was unconstitutional under the commerce clause, or
169
was at least preempted as inconsistent with the Williams Act.

Takeover statutes proliferated in the 1960's and 1970's, and thirtyseven states had enacted such laws by the early 1980's. The application
of these statutes is triggered by an offer to buy shares; their ostensible
166. 294 U.S. 532, 542 (1935); see also Pacific Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 306 U.S. 493, 499 (1939).
167. Wolfe, 331 U.S. at 623-25. A careful reading of the dissent shows that their concern is less
with corporate choice of law than with the general proposition that full faith and credit should
mandate any choices of law in multistate transactions.
The full faith and credit derivation of the single-law principle, with preference for the law of
incorporation, to govern central internal affairs matters was eloquently argued by Professors Reese
and Kaufman in their influential article. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note I. Other supporters of
this thesis include Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HARv. L. REv. 433,
439, 460-67 (1950); Harper, The Supreme Courtand the Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 883,
898 (1947); Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws, 27 U. Cli. L. REv. 463, 498-99
(1960). More recently, the practical necessity of applying the law of incorporation has been stressed
by Ratner and Schwartz. See Ratner & Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substantive Law of Corporations,45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 641, 665-74 (1979).
168. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The decision's negative impact on state takeover statutes rather than
its significance for internal corporate affairs has received the most attention. See Profusek & Gompf,
State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7
CORP. L. Rav. 3 (1983); Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the
Commerce Clause?, 8 CoRP. L. REv. 3 (1985); Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation:
Mite and its Aftermath, 40 Bus. L. 671 (1985); Note, The Unsung Death of State Takeover Statutes:
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REv. 1017 (1983); Note, State Takeover Statutes UnderAttackCasualties in the Battle for Corporate Control-Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 9951023 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, State Takeover Statutes Under Attack]; Note, The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 62-71 (1982); Note, Corporate Battles for Control-Edgar
v. Mite and the Constitutionality of State Takeover Legislation-The Continuing Saga, 26 How. L.J.
1425 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, CorporateBattlesfor Control];Note, Tender Offers- Edgar
v. Mite and State Tender Offer Regulation, 9 J. CORP. L. 95 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tender
Offers].
169. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1964) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
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purpose is to mandate disclosures and to prevent fraud in securities
transactions. 170 Thus, they bear some resemblance to blue-sky laws and
have been usually enacted in that form. Unlike blue-sky laws, however,
which cover only intrastate transactions, takeover statutes reach tender
offers, wherever made, if the target corporation, not the transaction,has
certain contacts with the state. 17 1 Other than place of incorporation,
which is the chief one, such contacts may be found if either the principal
place of business or the corporate headquarters is within the state, partic-

with substantial assets and/or
ularly when this circumstance is coupled 172
state.
the
within
shareholding
substantial
Precisely because of the concern created by the extraterritoriality of
takeover statutes, their proponents argue that the statutes control not
securities transactions but the internal affairs of corporations. Consequently, such legislation constitutes an exercise of the authority of a state
to regulate domestic or locally-centered corporations.1 73 The fact remains, however, that acquisitions of stock under a tender offer do not in

themselves alter the corporate structure, procedures, and relationships,
nor do they necessarily lead to a structural change; the acquirer may be
content with control at the shareholder level. Furthermore, the tender
170. For a recent summary review of particular provisions, see Note, State Regulation of Tender
Offers, 7 J. CORP. L. 603, 606-11 (1982); Note, CorporateBattlesfor Control,supra note 168 at 143234.
171. Accordingly, the precedents upholding the constitutionality of the territorial blue-sky laws

under the commerce clause have little relevance. See Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568,
588-90 (1971); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards, 242 U.S. 559, 564-66 (1917); Hall v. Geiger
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1917); see also Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue-Sky Laws,
71 HARV. L. REv. 209, 241-53 (1957) (discussing the problems in applying blue-sky laws to multistate security transactions).
Section 414 of the Uniform Securities Act approved in 1958 and adopted by many states exemplifies the strict territoriality of blue-sky law. For a discussion of the meaning and implications of
this section see Long, The Conflict of Laws Provisionsof the Uniform SecuritiesAct, or, When Does a
Transaction "Take Place in this State?," 31 Okla. L. Rev. 781 (1978).
172. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 5, at 207-17, 232-323 (1977);
Bartell, State CorporateTakeover Regulation, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 16, at 807, 807 n.l
(Apr. 22, 1983); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation:Interests, Effects and PoliticalCompetency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213, 219-20 (1977); Warren, supra note 168, at 676; Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers, supra note 170, at 605-06; Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover
Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 880-81 (1978).
173. The explanation for the internal affairs characterization is that tender offers typically (a)
result in shifts in control that affect management, (b) change the position of the remaining shareholders, (c) lead to mergers or consolidations or other fundamental changes, and/or (d) resemble
and are functionally equivalent to proxy solicitations. See Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role
ofState Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 722, 740-61 (1970).
See also AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krause, 482 F. Supp. 929, 931-39 (S.D. Ohio 1979) ("Tender offers
are to be considered functionally as internal affairs transactions.. . in which a state possesses a
compelling interest: investor protection."); Boehm, supra note 164, at 743, 756; Profusek & Gompf,
supra note 168, at 27-31.
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offeror need not be a shareholder and the accepting offeree ceases to be
one.

17 4

It was in this context that the Supreme Court in 1982 decided
MITE. 175 The Illinois statute attacked in that case applied to a tender
offer, wherever made, for the stock of a target company if either (a) at
least ten percent of such stock was owned by Illinois residents or (b) two
out of the following three contacts were present in Illinois: incorporation, principal executive office of the corporation, or at least ten percent
of the stated capital and paid-in surplus. 176 Was it constitutional for Illinois to apply this statute to a nationwide tender offer for the stock of an
Illinois corporation, where the latter had its principal place of business in
Pennsylvania and where forty-three percent of its stock was owned by
Illinois residents? In an opinion by Justice White, a majority of five justices found that the statute unduly burdened interstate commerce. 177
The MITE majority rejected the argument that the Illinois statute
regulated "internal affairs" rather than just "transactions" in the shares
of the target company, and held that the attempt to exercise comprehensive control over out-of-state transactions among non-residents constituted a major burden on interstate commerce. 178 The Illinois interest in
protecting local investors, while legitimate, could not outweigh such a
burden. The state interest was minor, speculative, and implausible because the statute was applicable "even if not a single one of [the target's]
179
shareholders were a resident of Illinois."'
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens
and O'Connor, also found the Illinois statute invalid per se because it
purported to regulate elements of interstate commerce directly:180
The Commerce Clause also precludes the application of a state statute
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders,
whether or not the commerce has effects within the state. . . .The lim174. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 n.53 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
for improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); see also
Wilmer & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1976); Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender
Offers, 47 S.CAL. L. Rsv. 1133, 1133-55 (1974).
175. The Supreme Court had raised hopes of an early authoritative pronouncement on these
issues when it granted certiorari in Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, but it disposed of the case
on venue grounds. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
176. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121, § 137.52-10 (1979).
177. MITE, 457 U.S. at 626-46. Three justices dissented on the technical ground that the case
was moot. Id. at 648-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun did not address the commerce
clause issue but agreed with the result on a federal preemption theory. Id. at 633 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).

178. Id. at 643-46.
179. Id. at 642.

180. Id. at 643.
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its on a State's power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the
limits on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case "any attempt
'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property
would offend
sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State's
18 1
power."
181. Id. at 642-43 (emphasis added) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)). The
reference to Shaffer, a due process jurisdiction case, is puzzling. The Court in Shaffer states quite
explicitly that even though the judicial and legislative jurisdictional inquiries have certain similarities, they are not identical. That a state has the power to have its law applied does not necessarily
mean that it can adjudicate the controversy. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215-16, 224-25. The language
relied upon by Justice White in MITE came from that part of the Shaffer opinion that discussed
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), the case which Shaffer overruled. Is Justice White purporting
to eliminate the distinction between the two jurisdictional inquiries, at least where interstate commerce is involved? Further, it is generally recognized that for judicial jurisdiction a "minimum
contacts" test applies, and direct, substantial, foreseeable "effects" within the territory suffice. Why
should legislative jurisdiction not attach to such "effects"? Was Justice White perhaps limiting the
similarity to the exclusion as a valid jurisdictional basis of indirecteffects only on people-shareholders resident within the territory?
In any event, Justice White's stricter view has been favorably received by some lower courts in
ways that portend a further extension of the negative reach of the commerce clause. For example, in
Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 547 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff'd, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir.
1983), the court followed the four MITE justices and concluded that a comparable Virginia statute
was a "direct" restraint and invalid per se. The court stressed that none of the other justices had
rejected or otherwise addressed the "direct" restraint analysis. See also Bendix Corp. v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 524, 534-39 (D. Md. 1982) (similar treatment of the Michigan
takeover statute).
More recently, the Supreme Court signaled that the "supposedly precise division between 'direct' and 'indirect' effects on interstate commerce" was being abandoned and that, in every case, we
must now look to the "nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the
effect of regulation upon the national interest in the commerce." Arkansas Electric Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1905, 1910 (1983). While this approach win probably eliminate the per
se invalidity of any restraint, it is likely to increase the scrutiny for extraterritorial effects, thus
strengthening the Martin Marriettainterpretation of Edgar v. MITE Corp.
Professor Richard Buxbaum, in a profound and comprehensive study of the implications for
state securities and corporate law of Edgar v. MITE Corp. and of other cases raising commerce
clause and preemption issues, expects a "surge [in challenges] in the near future." Buxbaum, Federalism and CorporateLaw, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1163, 1166 (1984). He is quite critical of a laissez-faire
perception of the commerce clause which leads to the invalidation of state corporate-type legislation.
He engages in elaborate efficiency analysis and concludes that, so long as state legislation does not
discriminate against interstate capital resource flows, it should not be subjected to commerce clause
scrutiny. Id at 1168-80. In other words, he is unhappy about the extension of the clause beyond
discrimination to pure overreaching through extraterritoriality.
Whether recourse should be had to the due process and full faith clauses, rather than to the
commerce clause, to curb such overreaching is a fine doctrinal issue. Nevertheless, that state law
extraterritoriality in the corporate field raises serious state-versus-state federalism questions cannot
be denied. Buxbaum himself recognizes that state antitakeover law cannot be made applicable to a
foreign corporation solely because one shareholder resides there; this would "impose significant externalities on other states," and an "indirect barrier to the interstate mobility of resources would be
created." Id at 1173-74. Yet, under his analysis such externalities and a regulation of the mobility
of resources runs afoul of the commerce clause only if they are discriminatory. Buxbaum is also too
sanguine about the ease with which dissatisfied shareholders can reincorporate in another state or
use the capital markets to circumvent state overreaching.
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The MITE majority was quite explicit in its concern over the burden
and delay caused by the state-by-state regulation of nationwide tender
offers.1 8 2 The same evil, however, may arise through local regulation of
local transactions where, as a practical matter or because of requirements
of uniform or equal treatment, some out-of-state transactions must also
conform. 183 Even if the characterization of the Illinois statute as regulating solely internal corporate affairs were accepted, the statute would still
not survive scrutiny under the commerce clause. In its alternative holding, the MITE majority noted that the only reason Illinois claimed authority to regulate was because ten percent of the outstanding shares
were held by Illinois residents. The Act "applies to corporations that are

not incorporated in Illinois and have their principal place of business in
other states. Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of
Professor Tribe's general position on the reach of the negative Commerce Clause is closer to
that advocated in the text. While Tribe appears to share Buxbaum's position that the commerce
clause should not be read to constitutionalize "an economic theory of free trade," he also stresses
that the "function of the clause is to insure national solidarity, not national efficiency." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAW 25 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
182. MITE, 457 U.S. at 642.
183. Commerce clause cases both prior and subsequent to MITE have taken a broad view of
what unduly burdens out-of-state transactions and have included in their calculus the extraterritorial
effects of intra-stateregulation. A major case on this point is Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 775 (1945), cited with approval in MITE, 457 U.S. at 643. See also Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373, 377-86 (1946) (Virginia statute requiring separation of white and black passengers on
interstate and intrastate motor carriers is unlawful burden on interstate commerce because of its
effect on nationwide travel); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Selig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-24 (1935) (interstate
commerce unduly burdened by state law forbidding in-state resale of milk purchased from out-ofstate farmers at prices below the minimum prices required to be paid in-state farmers). More recently, in United States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 278-84 (2d Cir. 1982), aJJ'd, 104 S.
Ct. 265 (1983) (three justices noting probable jurisdiction and Justice Powell taking no part), the
Second Circuit held that a Connecticut law which required brewers to fie an affirmation that their
Connecticut prices were not higher than their prices in neighboring states placed an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce because of its effect on out-of-state prices even though the law was
intended only to lower prices in Connecticut: "[lit has been held repeatedly that where the practical
effect of a state's legislation is to control conduct in other states, the regulation violates the Commerce Clause." Id. at 279-80. This logic has been extended to the area of tender offers. Post-Edgar
cases suggest that limiting the applicability of a takeover statute only to intrastate tenders will not
necessarily save it. A court may find a burden on interstate commerce if the local regulation would
frustrate a multistate tender offer by, for example, reducing the total number of shares offered and
thus indirectly nullifying the out-of-state tenders. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690
F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Occidental Petroleum v. Cities Service Co., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,063 (W.D. Okla. 1982). This approach may even undermine the prevailing assumption that the
traditional blue-sky regulation is totally immune to commerce clause challenges. See supranote 171.
Cf. North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Supreme Court
has consistently upheld the authority of states to enact blue-sky laws against commerce clause challenges."); Petrites v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1981) (blue-sky laws
have consistently withstood commerce clause challenges). For a strong criticism of Martin Marietta
and support for blue-sky state power, see Profusek & Gompf, supra note 168, at 24-27. See also, R.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 8-29 (1978); Buxbaum, supra note 181 at 1179;
Sargent, supra note 168, at 9.
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184

The potential impact of the statement that a state has "no interest"

in regulating the internal affairs of "foreign corporations" despite local
shareholdings is far reaching. Such a statement leaves nothing to be
placed in the constitutional balance under the test of Pike v. Bruce

Church, Inc.185 to justify any state interference in the internal affairs of
"foreign corporations." Because the application of internal affairs law to
a multistate corporation will affect interstate commerce in almost every
instance, little room remains for the effectuation of local corporate policy. This "no interest" language also bears on how the "significant contacts generating state interests" due process test of Allstate will be
applied in this field. Thus, regulating internal affairs without "interest"

not only may burden interstate commerce, but also it may well violate
due process.

How seriously should we take this limiting aspect of MITE in our
analysis of state authority over internal corporate affairs? That the quotation appeared in an incidental discussion of the Court's alternative

holding might make one cautious were it not for the fact that it is consistent with (a) the logic of the main holding in cutting down local control
of out-of-state transactions and persons; and (b) the philosophy of Wolfe,
which recognizes the interstate value of choosing a single law uniformly
to govern these matters.18 6 This interpretation gains support from the
approving reference in MITE to the "internal affairs doctrine. . . a con-

flict of laws principle which recognizes that only one state should have
authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs . . . because other18 7
wise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands."
184. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645. This language was taken from the opinion below, MITE Corp. v.
Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 501 n.29 (7th Cir. 1980).
185. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (state statute may regulate interstate commerce indirectly but the
burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in relation to the local interests served by
the statute).
186. [P]rior to [MITE] more modem conflicts of law and other corporate law concepts had
begun to recognize the importance of the actual presence of a corporation in a state rather
than its technical locus of incorporation if the subject corporation does not have a meaningful presence within it. Nonetheless, after [MITE] the more traditional internal affairs
analysis, which recognizes only the law of a corporation's state of organization, will be
accorded the most significant weight, at least for purposes of constitutional analysis.
Profusek & Gompf, supra note 168, at 19 (citation omitted); see also Wolff, The Unconstitutionality
of the Arkansas Tender Offer Statute, 36 ARK. L. REv. 233, 252-53 (1982); Note, Tender Offers,
supra note 168, at 104-06; Note, State Takeover Statutes Under Attack, supra note 168, at 1018-19.
187. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645 (citation omitted). Similar language favorable to the lex incorporationis can also be found in other recent Supreme Court cases such as First Nat. City Bank v. Banco
Para El Comercio, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); Shaffer v. Heitner, 439 U.S. 942, 952 (1977). See also
Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 806 (1971)..
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At the same time, however, MITE should not be read as constitutionalizing the lex incorporationis. The apparent recognition that the
state of the principal place of business of a corporation may have an "interest," and the approving references to the protective interests of a state
in its resident shareholders, leave room for an alternative internal affairs
regime" 8 or perhaps even the exceptional ad hoe application of certain
local rules when the local policy is strong and the incidental burdens on
out-of-state persons and transactions are minor.
The reinforcement of Wolfe by MITE should at least be deemed to

have destroyed the alternate holdings of the two well-known interventionist cases, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski' 89 and State ex rel Weede
v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware,190 in which local policy had

triumphed over the lex incorporationis. In Western Air Lines, the California Court of Appeals did not limit its holding to the pseudo-foreignness

of the corporation but proceeded to distinguish Wolfe. The court held
that a state has the power to apply its law to all corporate "dealings" in

securities with local residents, especially where the corporation also does
substantial in-state business, whatever its state of incorporation, principal
place of business, or headquarters.1 9 1
188. "The [MITE] decision would not appear necessarily to preclude the states from regulating
tender offers for local companies closely identified with one state, by virtue of incorporation, principal place of business and/or situs of a substantial number of shareholders." Pitt, Hostile Tender
Offers Now OmnipresentFact of Life, Legal Times, July 19, 1982 at 16, col. 3; cf Hi-Shear Indus. v.
Campbell, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,033 (D.S.C. 1980) (interest of state of incorporation to regulate internal affairs is recognized; state where some business is conducted and manufacturing facilities maintained has no such interest at least where headquarters are not located in the

state).
189. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961). A Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business, corporate headquarters, and substantial shareholdings in California had held a

shareholders' meeting in California to amend its charter and eliminate cumulative voting. Claiming
that the change constituted a "sale" of securities in California within the reach of California's bluesky law, the Commissioner of Corporations ruled that it was "unfair" to California shareholders and
threatened sanctions if the amendment were implemented. The corporation won an injunction in the
superior court on the ground that the commissioner had exceeded his jurisdiction. The court held
that because the amendment was not a "sale" and, in any event, took effect in Delaware, the place of
filing, which was beyond California's regulatory authority, the interference would violate full faith
and credit. Id. at 401-03, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22. The court of appeals reversed, stressing the
California locus of the crucial events: the original exchange, with commissioner approval, of the
stock of Western Air Lines for the stock of a prior California corporation; the proxy solicitation
from and holding of the meeting and vote in California; and the residence of many shareholders in
the state. Id. at 406, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 726. California later amended its statute to prohibit the
assertion ofjurisdiction over a foreign corporation unless the stock is not listed on the NYSE and at
least 25% is owned in California. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 25103 (West 1984).
190. 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942), afl'd sub. nom., State ex reL Weede v. Bechtel, 239
Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cerL denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949).
191. Western Air Lines, 191 Cal. App. 2d at 410-12, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 726-27 (citing Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954)).
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It is clear that this extended rationale cannot withstand the MITE
scrutiny. Regulating corporate "dealings" with local residents may be
legitimate, but using such dealings as a lever to subject multistate securities transactions or the internal affairs of foreign corporations to local
control would violate the commerce clause. The presence of some local
shareholdings and some local corporate business is insufficient to support
the interference with voting rights that occurred in Western Air Lines,
and that, as a practical matter, extended to all shares whatever their location and whatever the situs of the other corporate contacts. Even if it
were possible to engraft cumulative voting rights on only the shares held
in California, the out-of-state holders would have been prejudiced. Interstate commerce would have been thereby burdened and questions of unconstitutional discrimination would have arisen. 192 The criticism of
Western Air Lines by Professors Reese and Kaufman 193 finally bore fruit
in MITE, albeit under the commerce rather than the full faith and credit
clause.
Some states have sought to apply their corporate law to the financial
requirements for the issuance of shares by local public utilities organized
as foreign corporations. This was the case in Weede, in which the utility's headquarters, principal place of business, and assets were all located
in Iowa. The Iowa Supreme Court was not content to rely on the
pseudo-foreignness of the corporation, however, and proceeded to assert
that a state has the power, consistent with full faith and credit, to apply
its internal affairs law by virtue of the local business of a foreign corporation. The court stressed that although "the organic power of a foreign
corporation depends upon the law of the state from which its existence is
the corporaderived, in the exercise of such power in another jurisdiction
1 94
policy."'
public
and
laws
local
the
tion must conform to
But does the partial issuance of shares in Iowa constitute the exercise of the corporation's "organic power" in Iowa? Even before MITE a
line of post-Weede cases determined that similar controls over multistate
foreign corporations violated the commerce clause. In United Air Lines
v. Commerce Commission,195 for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois
faced the question whether Illinois constitutionally could subject the issuance of stock by United Air Lines, a Delaware corporation, to the fiscal requirements of Illinois law and to the scrutiny of the Illinois
192. See Horowitz, supra note 187, at 819; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1144; Small,
Changes in Rights, Preferences, Privilegesand Restrictionson OutstandingSecurities Under the California CorporateSecurities Law, 14 HASTINGs L.J. 94, 119, 122 (1962).
193. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1129.
194. Weede, 231 Iowa at 799, 2 N.W.2d at 387 (quoting 23 AM. JUR. Foreign Corporations§ 91
(1939)).
2d 516, 207 N.E.2d 433 (1965).
195. 32 Ill.
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Commerce Commission. United had executive offices in Illinois, but
only a small fraction of its business involved intrastate routes or passengers. While the court recognized that a public utility incorporated outof-state is subject to the regulatory authority of a state insofar as it "operate[s] within the state, including the issuance of stock," it ruled that the
issuance of securities is a "single, invisible act. .. [that] cannot be fractionalized and given portions allocated to specific states."' 9 6 Subjecting
the issue to a "public interest" review in the sixteen states in which
United Air Lines operated, each of which had only a limited local interest, would be "unjustifiably expensive, time consuming and burdensome"
and would violate the commerce clause. 197 In light of the interstate character of the business and the intended interstate use of the jet aircraft to
be acquired with the proceeds of the issue, Illinois could not impose its
198
own rules even on the intrastate portion of the issue.
It may be that United Air Lines and other similar cases1 99 remain
obscure and undiscovered by conflicts and constitutional experts. Nevertheless, not only are these cases harbingers of MITE's "no interest" holding, but also they strongly support the commerce clause presumption
against interference in the internal affairs of foreign corporations. They
further suggest that the controls involved in Weede overstep the constitutional boundaries. 2°° State controls over the issuance and transfer of the
stock of public utility and public resource corporations have continued to
be subjected to commerce clause scrutiny after MITE. For example, in
Baltimore Gas & Electric v. Heintz, 20 1 a Maryland statute prohibited the
acquisition anywhere of more than ten percent of the stock of public utilities by any stock corporation. It was clear that the statute, which applied only to corporations organized in Maryland, did not have a
196. Id. at 525, 207 N.E.2d at 438.
197. Id. at 524, 207 N.E.2d at 438.
198. Id.
199. For a similar pre-MITE application of the commerce clause in this field, see United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n, 172 Neb. 784, 112 N.W.2d 414 (1961); State ex reL
Utilities Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 288 N.C. 201, 217 S.E.2d 543 (1975); Panhandle E.
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 56 Ohio St. 2d 334, 383 N.E.2d 1163 (1978). That the foreign

incorporation of the companies involved was the crucial factor is corroborated by other cases where
similar restrictions by the state of incorporation have been upheld. See, eg., Michigan Gas Storage
v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 405 Mich. 376, 397-99, 275 N.W.2d 457, 464-65 (1979); People v.
County Transp. Co., 303 N.Y. 391, 401-02, 103 N.E.2d 421, 427-28, appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 961
(1952).
200. The result in Weede may perhaps be sustainable under either a "limited intervention" or an
"external affairs" analysis as effectuating a substantial local interest while imposing minimal burdens
on interstate commerce. The emphasis here will be on the local concern for the fiscal soundness of
local utilities and on the ease of compliance with certain stock issuance revenue requirements involving operational rather than internal affairs controls.
201. 582 F. Supp. 675 (D. Md. 1984). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 24(e) (1980).
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discriminatory intent against or effect upon interstate commerce. In
holding, however, that it placed an excessive burden on such commerce
as measured against the purported local interest, the Federal district
court stressed that the state could have achieved the desired end in a less
restrictive way, for example, by subjecting the stock acquisitions to scrutiny rather than prohibition.2 02 But even this latter concept may run
afoul of the commerce clause. This is suggested by the reported order of
United States District Judge Cook in the highly controversial Icahn/
Phillips Petroleum battle 20 3 which blocked, apparently on commerce
clause grounds, the enforcement of a new Oklahoma statute which subjects to the approval of the state corporation commission all acquisitions
of more than ten percent of the stock of a corporation, wherever formed,
owning more than $75 million in energy resources in Oklahoma. 204
The revitalization in MITE of the impact of the commerce clause to
control legislative overreachings by the states in the absence of federal
preemption 2 5 is welcome. Discrimination against interstate commerce
in the pursuit of parochial interests may be the most obnoxious type of
state interference, but it is not the only one. Extending a state's sense of
justice, however non-discriminatory and well-intentioned, to multistate
or multinational transactions not only offends the equal authority of the
other states involved but, by opening up interstate and international commerce to conflicting demands, creates a disconcerting burden on citizens.
When Congress has not enacted a uniform regime of regulation, such as a
federal corporation law,206 protection against excessive local interference
may be needed not only as a shield against local bias, 20 7 but also as a
202. Id. at 679-82 (citing Martin Marietta v. Bendix, 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982), the case
which carried the MITE analysis to its ultimate conclusion). See also Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Public Service Conm'n, 127 Mich. App. 88, 93-94, 338 N.W.2d 731, 735-36 (1983) (citing all the
earlier public utility cases to the same effect).
203. See Icahn Wins Round Against Phillips, ClearingHis Bid, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1985, at 13,
col. 3-4.
204. Senate Bill No. 143 §§ 3(2),(3),(4)b,5(4),(6), 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws 205. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425 (1982);
Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125, 165. For a critical
view of MITE, see Buxbaum, supra note 181.
206. See Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 377 (1946) (states may not regulate areas where
national uniformity is required); Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 396-97 (1913) (state regulation
violates the commerce clause if it either directly burdens commerce or conflicts with federal law); see
also Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 61, 73
(1979); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 150, at 49-55; Weintraub, Whos Afraid of ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 17, 25 (1981); cf Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408, 414 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (there is less need for national uniformity where the
context is "simple contract rather than shareholder-corporation law").
207. See, eg., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981) (court
shows less deference to local regulations when there is a bias against out-of-state persons and businesses); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938); United
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means of securing an equitable, stable, and predictable regime for complex multistate and multinational relationships. 20 8 The ascendancy of
federalist values to check state legislative chauvinism is an overdue antidote to the almost total withdrawal exemplified by Allstate. By charting
outer limits to the reach of state legislation, MITE is bound to place
some overdue controls on "the centrifugal, isolating or hostile forces of
localism" 20 9 in choice of law.
This article does not attempt to trace the implications of MITE in
all fields of choice of law in which interstate commerce may be implicated. At a minimum, it should seriously limit the freewheeling application of the law of any state of any contact in situations in which a
transaction or relationship that requires unitary treatment is connected
with more than one state. Furthermore, "minimum" interests do not
suffice; the interests advanced by the application of a state's law to any
issue must be strong enough to outweigh the consequent burden on interstate commerce. In addition, a literal application of the "direct restraint" analysis espoused by the four justices would leave the new
conflicts in shambles. It is precisely through the substitution of personal
for territorial contacts and of effects for conduct which would be limited,
if not precluded, by the "direct restraint" analysis that the new conflicts
has been able to justify the application of forum law in favor of local
parties, especially plaintiffs, in disregard of the situs of the events and
transactions.
We have come to the end of our constitutional inquiry, but not of
our quest for conflicts justice in this field. Constitutionality is a prerequisite but not a sufficient determinant of such justice. That a state has the
power to apply its own law does not necessarily mean that it should do
so. As Justice Stevens noted in Allstate, Minnesota's approach was
plainly "unsound as a matter of normal conflicts law" but still met the
minimum constitutional requirements. 210 In choosing the law applicable
to corporate internal affairs, the gap between what is permissible and
what is desirable is quite narrow. The constitutional calculus already
reflects recognition of the authority of the state of incorporation and of
the value of selecting a single, predictable regime to govern the rights and
obligations arising from the "indivisible" internal corporate relationship.
States Brewers Ass'n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 1982), affid, 104 S.Ct. 265 (1983); see also
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DTsrRusT 83-84, 90-91 (1980) (commerce clause protects out-of-state
businesses and persons).
208. See Profusek & Gompf, supra note 168, at 29.
209. Brown, The Open Economy: JusticeFrankfurterand the Position ofthe Judiciary,67 YALE

L.J. 219, 220 (1957); see also Hay, Full Faith and Credit and Federalism in Choice of Law, 34
MERCER L. Rlv.709, 718-22 (1983); Silberman, supra note 150, at 130-31.
210. 449 U.S. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Consequently, we must now attempt to identify the exceptional circumstances in which the lex incorporationis not only could be, but also
should be, overridden by local corporate policy.
VI.

ALTERNATIVES TO OR DEVIATIONS FROM THE LEX
INCORPORATIONIS: CONFLICTS ANALYSIS WITHIN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The lex incorporationis has always enjoyed a strong position in
American judicial and legislative practice, and MITE strengthened its
constitutional supports. But no serious effort has been made to reassess
this rule under the new conflicts methodologies. What is the explanation
for this? Are the constitutional strictures too tight or the merits of the
rule so obvious and weighty that a reconsideration would be superfluous?
Do commentators find the subject too treacherous and unrewarding or
are the courts and the legislatures too overburdened or tradition-bound
to pursue this demanding and complex task? There is probably some
truth in all of these possibilities.
A.

The New Conflicts, the Lex Incorporationis,and the "Real Seat"
Rule.

The conflicts revolution which gathered momentum in the 1960's
and 1970's has made substantial inroads in the conflicts law of a majority
of the states. 2 11 While a detailed review of the differences and variations
among the new conflicts approaches is beyond the scope of this article, it
is useful to identify those common themes that are potentially relevant to
choice of law for internal corporate affairs and to assess their impact on
the lex incorporationis.
The more radical new approaches deemphasize three of the principal goals of traditional conflicts in favor of other considerations. First,
the goals of forum-neutral justice and uniformity in the selection of the
applicable law are attacked as unrealistic or even improper. Instead, it is
postulated that forum policies and interests have priority and forum law
normally should apply to all disputes before the court unless a persuasive
case can be made for another law. The quest for the proper or most ap2 12
propriate law must thus be abandoned.
Second, the goal of allocative justice-the distribution of law-making authority in the private law sphere among equal sovereigns on the
basis of content-neutral criteria-must yield to the vindication of state
211. See supra note 50.
212. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 51, at 17-20; Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of
Interests Analysis, 32 AM. J. Com. L. 1, 9-12 (1984).
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interests in particular contexts and to the "substantive" justice of specific
2 13

results.
Third, the goal of certain justice and the pursuit of predictability
and ease of application through a system of conflicts rules is condemned

as rigid, mechanical, and formalistic jurisprudence. In its place, certain
general and open-ended standards such as "significant relationship" are
used, and flexible methodologies are employed (a) to "discover" legisla-

tive intent bearing on the spatial and personal applicability of the policies
and interests embodied in a state's substantive rules, and (b) to adjust the

conflicting policies and interests of the various states of contact under

2 14
vague formulae of compatibility and impairment.

Although neither the premises nor the pretentions of the conflicts
revolution limit it to any particular area, its principal impact so far has

been in the field of torts, in which it managed to destroy or at least qualify the lex loci delicti215 in a majority of the states. 216 In other areas the
penetration of the new conflicts has been minimal. 17 This is particularly

true when the unity and uniformity of the applicable legal regime is important. For example, succession of property continues generally to be

subjected to the law of the decedent's domicile at death for movables 218
and of the situs for immovables. 219 Domicile and situs also remain basically undisturbed, respectively, in status 220 and property. 22 1

There is little doubt that in the context of-the liberal rules of longarm and doing-business jurisdiction, and of the mandates of full faith and

credit on recognition and enforcement of judgments, the new conflicts
have rewarded forum shopping and encouraged parochialism, particu213. See Hay, Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HAsTINGs L. 1644, 1659-62
(1981); Korn, The Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique, 83-COLUM. L. REv. 772, 807-11 (1983);
Juenger, supra note 212, at 45-49.
214. R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 216-19, 291-95 (3d ed. 1981); 1
E. SCOLES & P. HAY,supra note 51, at 565-68; Juenger, supra note 212, at 14-28.
215. The term "lex loci delicti" refers to the law of the place where the wrong occurred.
216. See Reese, American Trends in PrivateInternationalLaw:Academic and JudicialManipulation of Choice of Law Rules in Tort Cases, 33 VAND.L. REv. 717, 736-39 (1980).
217. See id. at 737 ("To date, other areas of the law have been relatively unscathed by most of
the new approaches.").
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, §§ 260-265; Reese, supra note 216, at 738; 1
E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 51, at 766-95.
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, §§ 236-242; 1 E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra
note 51, at 766-95.
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, §§ 70-71, 285, 287; 1 E. SCOLES & P. HAy,
supra, note 51, at 415-47, 535-51.
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, §§ 223-232, 244-249, 251-256.
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larly when the local law favored local parties. 222 In terms of substantive

results, perhaps the most significant impact of the new conflicts has been
to enable courts in tort suits to sidestep unpopular legislation such as
guest statutes and limitations on the amount of recovery and immunities

of the "landmark" new conflicts cases revolve
to suit. Indeed, most
223
around these issues.

Whether, as a general matter, the sacrifices in practicality, neutrality, and comity brought about by the new conflicts are worth the candle;
whether the new methodologies can be made to work in difficult areas

and not only those, such as in personal injury torts, in which an overall
compensatory goal makes easy the displacement of "anachronistic" de-

fendant-protective devices; whether the yield in conflicts justice has increased in this flexible atmosphere; whether a better balance will

eventually be struck between forum preference and free choice with the
risks of "mishmash" 224 conflicts, and the values of neutrality and predict-

ability with the problems of conceptualist automaticity, are questions
which this article cannot address. Mounting criticism of the premises

and questioning of the promises of the new conflicts show that the jury is
still out. 225 Yet even under the new conflicts, there has been little challenge to the lex incorporationis as a presumptive rule. Whatever critical

discussion there is relates to the justification of alternatives to or deviations from the rule rather than its abolition. 226 This is quite remarkable

222. See Brilmayer, InterestsAnalysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392,
410-11 (1980); Ely, Choice ofLaw and the State's Interest in ProtectingIts Own, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 173 (1981).
223. See, eg., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973)
(ceiling on damages); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966) (interspousal immunity); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (guest statute).
224. See Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 645, 702-08 (1983).
225. Professors Hill and Rosenberg were the earliest critics of interests analysis and similar approaches. See, eg., Hill, Governmental Interests and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 463, 502-04 (1960); Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: An
Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. Rav. 459, 463-69 (1967). See also
Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 202 (1969); Twerski, Neumeier v.
Kuehner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, I HoFsTRA L. REV. 104 (1973).
The more recent literature of the "unbelievers" includes: Bodenheimer, The Need for a Reorientation in American Conflicts Law, 29 HAsTINGS L.J. 731, 744-50 (1978); Brilmayer, supra note
222, at 429-3 1; Davies, A Legislator'sLook at Hague and Choice-of-Law Rules, 10 HOFSmRA L. Rav.
171, 193 (1981); Juenger, supra note 212, at 48-50; Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Better
Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflicts of Laws, 30 HASTnNGS L.J. 255, 293 (1978); Kegel, Paternal
Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 615, 619-24 (1979); Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
772, 965-66 (1983); Nagan, Conflicts Theory in Conflict: A Systematic Appraisal of Traditionaland
Contemporary Theories, 3 N.Y. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343, 464 (1982); Rosenberg, The Comeback of
Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 946, 958 (1981).
226. See Latty, supra note 52 passim; Kaplan, supra note 1passim.
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when under the pro-forum, pro-resident-plaintiff biases of the new conflicts it would have been easy to attack the lex incorporationis as rigid
and formalistic and to make a strong case for the vindication of the local
corporate policy of the various other states of contact. This reticence
may be due in part to a desire to avoid unfamiliar substantive issues.
Perhaps, also, there is appreciation of the value of national uniformity in
this field.

2 27

Choice of law for internal corporate affairs is the subject least susceptible to the free-wheeling and forum-biased treatment typical of the
more radical new conflicts methodologies. In the typical tort or contract
dispute, the disfunctions of the new conflicts are least apparent. The case
involves a single transaction or event and a dispute between two persons
who have no continuing relationship with each other; the issues are few,
self-contained, and can be dealt with conclusively in the proceedings; all
the parties are before the court; the decision has no effect on non-parties;
and the risk of inconsistent judgments is negligible. By contrast, internal
corporate rules establish an entire system of private governance on a continuing basis involving persons-directors, officers, shareholders of various classes-performing different tasks and having potentially
antagonistic interests. It would be intolerable to allow its component
parts to be regulated under differing principles for different persons at
different times. Rather, such a regime must be uniform and stable to
promote efficient and equitable operation. The corporate participants
need to know the rules of the game in advance and must be able to plan
their transactions under fixed standards and procedures that determine
their rights and liabilities. Beyond the requirements of unitary and constant governance, the corporate participants, especially the shareholders,
justifiably expect and demand that they be treated equally with other
persons similarly situated and not be subject to differential treatment depending on such variables as the place where a suit is brought, where
some parties reside, or where the corporation has assets or does
228
businesS.
Another important difference between internal corporate affairs and
the situations where the new conflicts have displaced the old rules lies in
the matter of concession and autonomy. That is, the organizers of the
corporation, with the consent of the state, have made an affirmative and
227. See supra note 164.
228. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICrS LAW § 253 (3d ed. 1977) (it would be "intolerable"
not to give all shareholders the same rights and duties); Sargent, supra note 53, at 19-20 (considerations of efficiency, practicality, predictability support single law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 46, § 302 comments e & f, § 309 comment c.
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voluntary choice of the state of incorporation. 229 Historically, the lex
incorporationis was derived from the very concept of the corporation as
an artificial entity created and perpetuated by the state of incorporation.230 This conceptual explanation is now wedded to a consensual rationale: the choice of the state of incorporation comes about by
agreement among the organizers and its law is selected, explicitly or implicitly, to govern this private internal corporate relationship. It is there-

fore fair and reasonable that they be bound by

it.231

The autonomy of the parties and the protection of party expectations are given substantial weight in both the traditional and the new
233
conflicts. 2 32 The parties' choice of law is honored unless it is arbitrary.
Under the new conflicts, such choice will probably be scrutinized more
carefully when the law of the forum is to be displaced. 234 The lack of any
connection between the law chosen and the parties or the transactions

may be more blatant in the field of internal corporate affairs where charters are always available. There is therefore some room for the state of

the predominant contacts to challenge the lex incorporationis in exceptional situations.
The preclusive effect of judgments under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel reinforces the need to choose one constant
law to govern all internal affairs disputes. A judgment in a derivative

action merges all the related claims and precludes another suit not only
by the parties but also by any other shareholder in any forum. 235 Thus,
229. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 228, at § 253.
230. See id § 251.
231. See supra note 228. Furthermore, at least in free-enterprise countries, giving maximum
freedom to the organizers is consistent with the private nature of the corporate relationships and
with the enabling philosophy of corporate law. But see Sargent, supra note 53, at 18-19 (creature-ofthe-state, intent of parties formalistic, not connected to any state interests).
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, § 187; Covey & Morris, The Enforceabilityof
Agreements Providingfor Forum and Choice-of-Law Selection, 61 DEN. L. 837, 837-60 (1984);
Kozyris, JustifiedParty Expectationsin Choice of Law and Jurisdiction: ConstitutionalSignificance
or Bootstrapping?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 313, 314-16 (1982); see also I E. ScoLES & P. HAY, supra
note 51, at 632-36 (and authorities cited therein).
233. See I E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 51, at 637-49 (and authorities cited therein).
234. See Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts ofLaw: PartyAutonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1659, 1691 (1982) (the policy and interest
orientation of the new conflicts requires that party choice of law, at least in ordinary contracts,
should be treated as just another contact).
235. A recent famous dispute illustrates this point. Four stockholders, Auerbach, Limmer,
Cramer, and Parkoff, each brought separate derivative actions on behalf of General Telephone &
Electronics Corp. (GTE) against its directors, claiming that the corporation had made questionable
payments to foreign officials. They all alleged misuse and waste of corporate assets and breach of
fiduciary duties. GTE's board of directors consequently created a special litigation committee, consisting of three directors who had joined the board subsequent to the alleged wrongdoing, to determine what position the corporation should take. After more than six months of investigation, the

Vol. 1985:1]

CORPORATE CHOICE OF LAW

without the lex incorporationis, an unhealthy incentive will be created
for some shareholders to forum- and law-shop in ways prejudicial to the
interests and positions of other shareholders. Furthermore, adjudication
may prejudice non-party shareholders to the extent that the corporation,
usually amenable to suit in many fora, is bound by the related judgments.
New actions by these shareholders may also result in inconsistent judgments and serious difficulties of enforcement.
The final advantage of the lex incorporationis, like democracy, is the

lack of a better alternative. It is often said that most continental countries use the "real seat" rule,236 but in reality this so-called rule represents a limited departure from, not an alternative to, the lex

incorporationis. In Europe, as in the United States, a corporation is
formed under the chosen law of a particular jurisdiction. The law nor-

mally requires that the registered seat of the corporation, as specified in
committee found no breach of duty by the defendant directors and no merit to the stockholders'
claims. The committee determined that it would not be in the best interest of the corporation for the
derivative actions to proceed, and upon the committee's report, the corporation sought dismissal of
the actions. All four cases were dismissed by different courts. Cramer v. G.T.E., 582 F.2d 259 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1980); Limmer v. G.T.E., 76 Civ. 1494 (S.D.N.Y. March 11,
1977); Parkoff v. G.T.E., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 425 N.E.2d 820, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1981); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
In ParkofftheNew York Court of Appeals explored the res judicata effect of the earlier adjudications and held that the federal court's decision in Cramer barred Parkoffs claims under the doctrine of res judicata because: (1) in Cramerthe court had already considered all of the questionable
activities of GTE that Parkoff mentioned in his complaint; (2) there was no showing that Parkoff
unsuccessfully sought to intervene in Cramer; (3) there was no showing of collusion or fraud on
shareholders who were not parties to Cramer's action; and (4) Cramerwas dismissed on the merits.
53 N.Y.2d at 414, 425 N.E.2d at 84, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 434. The court, however, did hold that certain
of Parkoffs claims were not barred by Auerbach not only because they were different from
Auerbach's but also because Parkoff, unlike Auerbach, had not been able to complete pretrial discovery and his attempt to intervene inAuerbach had been denied. 53 N.Y.2d at 417-18, 425 N.E.2d
at 825, 442 N.Y.S. 2d at 436-37. For further discussion of these complexities, see 51 CORP. REP.
BULL. (PH), No. 16, at 1-2 (July 4, 1981). See also Tanzer v. Turbodyne, 68 A.D.2d 614, 417
N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Note, Res Judicata in DerivativeActions, 45 ALA. L. REV. 145
(1982).
236. See, ag., A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 15 (1976); 2 A. EHRENZWEIG,
PRIVATE INTERNAL LAW 121-24 (1973); E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY

LAws 29, 53 (1971).
For a fuller description and discussion of the "seat" concept, see W. BACHE, DER INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMENSVERTRAG NACH DEUTCHEM KOLLISIONRECHT

(1966) H. BATIFFOL

& P.

LAGARDE, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE §§ 229-240 (7th ed. 1981); D. EVRIGENIS, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-41 (1973); H. G. KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN
IN DEUTCHEN GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT (1971); E. KRISPIS, JURIDICAL PERSONS, ESPECIALLY COMMERCIAL CORPORATIONS, IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950); LEBEN, UNE TENATIVE DE
PERCEPTION GLOBALE: LE RECOuRS A LA NATIONALITt DES Socif s IN L' ENTERPRISE MULTINATIONALE FACE AU DROIT 216, 221-28 (1977). G. MARIDAKIS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 434-53 (1967); D. PAPASTERIOU, THE SEAT OF JURIDICAL PERSONS IN PRIVATE LAW (1979);

2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 33-36 (1960); Coester-Waltien,
German Conflict Rules and the MultinationalEnterprise,6 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 197 (1976).
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the articles, be located in the state of incorporation. If, however, the
"real" seat does not coincide with the registered one or is subsequently
moved to another state, there is "fraude a la loi." This is a technical
violation that not only undermines "good standing" at the state of incorporation but also opens the way for the state of the "real seat" to "pierce
the veil" of foreign incorporation and refuse to recognize the corporate

237
existence or even subject the internal corporate affairs to its own law.

In other words, the practical operation of the "real seat" rule is to require not only corporate existence but an additionaland real connection
to the state of incorporation.
Perhaps when most private commerce stopped at the national frontiers and managers and shareholders happened or were even required to
be citizens of the incorporating nation, it made considerable sense to attribute a "nationality" to the corporation based on a genuine connection
and recognize, under continental conflicts, that the national state controlled its existence and organization. The formal argument that the discrepancy between a registered and a "real seat" constitutes "fraude a la
loi" is buttressed by the power of a state to impose its own sense of justice
on the internal affairs of corporations centered there. Thus, the "real
seat" served as a surrogate for the state of the dominant contacts and
interests. 238 This was not unreasonable when the practical and formal
necessities of operations made the assumed coincidence quite probable in
fact. With the expansion of corporate activities across national frontiers
and the separation between management (center of administration) and
assets and operations (center of exploitation), the question of which of
these is the better connecting factor had to be addressed. Continental
practice continued to prefer "administration" based on the perception
that the nation where the corporate "brain" or "nerve center" is located,
where the key corporate decisions are made, and where "control" is exercised, has the greater concern about and power over internal corporate
affairs. 239 Yet there still remains a lack of consensus as to where this
"administration" is actually located. The majority view equates "administration" with the directors while alternative theories advocate the place
where shareholders meet and act.24 0 The uncertainty is compounded by

the fact that different nations at various times, while using the same standard, arrive at differing conclusions as to where a particular seat is lo237. See 2 E. RABEL, supranote 236, at 38-40; Conard, OrganizingforBusiness, in 2 E. STEIN &

T. NICHOLSON,

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

1, 61-62 (1960).

238. See 2 E. RABEL, supra note 236, at 33-68.
239. See id. at 40-41; see also Palmer, The Austrian Codification of Conflict Law, AM. J. CoMP.
L. 197, 224 (1980) (discussing Article 10 of the new Austrian statute on Private International Law,
enacted in 1978, which refers to the place where the corporation has its chief executive office).
240. See 2 E. RABEL, supra note 236, at 41-42, 47-50.
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cated. In addition, the constancy in the applicable law is continuously in

jeopardy through changes in the patterns and locations of corporate administration. The more diverse and multinational are the corporate op-

erations, the less plausible is the role of the "real seat" as the situs of the
most significant relationship. The states of nationality and residence of

the shareholders or of the principal business operations may assert an
equal or superior right of regulation, especially because these contacts are
not only more meaningful under an effects test, but are also more difficult

to manipulate than the place where the directors' or shareholders' meetings are held.
The elusiveness of the corporate center or domicile is tellingly illustrated by the experience of the United States with the concept of corpo-

rate "citizenship" in federal diversity jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c) (1982), a corporation is deemed a citizen of the state "by which
it has been incorporated" as well as of the state where "it has its principal
place of business." Incredible difficulties have been encountered by the
courts in localizing this single principal place of business and at least five

difficult and contradictory tests have been used-nerve-center, center-ofoperations, place-of-acting or physical assets, maximum-public-visibility,
and totality-of-corporate-activity tests.24 1 The greater mobility of resources and corporate operations makes the "real seat" or "headquarters" rule even less suitable in the United States than in Europe.
Even in its European cradle, the "seat" rule is losing ground.2 4 2 The
Netherlands stubbornly continues to ignore it,243 and Switzerland is con-

firming its opposition to it.244 Many draft international conventions,
where the continental views predominate, such as the Hague 1956 Convention 245 and the 1968 European Economic Community Convention on
241. See P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 220-36 (1983). For an exhaustive
discussion of corporate contacts, see the classic work of A. FARNSWORTH, THE RESIDENCE AND
DOMICILE OF CORPORATIONS (1939).

242. See E. STEIN & T. NICHOLSON, supra note 237, at 43, 55, 401-03; Stein, Conflict-of-Laws
Rules by Treaty: Recognition of Companies in a Regional Market, 68 MICH. L. REV.1327, 1332-33
(1970).
243. See R. KOLLEWUIN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1955); E.
RABEL, supra note 236, at 67 n.129; E. STEIN, supra note 236, at 30-31, 397.
244. Articles 149(1) and 150 of the Swiss Draft of Federal Private International Law provides in
principle for the application of the lex incorporationis. Certain exceptions in favor of the law of the
place of the corporation's business or of the domicile of the claimant apply only to external relations
issues such as the agency powers of the corporate officials (Articles 153 and 154). Message concernant une loi
federalesur le droit internationalprive du 10 Novembre 1982, No. 82.072, at 170-81,
236-40. For a discussion of the earlier version of this Draft, see McCaffrey, Swiss Conflicts Law, 28
AM. J. COMp. L. 235, 282-83 (1980).
245. See Hague Convention Concerning Recognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Oct. 31, 1951, art. I & II, 40 Revue Critique de Droit International (Fr.) 724, reprinted in 1
AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (1952) (law of incorporation is applicable except by a state following the "real
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Recognition of Companies, 246 adopt the principle of the lex incorporationis or its equivalent and allow for the exceptional application of the
law of the seat only in certain limited circumstances. 24 7 The "real seat"
concept was dealt a major blow in Article 58 of the Rome Treaty creating the European Economic Community.2 48 It defines the companies entitled to the crucial right of establishment throughout the Community.
Under Article 58 it suffices for a corporation organized in accordance
with the law of a member state to have "its [formal] registered office...
within the Community." 249 The increasing acceptance of the lex incorporationis in Europe is probably due not only to dissatisfaction with
the uncertainties and the problems of the "real seat," but also to such
other factors as the reduction in economic nationalism and the greater
mobility of capital within a free-enterprise system.
Other international texts have accepted in principle the lex incorporationis, including the Rules of the Institute of International Law,
adopted in 1965,250 and the 1979 Organization of American States Conseat" principle, but only if the "real seat" is in fact located in such state or in another "real seat"
state).
Article 3 of the French Corporation Law of 1966, which provides that "corporations whose seat
is located in France are subject to French Law," has been interpreted in a manner consistent with
this exception. In Comite de defense des actionnairesde la Banque ottomane v. La Banque ottomane
(Trib. Commerce de Paris - 4th Section, Oct. 19, 1982), reprinted and annotatedin 73 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL ProvE 98-118 (1984), involving minority shareholder informa-

tion rights, the court first excluded French substantive law under article 3 because the corporation
had its seat outside France, to wit in London. Because England followed the lex incorporationis, the
court then proceeded to examine the law of Turkey, where the corporation had been organized.
Because, however, Turkey followed the seat rule of conflicts, there was a remand to English substantive corporate law which was finally applied! On the renvoi aspects of continental conflicts law in
this field, see also Coester-Waltien, supra note 236, at 219-20.
246. See 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L. 35) 6 (1968), CONVENTION RELATING TO THE MUTUAL
REcooNmIoN OF COMPANIES AND LEGAL PERSONS, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 6255 (1981)
(adopting the principle of the registered seat which is the practical equivalent of the place of incorporation; certain exceptions, however, are allowed in articles 3-4: a signatory may declare that it wili
not apply the Convention if (a) the "real seat" is located outside the Community and the company
has no "genuine link with the economy of a member state" and/or (b) the "real seat" is located
within its own territory). See also E. STEIN, supra note 236, at 406-12; Goldman, The Convention
Between the Member States of the European Economic Community on the Mutual Recognition of
Companiesand Legal Persons, 6 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 104, 105-14 (1968).
247. See supra notes 245-46.
248. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Office for Offical Publications of
the European Communities (Luxembourg 1973), reproduced in 1 & 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
(1981).
249. Id, 1491.
250. 60 AM. . INT'L L. 523 (1966). Articles 1 and 2 adopt the incorporation principle. Under
articles 3-5, however, a state may refuse to recognize a foreign corporation if the "real seat" is
located outside the state of incorporation, the articles of incorporation are not in compliance with
the law of the "real seat," and either (a) the principal business activities take place outside the state
of incorporation or (b) there is no real connection with such state. For a full discussion of these
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vention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Companies. 251
In conclusion, the position of the lex incorporationis as a first principle of conflicts remains quite strong around the world 25 2 and also in the
United States, where it has been reinforced by the expansive application
of the negative commerce clause. But this should not preclude the development of alternatives to or deviations from the rule in exceptional situations to accommodate the strong policies and interests of other states of
contact. It is here that the contributions of the new conflicts can be put
to best use.
B.

Viable Alternatives to the Lex Incorporationis.

We must first examine those exceptional situations where a state has
such predominant contacts with the internal corporate relationship that
its entire law could supercede the law of the state of incorporation. Such
a claim does not offend the single-law desideratum and does not lead to
fragmentation because the applicable law will purport to provide an alternative rather than a supplementary or deviating regime. Thus, the
Edgar implications will be attenuated, the question being more of primacy under the full faith and credit clause. This calls for an examination
of the "pseudo-foreign" corporation doctrine and of the concept of
"domestication."
1. The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation: Update and Reevaluation.
a. The Latty Proposals and the principle of the Mansfield case.
Professor Latty was an eloquent and persistent critic of the lex incorporationis to the extent that it enables a corporation that is local in all
essential respects to escape domestic internal affairs law by clothing itself
in foreign incorporation papers. 253 Because a state is powerless to prevent its business organizations from obtaining a foreign charter or to prevent other states from issuing such charters, Latty proposed the direct
imposition of local law to the "pseudo-foreign" corporation. His proposals provoked widespread discussion but their impact on the courts has
provisions, and comparison with English law, see Drucker, Companiesin PrivateInternationalLaw,
17 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 28, 28-57 (1968).
251. Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law, Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Commercial Companies, 18 I.L.M. 1222 (1979).
Although no exceptions to the lex incorporationis are recognized, it is provided that the state of
headquarters may require the corporation to observe the requirements of its own law in a manner

which resembles "domestication" (Article 5).
252. For the importance of the lex incorporationis in the context of the multinational corporation, see Hadari, supra note 45, at 45: "A desirable criterion for determining the applicable personal
law could be established by creating a rebuttable presumption which would cause application of the
law of the place of incorporation or the registered seat to the internal affairs of foreign corporations."
253. See Latty, Pseudo-ForeignCorporations,65 YALE L.J. 137, 159-62 (1955).
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been minor and the only state legislature that considered them-North
254
Carolina's-took no action.
One of the few but often cited "pseudo-foreign" corporation cases is
Mansfield HardwoodLumber Co. v. Johnson.25 5 The Mansfield court did
apply local forum law instead of the law of incorporation, but was quite
circumspect in delineating the scope of the exception to the internal affairs rule. The corporation was treated as domestic because all contacts
other than the "naked fact of incorporation" 25 6 were local. Even in this
situation, however, the corporate charter and the non-repugnant statutory laws of the state of incorporation, especially those relating to corporate powers, must be honored. 25 7 Finally, the court based its holding not
only on the pseudo-foreignness of the corporation, but also on principles
of actionable fraud in the transfer of stock not involving internal
affairs.

258

Another case in the Mansfield mold, involving a notorious intrafamily dispute relating to the Chicago Tribune, is Tankersley v. Albright.2 59 A majority of the stock of the company, originally an Illinois
corporation that later migrated to Delaware, was held in trust under an
instrument executed in Illinois. 26° The assets and administration of the
trust as well as the headquarters and principal place of business of the
Chicago Tribune were located in Illinois. 261 The trustees sought a declaratory judgment confirming their authority to vote the shares in favor
of certain antitakeover amendments. 262 The court, applying Illinois instead of Delaware law in accordance with the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second), upheld the validity of the voting
trust. In view of the Illinois contacts, 263 the mixed corporate-contractual
nature of the conflicts question involved, and the fact that neither the
254. See Act of May 26, 1955, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432. For a fuller explanation,
see, Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The ProposedNorth CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct, 33 N.C.
L. REV.26 (1954).
255. 268 F.2d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (involving the fiduciary obligations of corporate management and majority shareholders in the purchase of minority stock), cert. denied, 361

U.S. 885 (1960); cf Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952) (where the law of Kansas, the
state of principal business and of the location of the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, was applied to
a similar issue over the law of Illinois, the state of incorporation, but without any explanation or
discussion of choice of law).
256. Mansfield, 268 F.2d at 321. Such contacts included residence of parties, situs of property,
principal place of business and disputed transaction.
257. Id
258. Id. at 321-22.
259. 374 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
260. Id at 540.
261. Id. at 550.
262. Id at 539-42.
263. Id. at 550.
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trust nor the corporation had any meaningful connection with Delaware,
the decision appears sound.
This narrow "pseudo-foreign" corporation exception which allows
for the enforcement of the mandatory policies and interests of the only
state of real contacts is an appropriate deviation from the general rule.264
The same is true for the "pseudo-foreign" aspects of Western Air Lines
and State ex rel. Weede. 265 In these situations there is little risk of uncertainty or of the kinds of extraterritorial burdens or conflicts outlawed in
266
Wolfe and Edgar.
b. The status of the California regulation of the internal affairs of
California-centeredcorporations. The 1977 amendments to the Corporation Law of California present a more difficult issue. 267 Under section
2115, California law applies to virtually the entire gamut of internal affairs of a foreign corporation, to the exclusion of the law of the state of
incorporation, if (a) the majority of stock is held in California and is not
traded over a national securities exchange and (b) at least fifty percent of
the corporation's "business"-measured by averaging payroll, assets and
sales-is connected with California. 268 The California approach represents the most serious current challenge to the lex incorporationis; it is
likely to test the internal affairs implications of Edgar even though section 2115 applies only to enterprises that in every business and ownership
respect have predominant, not only substantial, California contacts.
Even before Edgar was decided, the California approach had been controversial and the commentators were divided on its constitutionality.
What is remarkable about this pre-Edgardiscussion is the prescient shift
from a full faith and credit and due process rationale to an interstate
264. For favorable comments on Mansfield, see, for example, Kaplan, supra note 1, at 452-53.
See also Sargent, supra note 53, at 16-22 (strongly reaffirming this exception). Its holding also appears consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 46, § 302 comment g (allowing exceptional application of the law of the state of the "dominant interest").
265. See supra notes 161-62, 189-94 and accompanying text.
266. See generally Oldham, Regulating the Regulators: Limitation Upon a State's Ability to Regulate Corporationswith Multi-State Contacts, 57 DEN. L.J. 345, 364-70, 375-79, 389-92 (1980) (arguing for the adoption of "pseudo-foreign" corporation laws as "a means by which certainty can be
retained in the corporate choice of law while allowing the commercial domicile to regulate internal
affairs of corporations in more instances").
267. Act of July 7, 1977 ch. 235, sec. 19, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1073 (adding CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 2115).
268. CAL. CORP. CODE §2115 (West 1977). California has a long history of looking behind the
veil of foreign incorporation to curb serious abuses, see Note, California'sNew General Corporation
Law: Quasi-Foreign Corporations,7 PAC. L.J. 673, 678-84 (1976), and section 2115 was intended to
prevent evasion of the substantive strictures enacted in 1977. See Major Changes in the California
CorporationLaw: Hearings on A.B. 376 before the Assembly Committee of the Judiciary,Cal. Leg.,
1975-76 Reg. Sess. 4 (statement of H. Marsh, Jr.). It was in California, one should remember, that
the authority of the local state to penetrate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation had been
judicially upheld in Western Air Lines. See supra notes 189, 191 and accompanying text.
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commerce theory.269 The critics attacked the use of criteria that fluctuate from year to year and produce such uncertainties and lack of uniformity as to outweigh California's interest in the protection of local
shareholders. 270 Subjecting multistate corporations to varying internal
affairs laws depending on changing business contacts opens the door to
interstate chaos. 271 The supporters emphasized the significance of the
local contacts used and the weight of the related policies and concluded
that not only did they justify the incidental burdens placed on interstate
commerce but they also satisfied any due process and full faith and credit
272
requirements.
The first case to consider the issue, Louart v. Arden Mayfair,273 involved the imposition of cumulative voting on a Delaware corporation
that was not a pure "tramp," but had significant out-of-state contacts as
well. In holding section 2115 unconstitutional, the lower court stressed
the need for a single uniform standard of corporate governance, and concluded that the "uncertainties and the vagaries of potential fluctuations
from year to year.

. .

in the election of directors" 274 was incompatible

with full faith and credit and constituted an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce under Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.275 and

under the Horowitz analysis. 276 There was an appeal but the case was
277
eventually settled.
The constitutionality of section 2115 as it applies to cumulative voting was recently upheld at the appellate level in Wilson v. LouisianaPacific Resources, Inc.278 The corporation clearly fell within the statutory requirements. It had no significant connection with Utah, the state
of incorporation; California was its principal place of business, where all
its employees were located, and where the meetings of directors and
269. This was principally due to the Horowitz article mentioned supra note 187.
270. See, eg., Comment, California'sStatutory Attempt to Regulate Foreign Corporations: Will
It Survive the Commerce Clause?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 943, 954-57 (1979).
271. See id. at 959-61.
272. See eg., Oldham, CaliforniaRegulates Pseudo-ForeignCorporations-TramplingUpon the

Tramp?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. RFv. 85, 110-23 (1977); Ratner & Schwartz, supranote 167, at 664-69
(1979); Note, supra note 268, at 693-98.
273. No. C-192-091 (Sup. Ct. of Los Angeles County, May 1, 1978), discussed in H. MARSH,
MARSH'S CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 24.17 (1981).
274. Id.
275. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
276. See supra note 187.
277. See Comment, supra note 270, at 957. The impact of Louart is weakened by a dictum in a
later proceeding in the same case before settlement that dissenters' rights do not fall within the
single-law principle and section 2115 may apply to them. See H. MARSH, supra note 273, § 24.17.
278. 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982). For a critical discussion of this case, see
Ginger, Regulation of Quasi-Foreign Corporationsin California: Reflections on Section 2115 After
Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 14 Sw. U. L. REv. 665-83 (1984).
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shareholders had been taking place. 27 9 Relying principally on Allstate,
the court experienced no difficulty in turning down the full faith and
credit and due process challenges: Section 2115 is valid because it applies
only to corporations with significant-and predominant-contacts with
280
California.
The commerce clause issue, however, was a different matter. Without taking notice of MITE, the court considered and rejected three arguments that the statute impermissibly burdened interstate commerce.
First, the court found no evidence that section 2115 had deterred foreign
corporations from increasing their in-state business activities in order to
avoid California's internal affairs law. 2 81 But the reduction of in-state
business surely is not the only way in which interstate commerce may be
burdened. Extraterritorial control of internal affairs suffices under Wolfe
and MITE. Next, the court was unpersuaded by the argument that the
"transient nature" of the statute's applicability would significantly restrain commerce. 282 Responding to the central problem of uncertainty
and confusion and the potential conflict with the laws of other states,
especially that of the state of incorporation, 283 the court first cited Professor Kaplan's 1968 article2 84 to the effect that imposing on corporate internal affairs dual or variable sets of rules need not produce conflict, but
only compatible cumulation. 285 Subjecting the plaintiff to cumulative
voting does not create a conflict with Utah because Utah permits such a
procedure; interstate commerce, therefore, is not burdened. 2 86 This part
of the Wilson reasoning is equally unpersuasive. Conflict arises not only
when what one state requires, the other prohibits, but also when one state
279. Wilson, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 220-21, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
280. Id. at 222-23, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 857. In addition to Allstate, the court relied for its fiffl faith
and credit holding on Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935), and on the Western Air Lines language about pseudo-foreign corporations. Wilson, 138 Cal.
App. 3d at 222-23, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57. The court took the position that Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629 (1935), which had mandated the application of New York law as lex incorporationis to
shareholder assessments, not only was obsolete but also distinguishable because in that case New
Jersey, the only other potentially interested state where the resisting shareholders resided, had no
declared policy against such recovery. Wilson, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 224, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 856-58.
The converse was the case in Wilson. Id. As to due process, the court easily brought the facts within
the shelter of Allstate and its predecessors. Id. at 228-29, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 861. A contract clause
argument was also summarily dismissed. Id. at 229, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
281. Id. at 226, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 226-28, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 858-61.
284. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 476-77.
285. Wilson, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 226, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
286. See id. at 223, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 857. For a similar position on probable compatibility
satisfying full faith and credit in a case involving the inspection of shareholder lists under CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1600 (West 1977), see Valtz v. Penta Inv. Corp., 139 Cal. App. 3d 803, 808, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 922, 925 (1983), discussed infra notes 343-49 and accompanying text.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:1

imposes a mandatory standard while another applies a permissive policy
which allows the shareholders to decide whether to adopt the standard.
Patching together a composite set of compatible rules drawn from the
laws of the various states of contact not only is problematical in execution, but also upsets the unity of regulation under a single set of standards and maximizes the extraterritoriality of the strictest alternative.
The reference in Edgar to the burdens of multiple regulation includes difference and is not limited to incompatibility. Compliance with
the Illinois statute would not have violated the law of any other state, but
the opinion makes no reference to a direct conflict as a prerequisite to a
commerce clause challenge. This interpretation is consistent with the
perception of what constitutes a "burden" in other types of commerce
cases. 28 7 The court used a more solid ground-not a disclaimer of burdensomeness but a claim of right-for the second part of its decision. A
corporation meeting the requirements of section 2115 is so closely connected with California that "no other state could claim as great an interest in [regulating shareholder voting]. ' 2 8 Regardless of the effects on
interstate commerce, California can apply its internal affairs law to it not
only in California but everywhere else to the exclusion of the law of
2 89
incorporation.
The constitutionality of section 2115 will probably be challenged
again and eventually may reach the United States Supreme Court. The
chances of its passing the tests of Wolfe and Edgar are reasonably good.
The exclusion of corporations the stock of which is nationally traded,
and the use of criteria that cover only corporations the affairs of which in
every significant respect are centered in California, narrow the applicability of the statute to corporations that are predominantly local not only as
to operations, but also as to shareholdings for which no other state can
claim a superior or even a comparable right. But making amendments
along the lines suggested by some commentators-increasing the local
shareholding requirement to seventy or eighty percent, eliminating from
coverage certain issues where the problem of a significant conflict with
other states is greatest, and reducing the annual switching-back-andforth feature29 0-would place it comfortably beyond challenge.
287. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1969) (state regulation of train
lengths passes beyond what is plainly essential for safety and is outweighed by the interest of the
nation in an adequate, economical, and efficient railway transportation service).
288. Wilson, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 227, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 860.

289. Id. at 231, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 863; see also id. at 223 n.4, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 857 n.4 (citing
Justice Stevens' interpretation of full faith and credit in Allstate).
290. See Bartell, supra note 172, at 809; Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 of the New California
General CorporationLaw-The Application of CaliforniaCorporationsLaw to Foreign Corporations,
23 UCLA L. REv. 1282, 1328-32 (1976).
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As the state of dominant contacts with an interest in effectuating its
internal affairs policies, California would amply meet all requirements
imposed by even the most conservative of the new conflicts theories for
the total application of its law to the exclusion of the law of incorporation. Other states that have adopted a "significant" or even a "most significant" relationship conflicts approach may decide to honor
California's exclusive claim. 29 1 The more difficult question is whether
they are required to do so under the full faith and credit clause or under
the commerce clause. It can be argued that the constitutional underpinnings of a uniform, constant, and equal regime should extend to
whatever other law is chosen as the proper law of a particular corporation2 92 and that, in extreme cases, the application of the lex incorporationis itself over the law of the state of all contacts may raise
293
constitutional questions.
2. Mandating "'Domestication"or Local Incorporationfor Intrastate Operations. In the past, some states required "domestication"subjection to local law for the intrastate operations particularly of certain
public interest enterprises294 -and that practice is supported by constitutional precedent. 295 Some states, such as Pennsylvania, still have in their
statutes seldom-used provisions permitting domestication. 29 6 It has been
suggested that this approach, which does not directly regulate internal
affairs but only excludes foreign corporations from intrastate business
unless they either "qualify" as domestic corporations, or set up a domestic subsidiary, is consistent with Wolfe and the full faith and credit
clause, at least when the corporate business is centered in the state. Important local interests are served without generating legal uncertainty as
291. A more intriguing question is whether California will recognize comparable claims made by
other states for corporations centered in them. Section 2115 does not address this question because

it is purely unilateral. Other sections, such as CAL. CORP. CODE § 2116 (West 1977) which enforces
certain liabilities of directors of foreign corporations conducting intrastate business, refer to the "applicable laws of the state of incorporation."
292. See Horowitz, supra note 187, at 820.
293. See B. CURRIE, The Constitution and Choice of Law, supra note 153, at 188, 252.
294. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 444-45.

295. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("Louisiana has a constitutional right to subject foreign liability insurance companies
to the direct action provisions of its laws whether they consent or not"); Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 440, 444 (1931) (provision of Virginia constitution forbidding any foreign
corporation to carry on the business of a public service company, intrastate, does not impose a
burden on interstate commerce and is presumed to be constitutional); see also Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930) ("[A] state may properly refuse to recognize foreign rights which
violate its declared policy.").
296. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 909 (Purdon 1964).
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to the applicable internal affairs law. 297
Domestication as a condition of doing local busiiess is a powerful
tool that can be quite effective in preventing the "Delawarization" of the
local component of corporate activity. Indeed, it should be the preferred
tool of intervention in terms of certainty, limited effect, and direct connection to local corporate policy. The field of conflicts will readily recognize the validity of an express state claim to regulate the form, structure,
and internal relations of entities owning local resources or engaging in
local activities. Great care should be exercised, however, to use it in ways
that do not impose unconstitutional conditions on entry and do not interfere with or burden interstate operations. 29 Furthermore, domestication
should be tied to domestic operations and not used as a lever to subject to
local law the entire internal affairs of locally-connected foreign
corporations.
If, as is likely, a national corporation will choose to set up a local
subsidiary rather than domesticate itself, the application of the total domestic internal affairs law to the local assets and activities will be
achieved. This would include the imposition of the domestic fiduciary
standards and other controls on the parent as a shareholder and de facto
manager. To be sure, the local shareholders of the parent would not be
covered, but this is consistent with the local-business and assets focus of
domestication as well as with the constitutional prohibition against protecting resident shareholders through excessive interference in the internal affairs of genuinely foreign corporations.
If a state were committed to extend its law to the local shareholders
of all foreign corporations having local connections, it could use its bluesky power to exclude from intrastate sales the securities of those corporations whose internal affairs regimes did not meet the domestic standards.
This would of course minimize local shareholding. Perhaps it could also
go so far as to impose substantial local shareholding requirements on all
domestic corporations, but the drastic negative effect of such a step on
attracting foreign business makes such an eventuality extremely remote.
297. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 134, at 332-33; Gibson & Freeman, A Decade of the
Model Business CorporationAct in Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 1396, 1412-13 (1967); Kaplan, supra
note 1, at 445.

298. See Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922) (state law which permits the
revocation of a license of a foreign corporation to do business within the state because the corporation, while doing domestic business, resorts to a federal court sitting in the state, is unconstitutional);
Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and ConstitutionalRights, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 321, 337 (1935)

(states' power to exclude foreign corporations is limited by the requirements that the surrender of a
constitutional right "serves a purpose germane to that for which the power can normally be extended
without conditions" and that there be "no undue interference with the workings of the federal

system").
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DeviationsFrom the Lex Incorporationisto ProtectImportant

Local Interests.
1. The Different Categoriesof InternalAffairs and Local Corporate
Policy. The constitutional and conflicts considerations that support the
primacy of the lex incorporationis and the single-law principle militate
against piecemeal intervention into the internal affairs of a foreign corporation except when intervention is absolutely necessary to effectuate an
important local policy and when intervention is minor and non-disruptive. Even those most intensely concerned with local control of corporate policy concede the validity of this view.29 9 The Restatement
(Second) quite appropriately uses such words as "unusual" 3 ° and "overriding interest of another state" 3'0 to refer to the situation where the law
of incorporation-which is "almost invariably" applied3 02 and of "great
significance" 3 0 3-may be circumvented. Consequently, the test of the
"most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties" used by
the Restatement (Second)3°4 must be read in the context of the hostility
with which any interference is viewed in this field. It should not mislead
one to engage in simple balancing of contacts and interests on an issueby-issue or party-by-party basis.
Certain internal affairs matters are even less amenable to differential
treatment than others. The hard core areas where "indivisible unity" is
paramount should include first and foremost the rights that attach to
corporate shares: voting, obtaining information, inspecting corporate
records, and dividends, as well as rights in dissolution and liquidation
and in corporate consolidations such as mergers. Other shareholder matters, such as the validity of stock issues, assessments on or redemptions of
shares, fiduciary obligations, protection of minority rights, transfer restrictions, and the validity of shareholder agreements and voting trusts
also fall within this category. It is here that the considerations of predictability, constancy, and autonomy are strongly reinforced by the requirement of equal treatment.30 5 In addition, there are overwhelming
299. The most articulate proponent of local corporate policy, Professor Kaplan, writes that, in
the absence of a statutory directive, there should be great circumspection and restraint on the part of
the courts in giving effect to local corporate public policy; interventions into the affairs of a genuine
foreign or national corporation, he maintains, generally are not justified. See Kaplan, supranote 1,

at 475.
300. REsTATEmENT (SECOND), supra note 46, at § 302(2).

301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at § 302 comment g.
Id.
Id. at § 302 comment b.
Id at § 302(1).

305. See id. at § 302(2) comments e & f, Reese & Kaufman, supranote I, at 1124-26, 1134, 1137-

39, 1141-43.
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structure, and
practical reasons why corporate formation, governance,
30 6
law.
unitary
by
governed
be
to
need
procedures
The argument for applying the lex incorporationis to management's
fiduciary obligations to the corporation and to the shareholders is less
compelling. The imposition of the strictest of the potentially applicable
standards does not create serious practical problems because it is relatively easy for the fiduciaries to learn about applicable rules and to conform to them. Shareholder equality is also not directly implicated. The
greater flexibility in this area is recognized by the ReStatement (Second)
which does not include in section 309 the "unusual situation" qualification of the other sections to justify departure from the lex incorporationis.307 This aspect of section 309 has been recognized in at least two
recent cases where the law of another state was chosen. 30 8 As between
the state of the residence of the shareholders and that of corporate business, the former should have a superior claim because the ultimate beneficiaries of management's fiduciary duties are the shareholders.
In certain contexts the internal affairs characterization is so tangential or dubious that unitary treatment easily can be eliminated. The contractual aspects of a voting trust agreement, for example, may be
subjected to the formal and substantive requirements of the law chosen
under contract conflicts rules. 30 9 Similarly, the non-corporate aspects of
proxies 3 10 may be treated as involving issues in contract. The contract
and property aspects of transfers of securities similarly need not be re31
ferred to the law of the state of incorporation. '
Another more problematical category encompasses certain corporate rules that both significantly affect creditor rights as well as regulate
the internal relationship. This category includes the de facto corporation
and ultra vires doctrines, piercing the corporate veil, the liability of successor corporations, the personal liability of managers for corporate
torts, and the prohibitions against the distribution of corporate assetssuch as loans, dividends, stock and repurchases-to shareholders or
306. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND); supra note 46, § 302(1).
307. Id. at § 309 & comment c.
308. See Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982) (District of Columbia corporation had some officers, directors, and shareholders residing in the District, but all business and assets

were in Colorado; relationships in dissolution between directors and shareholders on the one hand
and creditors on the other were determined by Colorado law); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 162
N.J. Super. 355, 368-69, 392 A.2d 1233, 1240 (Law Div.) (New York corporation had no significant
contacts in state of incorporation, while New Jersey was the place of basic operations of the corporation, residence of all shareholders and payees of funds, location of transactions; New Jersey law
applies to liability of directors), affid, 171 N.J. Super. 34, 407 A.2d 1253 (1978).
309. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, § 305 comment b.
310. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1124-25.
311. Id. at 11-34.
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managers in certain instances. Although the Restatement (Second) fails
to single out this category for special treatment, a good case can be made
that the state where the corporation conducts business may have a more
"significant relationship," at least where the rights are asserted by resident creditors and relate to local transactions. 3 12 An examination of the
few cases that have articulated a choice in these contexts reveals that

while the lex incorporationis is not totally ignored, there is some recogni3 13
tion of the importance of taking account of local protective policy.
In other situations where creditors sought to pierce the corporate
veil to impose personal liability on insiders, however, courts applied the

lex incorporationis without much discussion. 314 The rights of creditors
to the corporate assets in insolvency proceedings have been determined
under the lex incorporationis because of the desirability of uniform

treatment.

315

312. See id. at 1139-41; see also Article 9 of the Rules adopted by the Institute of International
Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L 523 (1966), providing that the state where a corporation has a place of business may (a) require the appointment of a local representative who shall have the powers and duties
of corporate management under local law; (b) impose financial obligations for the protection of
creditors; and (c) liquidate the local assets in the interest of creditors); Coester-Waltjen, supra note
236, at 221-22.
313. In Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (i0th Cir. 1982), the court applied the law of Utah
where the sale of certain debentures had taken place and where all the corporate business was conducted, to the question of whether the incorporator, president, and secretary of a purported Nevada
corporation, later formally organized in Nevada, was personally liable on its obligations as a promoter. The court opined that Utah had a significant interest in protecting the rights of its citizens in
these circumstances. Id at 878. It conceded that Nevada law should govern the question of whether
and when the Nevada corporation was formed, and emphasized that the liability of the promoter
involved fraud to third parties and was not really an internal matter. Id at 877-78. Similarly, in
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 n.4 (2d Cir. 1981), the law of New York-where the
corporate headquarters were located, many transactions took place, and several creditors residedwas applied to determine the validity of certain loans at a time when a Canadian corporation was
insolvent. In Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1980), Georgia law was
applied to the issue of the personal liability of certain corporate officers of an Alabama corporation
who took part in the commission of a tort in Georgia. In Litarowich v. Wiederkehr, 170 N.J. Super.
144, 151-52, 405 A.2d 874, 877-78 (Law Div. 1979), the liability of a successor corporation for tort
claims was determined under tort criteria and interest analysis, without deference to the law of
incorporation of the entities involved.
314. See Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., 713 F.2d 139, 140 (5th Cir. 1983) ("mhe facts set
forth in the panel opinion constitute sufficient compelling factors, as required by Texas law, to require piercing [the] veil."); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 413, 418 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1981) (law of state of incorporation controls in diversity actions) (citations omitted). In Jefferson Pilot Broadcasting Co. v. Hilary & Hogan, Inc., 617 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1980), the court
applied the lex incorporationis because Alabama continues to adhere to the traditional conflicts
rules. In K Mart Corp. v. Knitjoy Mfg., 542 F. Supp. 1189, 1190 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1982) and
DuSesoi v. United Ref. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (W.D. Pa. 1982), the courts dodged the
issue by finding that the two potentially applicable laws were not materially different.
315. See, eg., Jump v. Goldenhersh, 619 F.2d 11, 14, 15 n.4 (8th Cir. 1980) (substantive law of
corporation's state of incorporation applies to determine which payments to creditors are voidable
under preferred payment statute).
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2. Limited Interventions in New York and California. The most
noteworthy example of limited but nevertheless substantial intervention
in the internal affairs of foreign corporations is that of New York where
statutory rules, in effect since the beginning of the century, impose liability on the management of foreign corporations for unlawful dividends,
loans to certain shareholders, false certificates, and transfers in fraud of
creditors. 316 For many years the courts applied these rules to all corporations that had a "substantial business" connection with New York, regardless of the location of the other corporate contacts. 317 In 1961, the
New York Business Corporation Law introduced the new concept of the
"domiciled foreign corporation," and subjected it to extensive internal
affairs regulation. 318 "Domicile" was based on either two-thirds shareholdings by New York residents or two-thirds of income allocable to
New York.319 But this concept was dropped very quickly as impractical
and too extensive. 320
In fact, it became quickly apparent that the pressures were in the
opposite direction: to limit New York interference by requiring a "majority" and not just a "substantial" business connection with New
York. 321 In the legislation enacted in 1963, not only was the applicability
316. See N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1940); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 60-61,
224 (McKinney 1943) (current version at N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 719, 1317(a)(1) (McKinney
1963)); see also Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 83 F.2d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 1936). Before
the enactment of these sections in the 1890's, New York courts applied the law of incorporation
across the board. See, ag., Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improvement Co., 140 N.Y. 576, 590-93, 35
N.E. 964, 968-69 (1894); Vanderpoel v. Gorman, 140 N.Y. 563, 567, 35 N.E. 932, 936 (1894); Demarest v. Flack, 128 N.Y. 205, 215, 28 N.E. 645, 648-50 (1891).
317. See International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1948);
Irving Trust Co. v. Maxwell, 56 F.2d 744, 747 (2d Cir. 1932); International Paper Co. v. United
States, 88 F. Supp. 891, 895 (Ct. Cl. 1950); German American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 60,
109 N.E. 875, 877 (1915).
318. N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 1317 (McKinney Supp. 1962) (repealed by Act of Apr. 24, 1962, § 96,
1962 N.Y. Laws 3569, 3604).
319. Id. See Henn, The Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 11
BUFFALO L. REv. 439, 455 n.109 (1962); Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business
CorporationLaw of New York, 11 BuFlALo L. REV. 591, 610-11 (1962).
320. Act of Apr. 24, 1962, § 96, .1962 N.Y. Laws 3569, 3604. See Note, Corporations: Domestic
Regulation of Foreign Corporations"Concept of "DomiciledForeign Corporation".New York Business Corporationof 1961, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 273, 285 (1962) (predicting that the attempt to define a
"domiciled foreign corporation" would lead to "complicated problems of interpretation and
application").
321. See Draft of Joint Legislative Committee, N.Y. Sen. Int. Pr. 522; Pr. 855 (Jan. 4, 1961).
The New York bar supported the traditional rule of incorporation and generally opposed any interference in the internal affairs of foreign corporations. See Report on NYBCL, Committee on Corpora.
tion Law, NYSBA, 33 N.Y.S. BAR 1_ 442 (Dec. 1961); PreliminaryReport of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Committee on CorporateLaw of the NYBCL (1961): First Interim
Report to 1957 Session ofNew York State Legislature, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 17 at 41, 47, 85-86, 91
(1957).
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of the rules relating to unlawful dividends and loans narrowed,3 22 but the
legislation also provided that only corporations that derive more than
one-half of their income from New York and whose shares are not listed
on a national securities exchange would be covered. 323 This retreat was
prompted by criticisms concerning (a) the uncertainty of what quantum
of business triggered the regulation, (b) the potential for conflicts between domestic and foreign law, and (c) the discouraging effects of prior
law upon bona fide foreign corporations doing business in New York. 32 4
Thus, the end result of the 1963 reform was to strengthen and expand the
325
applicability of the lex incorporations.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether the extraterritoriality,
however limited, of the New York statute is constitutionally valid and
represents proper conflicts doctrine. Early doubts concerning the validity of the pre-1963 New York rules under the full faith and credit clause
had been raised by Reese and Kaufman. 326 The issue now deserves serious reexamination under Edgar. The required New York connectionthe derivation of more than one-half of the income of the corporation
from New York sources-does not make the corporation in all essential
respects local, and is a slender reed to support general authority to regulate internal affairs. Excluding corporations the shares of which are nationally traded is not enough to cure the problem. The New York
intervention can be saved only because of (a) its narrow coverage-management responsibility for certain financial actions depleting corporate
assets, (b) New York's interest in protecting the persons likely to be injured by such actions-local creditors, (c) the use of a reasonable connecting factor-such as a source of a majority of income-between
coverage and the narrow interest assessed, and (d) the nature of the regulation- strengthening liability of management is not apt to produce an
intractable conflict with the internal affairs law of the corporation because it does not interfere with structures nor does it lead to unequal
treatment of the shareholders. Thus, it may be argued that the New
York intervention should survive the balancing test of the commerce
322. See, eg., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 719, 1317(a)(1) (McKinney 1963) (which eliminated
certain liabilities of shareholders and reduced the liability of officers).
323. See N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 1320 (McKinney 1963).
324. The background and details of the changes are discussed in Henn, supra note 319, at 43959; Latty, supra note 319, at 593-612.
325. The new law's principal retrogression is its recognition of the old "concession theory"
with respect to the foreign corporation, viz., that it is a creature of the law of its state of
incorporation and should, even when doing business in New York with New York residents, be governed, so far as regulatory aspects are concerned, by the law of its state of
incorporation and not by New York law.
Henn, supra note 319, at 451.
326. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1129.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:1

clause and should be upheld under the conflicts criteria against overreaching; it is relatively minor, non-disruptive, and genuinely protective
of local interests. This argument may not be frivolous, but neither is it
very compelling.
A similar argument can be made in favor of the statutory provisions
that apply the stricter New York law to limit the indemnification and
insurance of directors and officers of foreign corporations. 327 Controlling
such "malpractice" protection may have a deterrent effect on actions that
have local impact. Potential conflicts with the law of incorporation are
reduced by a provision that no indemnification shall be made if inconsistent with the law of incorporation. 328 On the other hand, the connecting
factor used, majority of income from New York sources, 329 appears
overinclusive.
In addition to strengthening management responsibility for unlawful
outlays and false reports, and controlling indemnification and insurance,
New York also extends certain other rules to foreigni corporations doing
any business in the state. It is difficult to detect a common thread running through all of these exceptional applications of New York corporate
law. The concern over burdening the courts with frivolous litigation may
justify and explain, under a procedural characterization, the imposition
of New York's rather strict requirements, including security for expenses, to derivative actions in New York. 330 This explanation is supported by the inclusion of corporations the shares of which are traded on
the exchanges and which do not derive the majority of their income from
New York, 331 but is undercut by the exclusion of foreign corporations
not doing business in New York. 332 Voting trusts in shares of foreign
corporations having business offices in New York and conducting their
principal business operations or having the greater part of their property
in New York are treated as "express trust[s] created under [New York
327. See N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW §§ 721-727, 1319(a)(4) (McKinney 1963).

328. See N.Y. Bus. COR. LAW § 726(b)(1) (McKinney 1963). But see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 727(e) (McKinney 1963) (declaring the insurance provisions of the law to be applicable as a matter
of public policy to the exclusion of.any other law).
329. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 726(d), 1320(a)(2) (McKinney 1963).
330. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 626, 627, 720, 1317(a)(2)-(b), 1319(a)(2)-(3) (McKinney 1963);
see also Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 184 Misc. 1074, 56 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
331. N.Y. Bus. COR. LAW § 1320(a) (McKinney 1963).

332. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1319(a)(2)-(3) (McKinney 1963) calls for the application to foreign corporations "doing business in [New York]" of the sections on derivative actions "to the extent
provided therein." See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 626-627 (McKinney 1963). Those sections by

their terms apply to all domestic and foreign corporations but the courts have properly superimposed the more narrow coverage of section 1319 and exclude corporations not doing business in New
York. See, eg., Oldfield v. Alston, 77 F.R.D. 735, 746 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Gilbert v. Case, 3 A.D. 2d
930, 163 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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law]" and subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts. 333 It is
doubtful that this language brings into application the corporate law
rules relating to voting trusts. Thus, this provision may be characterized
as procedural-pertaining to the administration of the trusts-rather
than as an element of internal corporate affairs.
The last category of New York interventions empowers "resident"
shareholders of foreign corporations to inspect shareholder lists 334 and
voting trust records 335 and to demand certain reports on capitalization
and distributions. 336 These provisions are applicable also on the basis of
337
the corporation's "doing business" in New York.
Inspection of shareholder lists under local law rather than under the
lex incorporationis has not been unknown in case law33 8 and is statutorily imposed also in California on foreign corporations that have their
principal offices or customarily hold board meetings in the state. 339 A
state presumably has the power to reach physical assets such as shareholder records within its borders. It might be argued that the application
of local inspection law involves no direct extraterritoriality, imposes no
conflicting obligations, and can be easily complied with by the corporation. 34° Thus, the burden on interstate commerce is insignificant. On the
other hand, treating shareholder lists as assets is simplistic and mistaken.
The inspection is a prelude to intershareholder communication in the
context of corporate governance and thus is clearly within the realm of
internal affairs; 34 1 the required nexus of the corporation in New York
and in California bears little relation to such communication. This is not
merely opening the local courts to inspection suits but calls for the application of local substantive law as well. Not surprisingly, the tactical advantages of using the New York provisions to bypass the standards of the
state of incorporation are already being discovered by takeover and
342
proxy fight specialists.
333. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1316(e) (McKinney 1963).
334. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1315 (McKinney 1963).
335. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1316(a)-(d) (McKinney 1963).
336. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1318 (MeKinney 1963).
337. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (McKinney 1963). For the inspection of voting trust records
it is also required that the voting trustee have an office or a transfer agent in the state. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1316(a) (McKinney 1963).
338. See, e-g., Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 121-22, 141 P.2d 571, 573-74

(1943).
339. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1600(d) (West 1977).
340. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, § 304 comment d; Reese & Kaufman, supra
note 1, at 1124, 1135; Padovano v. Watitzky, 355 So. 2d 871, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).

341. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1, at 1125, 1135 (arguing nevertheless that a stockholder's right to inspect the corporation's books should be governed by local law).
342. In the recent proxy and takeover fight for Louisiana Land & Exploration, a Maryland
corporation, the insurgents finally obtained the shareholder list under New York law. "'If you
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A constitutional attack on California's inspection provisions was recently rejected in Valtz v. Penta Investment Corp.343 The court easily
dismissed the full faith and credit and due process challenges, mainly on
the Allstate ground that the location of the principal executive office and
of the books and records in California are "significant contacts" that subject the corporation to the California inspection policy. The court reasoned that inspection of shareholder lists does not require a uniform
standard. 344 An equal protection argument was rejected because the legislation treats domestic and foreign corporations equally and all foreign
corporations with significant contacts are covered by the statute. 345 The
court also sought to avoid the impact of MITE by finding no connection
whatsoever between the inspection and "the corporation's ability to do
business in more than one state. ' 346 Because there was no burden on
interstate commerce, the court decided that it was not necessary to examine the legitimacy of the asserted local interest. 347 Even if the imposition of California law were to cause foreign corporations to locate their
principal executive offices outside California, "transactions" in interstate
commerce would not be affected. In any event, applying local law constitutes a valid condition of doing business in California and does not operate extraterritorially.3 48
There is little question that the Valtz court's narrow perception of
the commerce clause as invalidating only direct burdens on the movement of trade across state lines is erroneous. In MITE itself the statute
that was declared unconstitutional had nothing to do with trade or establishment; it concerned solely the making of tender offers for corporate
stock. There is also little merit to the proposition that a corporation having its principal offices or holding board meetings in California thereby
automatically submits its shareholder ledger to inspection under local
asked 10 lawyers about it, none would know that New York has that provision,' Bialkin [of New
York's Willkie, Farr & Gallagher] said. Kramer [of New York's Skadden, Arps] conceded, 'It's

certainly not a well-known provision.'" Masters, Interest, Doubts Sparked by Season's Proxy
Trends, Legal Times, May 23, 1983, at 9, cols. 2-3. These statements are rather puzzling in light of
such well-known inspection cases as Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 697-98 (2d Cir.

1966) (affirming order enjoining authorization to inspect shareholding lists); Gittlin v. Studebaker
Corp., 25 A.D. 2d 822, 269 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1966) (denying access to shareholders lists); Crane Co. v.
Anaconda Co., 39 N.Y.2d 14, 346 N.E.2d 507, 382 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1976) (inspection of shareholder

list is allowed unless corporation can show an improper purpose); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 56 Misc. 2d 538, 288 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (right to inspect shareholder lists is
unconditional absent proof of an improper purpose).
343. 139 Cal. App. 3d 803, 188 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1982).

344. Id. at 806-09, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 924-26.
345. Id at 809-10, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 926.

346. Id
347. Id at 808, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
348. Id at 807-08, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
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corporate law. As drafted, the law would apply even where all other
major corporate contacts are with the state of incorporation where the
ledger is also located and most of the shareholders reside. Why, in this
instance, should rights of inspection be determinable under California
law? The Valtz holding is sustainable, if at all, only if it were limited to
ledgers in California and if the unpersuasive local "asset" characterization is accepted or if the decision survives the balancing test because of
349
the de minimis effects on interstate commerce.

The fact that New York continues to enforce limited application of
its law to certain internal affairs matters of foreign corporations under its
statutory directives should not mislead one to assume that, outside the
statute, the lex incorporationis is in jeopardy. In fact, the opposite is
true. The New York courts' have remained singularly unreceptive to the
siren song of the new conflicts methodologies in this field.
Hausman v. Buckley 350 remains the cornerstone of the lex incorporationis in New York. Charging directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders of Pantepec Oil, a Venezuelan corporation, with breaches of
fiduciary duty in the sale of corporate assets and in making an unlawful
management contract, a derivative plaintiff sought rescission and damages in New York. The very concept of a derivative action, however, is
virtually unknown in Venezuela. As in many civil law countries, an action on behalf of the corporation can be brought only if a majority of the
shareholders so decide. 35 1 Complainants have recourse only to the meeting of shareholders and even there only a holder of ten percent or more
35 2
of the stock may put the matter to a vote.

349. These criticisms also apply to the New York inspection provisions except that the burden of
compliance is lesser in New York because only resident shareholders can exercise inspection and
informational rights. But the exclusion of non-residents raises a serious question especially under
the privileges and immunities clause because residence is not used as a neutral factor with nonresidents relegated to the law of their own jurisdiction. That a state has "no legitimate interest in
protecting non-resident shareholders," MITE, 457 U.S. at 644, in the context of extraterritorial regulation, does not prevent it from making the benefits of local law equally available to out-of-staters.
But see Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 1982) (no privileges and
immunities and equal protection challenges made to the Michigan takeover statute whose application had been judicially limited to the protection solely of resident shareholders). The impact of the
privileges and immunities clause on choice-of-law remains uncertain and controversial. For a good,
brief discussion and references to the writings of Currie, Schreter, and Sedler, see KL CRAMPrON, D.
CURRIE & H. KAY, supra note 214, at 501-08. See also Ely, supra note 222, at 181 (questioning the
premise that a state has a greater interest in protecting its own residents than it has in protecting
others). On the general topic of discriminatory treatment of non-residents, see Simson, Discrimination AgainstNonresidentsand the PrivilegesandImmunities Clause ofArticle IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv.
379 (1979); Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 487 (1981).
350. 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
351. Id at 701.
352. Id at 698 n.5.
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Applying the conflicts rules of New York, Judge Kaufman first rejected plaintiff's claim that the availability of the derivative action is
"procedural" and, therefore, subject to forum law: the conditions on the
right to enforce corporate claims go to the substance of the claims; the
3 53
issue is not just "who" or "how" but "if" the action will be bought.
The judge then cited many of the older New York cases, including Newman v. Baldwin,354 a demand-on-stockholders case, as well as cases from
other jurisdictions and the FirstRestatement3 55 in support of the proposition that the traditional lex incorporationis rule continued to prevail in
New York.3 5 6 What makes this case particularly important is that the
modem methodologies were in fact considered-particularly the theories
of "center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts" 357 but it was nevertheless concluded that those theories did not, at least as yet, apply to corporate stockholder litigation and that the lex incorporationis continues to
serve the conflicts values of predictability and ease of application and the
358
single-law desideratum.
The enactment of the New York Business Corporation Law
(NYBCL) in 1963, which continued the applicability of some of its derivative suit provisions to foreign corporations, 35 9 and the triumph of the
conflicts revolution in New York 36° did not lead to an abandonment of
Hausman in areas such as business trusts, where the NYBCL did not
specifically apply. On the contrary, we find a reaffirmation of the lex
incorporationis as a presumption that apparently may be overcome only
in a compelling case. In Greenspun v. Lindley,3 61 the lower court cited
Hausman and other cases in support of the application of the lex incorporationis to the demand requirements, but recognized that in "unusual instances the law of the forum or of another state having more
353. Id at 701.

354. 13 Misc. 2d 897, 179 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
355. 299 F.2d at 703 n.11.

356. Id at 703. The court conceded that New York may recognize an exception for foreign
"paper corporations" but this was not the case for Pantepec. Id at 703 n.l1. Apparently the company did no local business and, therefore, the New York statutory exceptions to the lex incorporationis did not apply.
357. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961);
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99, - N.Y.S.2d - (1954).
358. 299 F.2d at 703-04 n.14 (citing Reese & Kaufman, supra note 1).
359. For a discussion of the New York statutory scheme, see supra notes 316-37 and accompanying text.
360. See, eg., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
361. 49 A.D.2d 20, 21-22, 352 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1974) (involving a Massachusetts trust), aff'd,
36 N.Y.2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 79, 369 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1975).
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significant contacts with the transactions might be applied. ' 362 The
Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing (a) the voluntary association of
the shareholders under a declaration calling for the application of the
state of incorporation law, and (b) the pragmatic and theoretical advantages of determining the rights of the shareholders on a uniform basis
regardless of forum and of the states of contacts of the trust. 363 But the
court left open the possibility that if the trust had been "present" in New
York-doing business, headquarters, meetings, assets, shareholdingsNew York law may have been applicable. 36
The reluctance of the courts to set aside the traditional practice is
exemplified by subsequent cases such as Rottenberg v. Pfeiffer,365 in
which party autonomy and expectations as well as the uniform treatment
of the beneficiaries irrespective of residence were cited to support the lex
incorporationis rule, even when significant contacts with New York are
present. In Skolnik v. Rose, 366 decided in 1982, the Court of Appeals
further narrowed the potential Greenspun exception by holding that the
agreement of the beneficiaries is governed by the law of a state which has
some contacts with the business trust will be respected even where the
trust has significant contacts with New York.
In the most recent case in this area, the Supreme Court of Kings
County went even so far as to engraft the lex incorporationis upon the
New York statutory provisions which by their very own terms do apply
to foreign corporations doing business in New York. 3 67 The court held
that sections 629 and 1319 of the NYBCL, which call for the application
of New York law, including the demand requirement, to foreign corporations are not mandatory but only permissive in the sense that they merely
invite conflicts analysis!368 Superimposing the "center of gravity" theory
on section 1319, and holding that incorporation is superior to headquartering, the court applied to Penn Central the law of its incorporation
state-Pennsylvania-where some business transactions also had taken
place, over the law of New York where the corporate headquarters were
located and significant business had been transacted. 369
362. Id. at 22, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supranote 46, §§ 302, 304,
309).
363. 36 N.Y.2d at 477, 330 N.E.2d at 80-81, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26 (1975).
364. Id. at 477, 330 N.E.2d at 80, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26.
365. 59 A.D.2d 756, 756-57, 398 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (1977).
366. 55 N.Y.2d 964, 965-66, 434 N.E.2d 251, 252, 449 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (1982).
367. See Lewis v. Dicker, 118 Misc. 2d 28, 30-32, 459 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216-18 (Sup. Ct. 1982)
(citing Greenspun and Rottenberg).

368. Id.
369. Id. Cf Stephenson v. Landegger, 337 F. Supp. 591, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (where a foreign
corporation doing business in New York has more contacts in New York than in its place of incorporation, New York law applies), afid, 464 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1972).
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In the derivative suit area, Galef v. Alexander 370 also deserves special mention. Citing a string of New York cases to the effect that the law
of the state of incorporation governs "internal affairs," including questions as to the relationship between the corporation's shareholders and
its directors, 371 the court went on to take notice of the modern methodologies but concluded that even under a grouping-of-contacts approach
there appeared to be no basis in the circumstances of that case for believing that a New York court would have applied any law to the termination powers of directors other than that of Ohio, where the company was
incorporated.3 72 Because the corporation in fact had major Ohio contacts, it is difficult to disagree with this conflict conclusion.
The new conflicts methodologies also surfaced in Gildenhorn v.
Lum's, Inc.,373 an insider-trading case in which the court explained that
the application of the law of Florida was proper also under the "grouping
of contacts" and the "governmental interests" theories. In addition to
being the state of incorporation, Florida had other "contacts" such as the
corporate headquarters, the residence of the plaintiff, and the place
where the inside information had been received and communicated. The
only New York contact had been the trading of the stock on the New
York Stock Exchange. Thus, Florida was found to have had the paramount interest in "defining and enforcing the fiduciary obligations" owed
374
to the enterprise.
Other issues where the law of incorporation was applied without
elaborate discussion include the fiduciary duties of management and controlling shareholders, 375 the sale of control, 376 the delegation of management functions, 377 dissenters' rights in mergers, 378 shareholder
380
meetings, 379 and shareholder agreements.
On the other hand, the Second Circuit deftly avoided the lex in370. 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
371. Id. at 58.
372. Id. at 58 n.14.
373. 335 F. Supp. 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd sub. nom, Schein v. Chasen, 519 F.2d 453 (2d

Cir. 1975).
374. Id. at 332-33. See also supra note 97.

375. See Lachman v. Bell, 353 F. Supp. 37, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Delaware law governs duties
of management in disposition of corporate assets even where corporation has its principal place of
business and other assets in New York). See also supra note 95.
376. See supra note 98.
377. See supra note 101.

378. See Montei v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 61 A.2d 910, 911, 402 N.Y.S.2d 833, 833 (1978)
(Delaware law).

379. See Fairmont Foods Co. v. Manganello, 301 F. Supp. 832, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also
supra note 102.
380. See Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 100, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (1980)
(Delaware law). See also supra note 104.
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corporationis in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,381 a major recent case
in the takeover field which, on the merits, is heralded as a harbinger of a
stricter application of the business judgment rule against management's
abusive defenses. 382 The first issue in the case was whether shareholders
could bring a derivative action to vindicate the corporate rights of Norlin
against its management for improper issuance of stock to Andes, a
wholly owned subsidiary, and to an employee employee stock ownership
plan. Both companies had been incorporated in Panama. Because, however, Norlin had its principal place of business and executive offices in
New York, where the shareholders and directors meetings were held, and
no significant operations in Panama, the court had no difficulty in avoiding the Hausman rule and in applying New York law to the derivative
aspect of the case under sections 626 and 1319.383
The second and more difficult issue was whether the Norlin stock
held by Andes could be voted. Under New York law, the answer was
clearly in the negative. 3 4 But under the law of Panama, such stock
would lose its voting rights only if the corporation was registered at the
National Sales Commission or its shares were sold in the Panamanian
markets, which was not the case here.38 5 This issue not being within the
New York statutory provisions, the court first recognized that the law of
Panama is relevant but cautioned that it should not be applied automatically and that exceptions are possible in the circumstances outlined in
Greenspun v. Lindley,386 decided by the New York Court of Appeals in
1975.387 Interestingly, the Norlin court did not cite Zion v. Kurtz, 388 the
last and clear pronouncement of the New York Court of Appeals, and a
ringing reaffirmation of the primacy of the lex incorportionis as the "generally accepted choice-of-law rule in New York. '38 9 After reviewing the
major Norlin contacts with New York, including the listing of its stock
on the New York Stock Exchange and the issuance of the stock in question in New York, the court evaded the question whether they would be
sufficient to override the law of Panama by stressing that, in the circumstances of the case, Panama had expressed no legitimate and substantial
interest in this matter. The court read the limitations on the scope of the
381. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
382. See Sommer, The Norlin Case and Business Judgment Rule, 17 REv. SEC. REG. 799-803
(1984); Junewicz, Advanced Planningis Necessary to Battle New Defense Strategies, Nat'l L.J., Oct.
8, 1984, at 18, col. 2.
383. 744 F.2d at 261.
384. Id. at 262 (citing section 612(b)).
385. Id. (citing Articles 35 and 37 of Panamanian Cabinet Decree 247 of July 16, 1970).
386. Id. at 263.
387. 36 N.Y.2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 79, 369 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1975).
388. 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980).
389. Id. at 100, 405 N.E.2d at 684, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
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Panamanian law to mean that there was a gap in the law which could be
filled by New York, 390 not, as would have been more natural under principles of statutory interpretation, that for other corporations the Panamanian rule was that the stock retained its voting rights.
Finally, when the court reached crucial issues on the merits of the
dispute-whether the issuance of the stock in fact did constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty and what was the scope of the business judgment ruleit proceeded to apply substantive New York law without any discussion
or explanation whatever, 391 even though it should have been clear that its
treatment of the prior two issues was not dispositive of, or even germane
to, what law should apply to the merits.
How far will New York go in enforcing its fiduciary principles in
takeover battles is a matter of considerable practical importance, but
Norlin is too ambiguous to furnish a reliable guide. Given the unwillingness of the court even to confront the issue of deviating from the internal
affairs rule, a prudent reading of the case should respect the lex incorporationis but leave open the possibility of applying New York law
when the corporation is centered in New York in most major respects, in
line with the philosophy of the other New York cases.
D. The Lex Incorporationisand the Metamorphosis of State Takeover
Legislation.
1. The Commerce Clause Problem. The typical state takeover
statute that ran into early trouble in the lower courts and finally fared so
badly in MITE is rapidly disappearing. But the proponents of the idea
are not giving up. A major push has been under way to internalize takeover controls so as to bring them within the authority of the law governing the target corporation. Exempting foreign corporations, however,
is not enough to overcome the commerce clause problem. To come
the takeover model must change in
within the realm of internal affairs,
392
substance, not just in form.
a. Ohio regulation of "controlshare acquisitions." Ohio, an aggressive antitakeover state, rushed to respond to the MITE challenge by
adopting a new type of internalized control. The acquisition of shares,
390. 744 F.2d at 264.
391. Id. at 264-67.
392. Even if the commerce clause problem were to be overcome, however, there is little question
that state takeover controls in whatever form do interfere with interstate tender offers and, therefore,
may be preempted by the Williams Act, 90 Pub. L. No. 439, 82 Stat. 456 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78
(1982)) and thus would fall on supremacy grounds. The MITE majority did not address the preemption issue in view of its disposition of the case under the commerce clause. The potential impact of
the proposed federal tender offer controls on the new state takeover statutes is too tangential a
subject to be considered in this article.
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by tender offer or otherwise, that would make the acquirer a holder of
twenty percent or more of the voting stock of a corporation are now
subject to Ohio corporate law as "control share acquisitions. ' 393 In
terms of coverage, however, this legislation makes a major retrenchment
from the original controls that extended to many foreign corporations.
Only Ohio-incorporated, publicly-held targets with at least one additional substantial local connection-principal place of business, principal
executive offices, or substantial assets within the state-are included re394
gardless of local shareholdings.

The regulation treats the "control share acquisitions" similarly to
mergers and consolidations; they must be approved by a majority of both
the entire voting power and the disinterested voting power of the corporation. 395 "Control bids" made to Ohio residents in Ohio-offers to
purchase shares that will increase the offeror's holdings to more than ten

percent-and oppositions to such bids are also made subject to the Ohio
antifraud rules irrespective of any connection between the corporation
396
and/or its shareholders and Ohio.

Whether this regulation of "control share acquisitions" will pass
commerce-clause muster under the lex incorporationis will depend on
whether the internal affairs label is credible. The Ohio General Assembly articulated an express finding to that effect, emphasizing also the
minimal impact on interstate commerce. 39 7 But, of course, this self-serving statement should not be dispositive. The arguments for and against
such characterization of the old tender offer controls have been discussed
393. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(r)(1) (Page Supp. 1983).
394. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(y), (z) (Page Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the particulars of the statute, see Bartell, supra note 172, at 809; Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio
Takeover Act II, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 108, 108-23 (1983); Profusek & Gompf, supra note 168, at 3641; Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and its Aftermath. 40 Bus. LAw.
671, 694-96 (1985).
Mindful of the MITE recognition of the legitimacy of the state's protective interest in local
shareholders, the Ohio Assembly explained that it did not include an express local shareholding
requirement "because of the difficulty of ascertainment by potential acquirers and others of the residence of shareholders" and proceeded to find that "corporations containing the jurisdictional nexus
. . .may be deemed to have a substantial and significant shareholder base in the state." 1983 Ohio
Legis. Bull. Amended Substitute HB No. 822, § 3 (Anderson). This is ingenious but unconvincing.
The jurisdictional criteria used are not shareholder-oriented. Certainly the acquirers would be delighted to be exempted from regulation if they could disprove local shareholdings. Furthermore, the
addresses of the record holders may be used to corroborate or even to establish a reasonable residence connection as under CAL. CORP.CODE § 2115 (West 1977). If the internal affairs characterization of the regulation is upheld, the shareholder connection would be merely reinforcing; if it is
rejected, however, only the presence of an overwhelming number of shareholders and shares in the
state could perhaps suffice by itself to outweigh the out-of-state burdens.
395. Ofio REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page Supp. 1983).
396. OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§§ 1701.01, 1707.041-.042 (Page Supp. 1983).
397. See 1983 Ohio Legis. Bull. Amended Substitute HB No. 822 §§ 2, 3 (Anderson).
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earlier. 398 At least two important new features reinforce the internal affairs argument. First, the new system is voluntary in that it applies only
if the charter or by-laws of the corporation do not exclude it. Second, the
only requirement is shareholder approval of the acquisition following the
filing of a disclosure statement with the corporation. The offer is not
subject to the prior obstructionist control of a state agency and there is
no differentiation between friendly and hostile offers. 399 An attractive
offer for a substantial percentage of the stock is thus likely to receive the
requisite votes and tenders, although some delay may occur.
It must be conceded that while the new controls go beyond the regulation of the internal workings of the corporation and extend to private
transactions among stockholders, they nevertheless create rights and obligations in shareholders qua shareholders. As such, these controls resemble restrictions on the transferability of shares and on transactions in
corporate control which normally fall within the internal affairs domain. 4°° In the statute itself the takeover controls are placed among the
other restrictions on the transfer of shares and it is expressly provided
that the by-laws may impose additional director or shareholder consent
requirements. 4° 1 It may be that acquisition controls, unlike typical transfer restrictions, are aimed at preventing someone else from becoming a
shareholder rather than at merely preserving the original composition of
shareholders-the "intuitus personae." But the same is true of such
transfer restrictions as consent requirements or prohibitions against
transfers to designated persons or classes of persons, which are generally
valid except when they serve no legitimate purpose. 4° 2 The imposition of
fiduciary obligations on sales of control stock is traditionally also classified as an internal affairs matter. In support of the internal affairs character of these controls, Ohio can also point to certain provisions of its law
398. See supra notes 173-74.
399. See Kreider, supra note 394, at 120; Profusek & Gompf, supra note 168, at 40.
400. But see Kreider, supra note 395, at 121 (noting that the Second Ohio takeover act regulates
individual transactions in contrast to internal corporate statutes which apply to corporate action);
Profusek & Gompf, supra note 168, at 40-41. Cf Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 579-82 (4th
Cir. 1983) (even though statute applies only to Virginia corporations, it has extraterritorial effects
because it covers transactions among nonresidents).
401. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.1 l(B)(8) (Page Supp. 1983). At least one Ohio corporation
is moving ahead to make such acquisitions subject to a two-thirds rather than a majority approval.
See GF Business HoldersareAsked to Approve New Name, Structure, Wall St. J., May 3, 1983, at 16,
col. 2.
402. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(c)(3)&(4) (1983); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir. 1977); Grynburg v.
Burke, 378 A.2d 139, 143 (Del. Ch. 1977). On the validity under Delaware law of restrictions
against transfer of shares of stock to aliens including prohibitions against acquisitions by aliens of
more than stated percentages, see Finkelstein, Stock Transfer Restrictions Upon Alien Ownership
Under Section 202 of the Delaware General CorporationLaw, 38 Bus. LAW. 573, 573-92 (1983).
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that subject to director and shareholder approval certain "majority share
acquisitions" by a domestic corporation or a domestic or foreign subsidiary in exchange for more than one-sixth of the voting stock of a domestic
corporation. 4° 3 These kinds of provisions have been assumed to fall
within the power of the state to regulate combinations of its corporations
and the issuance of stock to effectuate them. To be sure, applying local
law to "control share acquisitions" in domestic corporations may well
operate extraterritorially but so do most internal affairs rules. 4o4 This is
the natural consequence of referring such matters to the lex incorporationis. In conclusion, the Ohio controls have a better chance than ever to
4
survive a commerce challenge. 05
b. The Maryland controls over second-tier transactions. Maryland
has chosen a different escape route but again through the "internal affairs" channel. 40 6 Rather than regulating the original acquisition, Mary403. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01(R), 1701.83(A) (Page 1978 & Supp. 1983).
404.
These provisions [supermajority votes, fair pricing] of the second-generation statutes may
be said to constitute burdens because of their direct impact on a particular type of transaction. But is their extraterritorial effect really any greater than that of the general corporation statute's voting, proxy, merger, appraisal or "going private" provisions on the
nonresident shareholders of public corporations?
Sargent, supra note 53, at 28 n.81. Cf Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U.S. 436, 446 (1894) (although a state
may not lay charges on interstate commerce and may not prevent foreign corporations from engaging in interstate commerce within its borders, it has the power to determine "upon what conditions
its laws as to consolidation of corporations may be availed of"); 15 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
CORPORATIONS § 7162 (1983).
It should also be pointed out that the Ohio controls, unlike those of Michigan held unconstitutional in Martin Marietta,see supra note 181, because of their effects on out-of-state transactions, do
not enable Ohio shareholders to deny other shareholders the benefit of the tender offer. The fate of
an acquisition rests with all shareholders equally. See Profusek & Gompf, supra note 168, at 25-26.
405. Recent comment on the new Ohio system has been generally favorable but guarded. Professor Shipman, an early and persistent supporter of the Ohio anti-takeover stance, stresses the internal affairs characterization and the shortness of the delay. Only the state of incorporation would be
exercising such authority, so there is no risk of conflict with the laws of other states. See House
PanelFindsLittle Agreement on Federal Tender Offer Law Reform, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 23, at 915, 916 (May 25, 1984). See also Note, CorporateBattlesfor Control,supra note 163, at
1474. Others, while recognizing the legitimacy of the lex incorporationis, are "queasy" because of
the uncertainty generated by the slow approval requirements and because of the effects on out-ofstate transactions. See RICO's Reported Demise, Tender Offers, ULOE Adoption Considered at ABA
Meeting, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1392, 1393-94 (Aug. 17, 1984) [hereinafter cited
as RICO's ReportedDemise]; Easton, With Caution States Refashion Takeover Barriers,Legal Times,
April 23, 1984, at 2, col. 1. Local incorporation coupled with a significant local connection, as is
done under the Ohio approach, would seem to satisfy Sargent's requirement that the corporation
have sufficient local identity to outweigh the incidental burden on interstate commerce. See Sargent,
supra note 53, at 22-24, 30-34.
406. House Bill No. 1020 as originally passed by the Maryland House was quite controversial
and was vetoed by the Governor after a number of major Maryland corporations threatened to move
out. Following certain amendments, the bill passed again and the governor signed it on June 22,
1983. Act of June 21, 1983, 1983 Md. Laws 2464-66. On the history of this bill as well as on the
increasing use, by charter amendment, of anti-second-tier provisions, see MarylandBill on Takeovers
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land, like Ohio, focuses on the second tier-the extension of control by

the successful tender-offeror. The initial acquisition of shares through a
tender offer or otherwise in one or more transactions is unaffected. But a
"business combination" between a corporation and any ten percent

shareholder requires not only the recommendation of the board, but also
eighty percent approval by the total outstanding stock and two-thirds
approval by the outstanding stock held by those other than the ten-percent shareholder, voting together "as a single voting group."'4° 7 Even
with these approvals, the rights of dissenting shareholders are strengthened. 408 An exemption is provided where the remaining shareholders are
bought out at the highest of certain alternative prices,409 provided that no

action adverse to minority shareholders has been taken at the corporate
level and that the ten percent shareholder has not increased his holdings
4 10
since acquiring that status.
These rules apply to all corporations organized under the law of
Maryland unless their charter is amended by a vote of eighty percent of

the shareholders, including two-thirds of the disinterested shareholders,
to disclaim coverage. 4 11 Thus, the only required connection is the naked

fact of incorporation in Maryland. There seems little question about the
internal affairs nature of these "business combinations," and challenges
to the application of Maryland law under the commerce clause will be
4 12
difficult.
c. The Pennsylvania extension. What is probably the strictest system of antitakeover regulation was recently enacted in Pennsylvania. In
essence, Pennsylvania engrafts a dissenter's right not on the second-tier
but on the very acquisition of "control," that is, at least thirty percent of
Spurs a Fight, Wall St. J., May 26, 1983, at 33, col. 3. For a comprehensive description of the statute,
see Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 MarylandFairPrice Legislation, 43 MD. L. REv.
266 (1984).
407. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-602 (Supp. 1984). "Business combination" is redefined to include mergers, consolidations, share exchanges, certain sales of more than 10% of the
assets, issuance of more than five percent of the stock, liquidation, dissolution, and reclassifications
or recapitalizations of securities involving the 10% shareholder.
408. See MD. CoRPs. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 202(a)(5), (b)(3) & (c) (Supp. 1984).
409. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-601(E) (Supp. 1984).
410. MD. CORps. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(B) (Supp. 1983). The alternative prices include
the price paid in the first tier of a tender offer.
411. MD. CORPs. & ASNS CODE ANN. § 3-603(E)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1984).
412. It is the view of many commentators that Maryland's is the most likely of the second-level
antitakeover statutes to survive a constitutional challenge. Sargent, supra note 53, at 27; Warren,
supra note 394, at 698; Easton, supra note 405, at 2, col. 1; RICO's Reported Demise, supra note 405,
at 1394. The least defensible aspect of the Maryland statute is the inclusion of the sale of more than
10% of the assets, wherever situated, among the covered transactions. It has been reported that
Michigan S. Bill No. 541, recently adopted, incorporates a similar plan. Sargent, supra, note 53, at
10 n.24.
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the total voting power of a corporation. 413 "Dissenting" shareholders

may make a demand on the acquirer for payment of the "fair value" of
their shares, including any control premium component, under an appraisal-type proceeding. 4 14 The likely practical effect of this system
would be to compel tender offerors for more than thirty percent to extend their offers to one-hundred percent of the outstanding shares, in a
manner similar to the British system.415 As if this were not enough, sec-

ond-tier transactions such as mergers, consolidations, and sales of substantially all the assets, between a "controlling" shareholder and the
corporation or a subsidiary are also required to be approved by a majority vote of the disinterested shareholders.4 16 The same vote is needed to
validate corporate dissolution or liquidation if the "controlling" shareholder receives preferential treatment. 417 Finally, in an obvious "local
interest" vein, the board of directors is now specifically empowered, in

exercising its business judgment, to consider the effect of its actions upon
the employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation and upon the

communities where offices or other establishments of the corporation are
located. 418
The language and the location within the statute of these provisions

demonstrates that an attempt is being made to treat "control" acquisi413. Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 92, § 910, 1983 Pa. Legis. Serv. 775, 777-78 (Purdon). For a full
commentary on the Act, see Newlin & Gilmer, The PennsylvaniaShareholderProtectionAct: A New
State Approach to Deflecting CorporateTakeover Bids 40 Bus. LAW 111 (1984). A similar system is
under consideration in Missouri (S. Bill 409, in author's possession) and in Hawaii, see 16 Sac. R G.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 11 , at 514 (Mar. 16, 1984). A number of Pennsylvania corporations, including Gulf Oil and Scott Paper, were reportedly the prime movers behind the legislation. See Bill That
CouldDeterHostile Takeovers NearingPennsylvaniaSenate Vote, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1982, at 8, cols.
1-3. Corporations that have no class of voting shares registered under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are exempted. Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 92, § 910(g). In addition, the articles ofincorporation may explicitly provide that section 910 shall not be applicable. Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 92, §
910(A). Sun Company reportedly opted out under subsection (A) in order to leave open the possibility of a friendly takeover. See Sun Co. Remains Speculative Merger Target as Price Rises, Volume
Gains Despite Denials,Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1984, at 61, cols. 3-4. But Sun can not escape the antisecond-tier provisions of the law. See id Similar action was also taken by the Philadelphia Electric
Company. See LV CoRp. REP. BULL. (PH) No. 8, at 6 (Apr. 10, 1984).
414. Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 92, § 910(E).
415. See Prentice, Take-Over Bids---The City Code on Take-Overs andMergers, 18 McGxL L.L
385 (1972).
416. Act of Dec. 23, 1983, No. 92, § 409.1(c)(1). This section does not apply to transactions
approved by a majority vote of the disinterested directors and to transactions where the consideration received by the shareholders is not less than the highest amount paid by the "controlling"
shareholder for any of his shares. Id. § 409.1(c)(2).
417. Id. § 409.1(e)(1).
418. Id, § 408(b). It would appear that these provisions apply to all Pennsylvania-incorporated
companies irrespective of any other contact to the state of the corporation, the directors, and the
shareholders or the tender offeror, and of any connection between the "control" acquisition itself
and the state. Id. §§ 2(6), 3(1).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1985:1

tions as involving fundamental corporate changes that should be governed by the lex incorporationis. But, unlike Ohio and Maryland,
Pennsylvania goes beyond subjecting the acquisitions to special approvals
or even imposing particular terms on subsequent consolidations; it also
mandates the purchase of the shares of the dissenters whether or not the
acquirer proceeds to the second-tier. The treatment of a mere acquisition
of control as tantamount to a fundamental change on the order of a
merger that transforms the very identity and essence of the corporation
may be extreme, but it does not necessarily destroy the internal affairs
character of the regulation. But carrying this treatment to its ultimate
conclusion by triggering dissenters' rights is a more serious matter. If
substance is to prevail over form, it should be recognized that the principal effect of this system is to require tender offerors to buy all of the stock
of the target. Thus, it operates very much like a regulation of securities
transactions, and one could argue that the restrictions against extraterri41 9
toriality should apply to this last feature of the system.
d. The Minnesota-Wisconsin dare: reaching takeovers of foreign
corporations under the umbrella of blue-sky regulation. The Minnesota
420
Take-Overs Act of 1984 institutes a two-fold program of controls.
Not only does it cover "control share acquisitions" of domestic corporations in the Ohio style,4 21 but it also requires certain tender offerors to file
a registration statement containing a variety of disclosures, including information on the economic effects of planned changes in the target's busi423
ness. 4 22 In addition, substantive fairness requirements are imposed,
and a second-tier transaction within two years triggers an obligation to
offer to Minnesota residents substantially equivalent terms in a manner
424
resembling the Maryland system.
419. Newlin and Gilmer seek to distinguish the Pennsylvania approach from that condemned in
Edgar by emphasizing the absence of disclosures and regulatory controls and the lack of delay and
by pointing out its internal affairs nature and its application only to locally-incorporated targets.
Thus, they argue, the Act has no extraterritorial effect. See Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 413, at
118-22. See also, RICO's Reported Demise, supra note 405, at 1394 (the Pennsylvania approach falls
between Ohio's maximum and Maryland's minimum).
420. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B; 302A (West Supp. 1984). It has been reported that at least one
corporation, Minstar, Inc., is planning to leave Minnesota and reincorporate in Delaware to escape
these controls. See MinistarPlansto Ask Holdersto Approve ReincorporationPlan, Wall St. J., Mar.
15, 1985, at 40, col.2. The fact that Irwin Jacobs, a notorious raider, heads Ministar perhaps explains this antitakover philosophy.
421. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West Supp. 1984). A bill was recently introduced in the
state Senate - S. 729 - that would repeal this section. See 17 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 13,
at 556 (Mar. 29, 1985).
422. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03.(6) (West Supp. 1984).
423. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.06 (West Supp. 1984).
424. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.06(7) (West Supp. 1984).
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Where it goes beyond "control share acquisitions," the regulation
proceeds on a blue-sky theory-it applies only to those tender offers
which are made to resident shareholders. 4 25 Thus, an offeror who totally
by-passes Minnesota is unaffected by this legislation. Furthermore, only
the shares of certain publicly-owned targets are covered. But instead of
referring to the state of incorporation to identify the targets, the statute
focuses solely on twenty percent ownership of the stock by Minnesota
4 26
residents plus corporate ownership of "substantial assets" in the state.
Thus, foreign corporations are clearly included. But the special civil remedies for violating the statute-disenfranchisement for one year, nontransferability of shares and a corporate option to redeem the shares at
book or cost-are available only to, or for the benefit of, Minnesota
4 27
residents.
There have been at least two cases which addressed the constitutionality of certain of these provisions. In Edudata v. Scientific Computers,428 the tender offeror was able to obtain a temporary restraining
order against enforcement pending a hearing on the merits, but the case
was settled shortly thereafter and the issue never came to a head.4 29 But
in CardiffAcquisitions v. Hatch,4 30 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a lower court decision upholding the disclosure provisions of the
statute against a commerce clause challenge on two grounds. First, the
provisions do not significantly burden interstate commerce; there exist no
precommencement filing period, no delay, and no fairness tests. Second,
they are convincingly limited to the protection of only Minnesota residents of Minnesota-connected corporations. 43 1
Wisconsin went even further than Minnesota by combining the Ohio
and Maryland approaches for domestic, locally-connected corporations4 32 to a blue-sky registration, fair pricing, antifraud scheme for takeovers not only of domestic, but also of those foreign corporations which
are connected with Wisconsin by having there (a) their principal place of
425. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.06(8) (West Supp. 1984).
426. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01(9) (West Supp. 1984). In Cardiff Acquisitions v. Hatch, 751
F.2d 906, 911 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984), the "substantial assets" language had been interpreted by the State
Commissioner to catch only corporations having their primary place of business in Minnesota. The
particular target in that case had most of its manufacturing facilities, all of its research and testing
centers, almost three-fourth of its employees, and more than 20% of its shareholders in Minnesota.
427. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.06(ii), 80B.10(4) (West Supp. 1984).

428. See Scientific Computers Will Pay $6.4 Million to End Edudata Offer, Wall St. J., Oct. 29,
1984, at 41, col.4 (unpublished order).
429. See id.
430. 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
431. Id. at 909-12. The court did not pass on the constitutionality of the "fair pricing" secondtier requirements on the ground that they had not been invoked by the state. Id. at 914.
432. Wis. STAT. §§ 180.69, 180.725 (West Supp. 1984).
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business, (b) substantial assets, (c) securities registered or exempt under
Wisconsin or federal law, and (d) 100 resident shareholders or five percent of their stock owned by residents. 433 Certain of these provisions
apply only to those corporations whose securities are either (a) not registered, or (b) held fifty-one percent by residents, or (c) held thirty-three
percent by residents where the corporation's principal place of business is
located in Wisconsin or its operations have a "substantial economic effect" in the state.4 34 The blue-sky rationale is reinforced by the fact that
435
these controls apply only to tender offers made in Wisconsin.
Whether the Minnesota and Wisconsin controls as they apply to foreign corporations will eventually survive the commerce clause challenges
is difficult to predict. Shorn of the full "internal affairs" crutch, they will
stand or fall depending on whether the burden that they impose on interstate commerce is deemed to be outweighed in each particular instance
by the state interests in the protection of resident shareholders and in the
control over offers made within the state. Martin Marietta and the related cases4 36 stressed the burden of the interstate effects even where the
regulation is limited to intraterritorial persons and events. By contrast,
Cardiff tipped the balance in the opposite direction by focusing on the
insignificance of the particular interstate effects and on the strength of
the state interests and powers in the specific context of that case. In
addition, Cardiffappeared to bring in an "internal affairs" consideration
through its references to the Minnesota connections of the target. The
many requirements of real corporate contacts with the state in the Minnesota and Wisconsin systems can be used to construct "pseudo-foreign"
corporation basis for the legislative intervention which should be given
credence to the extent that such requirements catch only those corpora437
tions that are in all material respects genuinely local.
Even if these cases were to be reconciled by distinguishing them on
their facts or on the differences in the legislative schemes, there is little
question that they exemplify differing philosophies on the importance of
state regulation of multistate takeovers. Which view ultimately prevails
433. Wis. STAT. § 552.01(6) (West Supp. 1984).
434. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(7) (West Supp. 1984).
435. Wis. STAT. § 552.05(1) (West Supp. 1984).

436. See supra notes 181 & 183. Cf BLUE SKY LAW REP. (CCH) S 71,845 (Apr. 2, 1983)
(opinion of the Nebraska Attorney General that the Nebraska Takeover Act of 1983, which man-

dates certain disclosures in connection with all takeovers for domestic or foreign targets which have
35 or more resident shareholders, is unconstitutional under Edgar since it applies to "transactions
not involving Nebraska residents or corporations, and taking place wholly outside Nebraska"). The
Attorney General did not consider whether the limited remedies provided for violations of the statute, mainly injunctions and liabilities in connection with offers in Nebraska, could have saved some

or all of the statute on a blue-sky analogy.
437. See supra notes 253-67.

Vol. 1985:1]

CORPORATE CHOICE OF LAW

will depend on the amplitude with which the Supreme Court interprets
the MITE language on the role left to the states and on the assumed
validity of blue-sky type state power.438

2.

The Preemption Issue. In Edgar, no view commanded a ma-

jority on whether the Illinois statute was also inconsistent with the Williams Act and, therefore, preempted under the supremacy clause.4 39
Because the metamorphosis of state takeover statutes is likely to bring
many of their features within the internal affairs realm and thus overcome the commerce clause challenge, the preemption issue will probably
surface again. Excessive meddling in interstate tender offers is best dealt
with through a preemption analysis rather than by second-guessing the
internal affairs character of the new controls under the commerce clause.
Indeed, an exclusive federal regulation of tender offers for the stock of

interstate corporations would override not only state takeover controls
but also inconsistent state corporate law, thus invalidating numerous de-

fensive measures now used or abused under permissive state law. 440 A
preemption approach could leave room for state regulation of local offers

as, for example, under section 1904(c) of the American Law Institute's
proposed Federal Securities Code of 1978. 44 1 This section imposes a
double cumulative requirement of localism: To escape federal preemp438. See Edgar,457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J., concurring).
439. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 634-40.
440. Management action or proposals to institute antitakeover defenses permissible under state
law have reached the level of an epidemic. Most of these efforts prove successful. See supra note 6.
See also Lautzenhiser, State and FederalRegulation of Shark Repellant Provisions: How Much is
Needed?, I1 N. KY. L. REv. 481 (1984); Anti-Takeover Measures in 1984 Seen Matching or Exceeding Last Year's Pace, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1984, at 10, col. 2. The management of Dow Jones itself is
proposing the declaration of a 50% dividend in a new class of stock transferable only to major
shareholders. The effect of this would be to delist all of its stock from the NYSE. Minority shareholders have lost the first round in a court challenge against the legality of the dividend. See Dow
Jones Holders Lose Court Bid to Block New Class ofStock, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1984, at 12, col. 2.
Sometimes the opponents of antitakeover defenses combine litigation with a proxy fight. See Nortek
Lawsuit Seeks to Halt Woodhead's AntiTakeover Moves, Wall StJ., Feb. 7, 1985, at 4, cols. 5-6; An
Urgent Message to All Stockholders ofDaniel Woodhead, Inc., Wall St.J., Feb. 1, 1985, at 28, cols. 12. A new and promising development is the increasing opposition of institutional investors, including pension funds and employee ESOPS, to management's self-entrenching antitakeover policies.
See InstitutionalInvestors Form Council to Address Corporate Takeover Issues, 17 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No 4, at 159-60 (Jan. 25, 1985). For a fascinating example of a situation where, apparently under shareholder pressure, management itself embarked on a campaign to repeal structural
shark repellents, see FortuneFinancialGroup Inc. proxy ad, Wall St.J., Feb. 6, 1985, at 37, cols. 5-6.
On the legality of some antitakeover defenses under traditional state law, see Finkelstein, Antitakeover ProtectionAgainst Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers The Validity of FairPrice, Mandatory
Bid, and Flip-OverProvisions Under Delaware Law, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 307-09 (1984); see also
Lautzenhiser, supra;Comment, Testing the Flight ofthe Golden Parachute"JudicialSmooth Sailing
or Turbulence Ahead?, 11 N. KY. L. Rv. 519 (1984).
441. FED. SEC. CODE § 1904(c) (Proposed Draft 1978).
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tion, not only is a major local connection-that is, the principal place of
business-of the target corporation itself required but also at least fifty
percent of the shareholdings and shareholders must be local. By con-

trast, Recommendation 9 of the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender
Offers promotes a "local" definition based on state of incorporation, fifty
percent of shareholdings within such state, and certain maximum size

and stock-trading requirements. 4 2 The Advisory Committee's approach
favoring the lex incorporationis rather than the law of the state of princi-

pal business in the non-preempted area is more consistent with the "internal affairs" nature of the subject matter and with the state interest in
the shareholders themselves.
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE LEx
INCORPORATIONIS AND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LEGISLATION

VII.

In choosing the law applicable to internal corporate affairs the states
have drawn no distinctions between sister-state and foreign country cor-

porations."

3

In addition, the commerce clause is not limited to inter-

state dealings but extends to foreign trade and transactions as well.
Thus, the same criteria are used in both the interstate and the international contexts.

Another matter which deserves attention here is the international
applicability of federal law that affects internal corporate affairs. In particular, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") 444 clearly has
had some impact, and some conflicts consideration is warranted. 445

Although the main thrust of the Act is to regulate trading in securities, a
subject matter unrelated to internal affairs, there are at least four areas
442. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers---Report of Recommendations, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) No. 1028, at 17 n.17 (July 15, 1983); see also Lowenstein, PruningDeadwoodin Hostile
Takeover A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 255 (1983) (approving reference to
the law of the state of incorporation for antitakeover defenses).
443. See, eg., Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696, 702-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885
(1967); cf First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterion De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 615
(1983) (referring to the conflicts rule of lex incorporationis in the context of a Cuban corporation).
444. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
445. See Rosenfeld, ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Laws: A Conflict-of-Laws Approach, 28
STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1011-14 (1976) (discussing the international applicability of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission'sAdministrative, Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies--TheirInfluence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58
NoTRE DAME LAW. 173, 179-226 (1982) (discussing the SEC's influence on internal corporate affairs); see also Thomas, Extraterritorialityin an Era ofInternationalizationof the Securities Markets:
The Need to Revisit Domestic Policies, 35 RUT. L. REv. 453, 465-66 (1983) (discussing the international applicability of the securities laws); Thomas, ExtraterritorialApplication of the U.S. Securities
Laws: The Needfor a Balanced Policy, 7 L CoRp. L. 189 (1982).
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where the Act intersects with them: proxy regulation, 44 6 periodic report-

ing requirements of management to shareholders, 447 short-swing profit
disgorgement rules, 448 and securities fraud perpetrated on the corpora-

tion by its fiduciaries. 449 Although the federal law purports to be neither
comprehensive nor preemptive of state law, its complementary character

thus raising quesdoes not make it any less relevant to internal affairs,
4 50
tions about its applicability to foreign corporations.

A. The Explicit Controls Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the Securities and Exchange Commission Rules.
The voting rights of shareholders are at the core of corporate governance. The rules controlling the solicitation and use of proxy statements and the related informational obligations for shareholder meetings
significantly affect the exercise of such voting rights. Professor Eisenberg
has cogently argued that, at least in the public corporation, voting by

proxy has replaced the shareholders' meeting as the principal vehicle for
446. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
447. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1982).
448. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
449. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
450.
The Act and the Proposed Rules [later adopted] taken in combination raise serious questions of international law. In essence, the question is whether. . . the United States has
jurisdiction to regulate the internal affairs offoreign corporationswhich have no contacts
with the United States other than the requisite number of shareholders [300 residents in

United States].
[If foreign issuers] "voluntarily" accept the jurisdiction of the Commission by listing
or publicly selling their securities in the United States, there is no problem [under international law] at least to the extent that such regulations do not significantly interfere with
legitimate regulation of the same subject matter by thejurisdiction ofincorporationordomicile.
Committee on International Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The 1964 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the ProposedSecurities andExchange Commission
Rules-InternationalLaw Aspects, 21 A.B. CrrY N.Y. 240, 243-44 (1966) (emphasis added). "A
short swing profit by the corporate insider-presumably legal under the laws of the jurisdiction of
incorporation of the corporation-does not. . . have an effect within the United States which is
substantial. . . 'direct and foreseeable'... merely because the corporation happens to have 300
United States [resident] shareholders." Id at 250 (emphasis added). It is "essential to weigh the
various interests involved, including of course not only the interests of the United States but of the
international community as a whole and of the 'home' state of the foreign corporation." Id at 251
(emphasis added). Basing applicability of the law on shareholder residence would mean that "a
corporation, the shares of which were internationally owned, would be subject to the valid assertion
of plenary jurisdiction to regulate its internal affairs by each state in which it happened to have
shareholders [which is contrary to the principle of territoriality]." Id at 252 (emphasis added).
"Mhe Committee submits that compliance by the foreign corporation [having an 'inadvertent' contact with the United States] with the laws of the country of its incorporationcomports more closely
with the standards of comity which are the basis of international law than the assertion of jurisdiction by each country in which such corporation has shareholders." Id (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
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shareholder decisionmaking. 451 Sections 14(a), (c), and (f) of the Act and
the SEC Proxy Rules, in addition to controlling the content of disclosures and the manner of solicitation of proxies, also subject certain aspects of the voting procedures, shareholder proposals, inspection rights,
and communications to substantive norms which would normally be categorized as internal affair rules. 452 The obligation of corporate management under section 13 of the Act to maintain records and to provide
information for the benefit of the shareholders about the operations and
financial condition of the corporation4 53 also does relate to internal affairs. So too does section 16, under which a corporate insider is required
to report his acquisitions and, by virtue of his presumed access to confidential corporate information, disgorge to the corporation short-swing
profits made by trading in its stock. 454 The emphasis here is on the
breach of fiduciary duty rather than on the effect on the market.
The registration requirements are the centerpiece of the Act's regulatory scheme. 455 The provisions affecting internal affairs in sections 13,
14, and 16 apply only to those corporations that have "registered" securities under section 12.456 At first glance, place of incorporation and other
corporate connections appear irrelevant, but four connections are used in
the major exemptions from registration or from certain obligations: (a)
place of incorporation, (b) residence of shareholders, (c) principal place
of management, and (d) residence of directors. For example, only foreign private issuers, defined as corporations "incorporated or organized
under the laws of any foreign country, '4 57 are eligible to use the available
exemptions from the obligations of sections 12, 14, and 16.458 United
States corporations are by definition excluded from this exemption.
Also, compliance with the publicity requirements of the state of incorporation satisfies United States law in certain contexts. 459 Thus, place of
incorporation is an important threshold consideration in this area. It and
451. Eisenberg, Access to the CorporateProxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1490 (1970).
452. 15 U.S.C. § 28n (a),(c),(f) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1-11, 240.14c-1-7, 240.14f-I (1984).
453. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (a)-Q) (1982).

454. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a)-(b) (1982).
455. 15 U.S.C. § 78! (1982).

456. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (a)-(b), 78n (a)-(c), 78p (a) (1982). Such securities for section 12 purposes
are (a) securities registered on a national securities exchange or (b) securities of a corporation in
interstate or foreign commerce that has total assets exceeding $3 million and is owned by at least 500
persons. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(g) (1982) (section 781(g) as currently enacted provides for an asset limitation of $1 million but has been liberalized by 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1984) which increases the

asset limitation to $3 million.)
457. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(b) (1984).

458. See 17 C.F.R. § 240-12g3-2(a), (b), (d) (1984) (exemption from regulation under § 12(g) of
the Act); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3(b) (1984) (exemption from § 14(a), (c), (f)
and from § 16 of the
Act).

459. See 17 C.F.R. § 12g3-2(b)(1)(i) (1984).
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89.

residence of shareholders are the most significant connections for section
12 purposes.
The courts generally have respected the spirit of nonextraterritoriality reflected in these provisions. 46° Furthermore, in considering whether

to impose additional limitations upon the transnational reach of provisions such as section 16(b), the courts appear to have been influenced by

461
the place of incorporation.

Foreign corporations generally are exempted from the obligation to
register a class of securities if fewer than 300 residents of the United

States own securities of such class. 462 Furthermore, sections 14(a), (c),
and (f) and section 16 do not apply to non-North American registered
foreign corporations unless more than fifty percent of their voting stock
is owned by United States residents and either (1) their principal place of

management is in the United States, (2) a majority of their directors or
executive officers reside in the United States or are United States citizens,
or (3) more than fifty percent of their assets are located in the United
States.4 63 In other words, having a substantial number of United States
shareholders is a prerequisite to subjecting an unlisted foreign corpora-

tion to certain internal affairs obligations of the 1934 Act. Even then,
however, the principal obligations--proxy regulation and disgorgement

of short-swing profits-do not apply unless certain additional connections are present, including in large ownership of the voting stock by
United States residents.

The proposed Federal Securities Code addresses the extraterritoriality question in section 1905. The general approach of the Code is to
460. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (plaintiff shareholders of a foreign corporation did not claim violations of the proxy rules under §14(a)
despite the extensive solicitation in the United States, apparently because the securities had not been
registered. Because the solicitations related to a merger, § 10(b) was relied upon instead), modified
on other grounds, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Jordan v. Global Natural Resources, 564 F.
Supp. 59, 67 n.5 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (foreign corporation not subject to § 14(a) proxy rules because
§ 12(g)(3) specifically exempts foreign corporations from regulations under the proxy rules). Cf
Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597, 609-10 (D.N.J.) (foreign corporation
did not violate § 14(e) since it made sufficient disclosure to shareholders), affd, 497 F.2d 394 (3rd
Cir.1974); Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 527-29 (8th Cir. 1973) (foreign corporation
held liable under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 since a decline in value of stock held by United States
residents was a direct result of the corporation's misconduct).
461. See Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (a Canadian corporation
whose only act within the United States was registration with the SEC); Roth v. Fund of Funds, 279
F. Supp. 935, 938 (S.D.N.Y.) (corporation not exempted because buy and sell orders given from
outside United States where New York was place of alleged wrong), af'd, 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir.
1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). See also Thomas, SecuritiesRegulators Grapple with Extraterritoriality, Legal Times, Jan. 17, 1983, at 20, 23.
462. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (a) (1984).
463. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3(b) (1984).
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require registration of all corporations, wherever situated, that meet certain asset and shareholding criteria similar to those of present section
12(g). But the SEC is empowered to exempt from registration issuers
that are not "residents" of the United States, 464 and residence for corporations is defined as the "place of organization or principal place of business." 465 Thus, it appears that only corporations that are organized and
have their principal place of business abroad may be exempted. What is
noteworthy for our purposes is the prominence given to the place of incorporation and, more specifically, the absolute registration requirement
for all corporations incorporated in the United States. The residence of
directors has no bearing on the applicability of the Code to their corporations. In addition, the SEC has general authority to exempt all "persons," including possibly non-residents, from the application of certain
466
specific provisions of the Code.
The manner in which sections 12(g), 13, 14(a), and 16(b) of the Act
have been applied extraterritorially under the present regime of registration and exemptions is basically consistent with the primacy of the lex
incorporationis. Coverage extends to all corporations organized in the
United States regardless of any other contacts. The main connection that
brings foreign corporations within the reach of these provisions is majority or substantial shareholdings by United States residents, sometimes
reinforced by major management contacts with the United States or national trading of their securities in the United States. These are strong
links that trigger the protective interests of the United States. The limited nature of the interference with the internal affairs of the foreign corporation, the relative clarity and strength of the criteria used, and the
adequacy of the prior notice given to the affected parties, make a good
467
case that the present system is satisfactory under conflicts analysis.
B. The Impact on Internal Affairs of the Extraterritorialityof Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
The writings on the "extraterritoriality" of section 10(b) are legion.46 The common wisdom that the securities acts basically regulate
transactions in securities and have only a tangential effect on most inter464. FED. SEC. CODE § 1905(c)(2) (Proposed Draft 1978).

465. FED. SEC. CODE § 299.44 (Proposed Draft 1978).
466. FED. SEC. CODE § 303 (Proposed Draft 1978).
467. The same cannot be said, however, of the introduction of the "principal business" connection as a basis for United States regulation under the Federal Securities Code because of its lesser
relevance to issues of internal affairs.
468. See infra note 472. The subject is considered so important that the Restatement of Foreign
RelationsLaw of the United States (Revised) (Tentative Draft No. 2) (1981) saw fit to include an
entirely new Section 416 governing specifically "Jurisdiction over Securities Transactions."
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nal corporate affairs extends to "securities fraud" under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 of the Act. It is only where shareholders are allowed to
pursue remedies for fraud perpetrated upon the corporation itself that
section 10(b) significantly intersects with internal affairs. There has
4 69
never been much doubt that 10(b) claims may be pursued derivatively.
But should such suits be treated as traditional derivative suits whose substantive aspects 470 are governed by the internal affairs law of the corporation? Until 1977, the prevailing view was that, both in the domestic and
in the international contexts, the pursuit of shareholder claims for securities fraud perpetrated on the corporation-at least where the corporate

management was implicated-was a matter of 10(b) law, not of state corporate law. 4 71 Consequently, the international scope of such claims was
to be handled under the extraterritoriality analysis applied in the ordi472
nary 10(b) case.

469. See Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24,26 (2d Cir. 1964); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins.
Co., 174 F.2d 799, 800 (3rd Cir. 1949); Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5
CorporateMismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. Rlv. 1007, 1020-22 (1973).
470. For discussion of the procedural aspects and especially the manner of application of rule
23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, supra note 91.
471. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) is one of the earliest cases to deal
with this issue. A majority of the directors who authorized the issuance of shares to an insider had
knowledge of important earnings information which they withheld from the minority directors. 339
F.2d at 26. Did this bar the corporate 10(b) claim? The court had no difficulty "in rejecting such
cliches as the directors constitute the corporation and a corporation. . . cannot defraud itself...
Denial of relief on this basis would surely undercut the congressional determination [embodied in
10(b)]." 339 F.2d at 29. In O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), decided a few weeks
later, the same court distinguished and significantly limited Ruckle to situations where at least some
directors are deceived. 339 F.2d at 768. In subsequent years the view that commanded wider support was one protective along the lines of Ruckle rather than technical as in O'Neill. For a full
review and analysis, see 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LowENrFLs, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 4.7 (1984).
472. The most important early case on the "extraterritoriality" of derivative 10(b) actions is
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), aff'd inrelevant part& rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). This was an action by an American
shareholder on behalf ofa Canadian corporation against foreign defendants for alleged 10(b) fraudinsiders' trading- committed in Canada. The only other United States connection, unrelated to the
transaction, was that the stock was listed on the American Stock Exchange. The lower court came
closer than any other court to the proper analysis of the issue. While it did refer to the rebuttable
presumption of the territoriality of regulatory legislation, to the location of the harm in Canada, and
to the failure of the SEC to make rules to protect the American markets in this kind of situation, the
court correctly placed the principal emphasis on corporateconflicts of law and dismissed the claim
on the ground that plaintiff had in reality alleged not securities fraud but corporate mismanagement
which is governed by the law of incorporation under the internal affairs rule. 268 F. Supp. 385, 39293 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
The Second Circuit totally disagreed on this precise point, stressing the regulatory and protective nature of § 10(b) and the absence of SEC rules exempting application of the section in that
instance. In the famous language repeated in many subsequent cases the court stressed that it believed "that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to
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4 73
Then came the landmark case of Santa Fe Industries v. Green,
which excluded corporate mismanagement in securities transactions

from the ambit of section 10(b). This case would have practically eliminated derivative 10(b) claims involving internal corporate affairs had it

not been for the "constructive deception" loophole opened by Goldberg v.
Merridor474 and its progeny475 for situations where truthful information
is not disseminated to disinterested parties within the corporation. In the
4 76
Goldberg circumstances, the Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook approach
would call for the international reach of the "constructive fraud" claim

to be determined under 10(b) criteria without deference to the law governing the internal corporate affairs. A better approach was adopted by
the lower court in IIT v. Cornfeld,477 in which a derivative 10(b) claim

brought on behalf of a foreign corporation was dismissed because most of
the shareholders were foreign nationals and residents: "Whatever the

value or justification for 'federalizing' the law of corporate management
in the domestic context, an extension of the law to 'Americanize' the
corporations laws of the entire world is a different prospect. ' 478 The

court recognized that the internal relationship between directors and
protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to
protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American
securities." 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), affid in part & rev'd in part,405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). By reversing the lower court and holding that an American

shareholder can assert a corporate 10(b) claim because of the indirect diminution of the value of his
stock, regardless of the fiduciary law and the derivative suit requirements of the state of incorporation, 405 F.2d at 208-09, the Second Circuit recognized a special derivative action involving breaches
of fiduciary duty as a matterof 10(b) law.
The extraterritorial dimension of Schoenbaum has been generally discussed in the literature
without addressing its fiduciary and derivative aspects. See Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign
Aspects of SecuritiesRegulation: Towards a Reevaluation ofSection 10 of the SecuritiesExchange Act
of 1934, 55 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1034-35 (1969); Note, American Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud,89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 556-57, 563-68 (1976).
Application of Canadian fiduciary and derivative law most probably would have supported
maintenance of the action in Schoenbaum leading to the same result. Subsequent cases on extraterritoriality have limited the scope of Schoenbaum to situations where the effects on United States securities markets are direct and substantial. See, eg., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1333 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 528 (8th
Cir. 1973).
473. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
474. 567 F.2d 209, 215-18 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
475. See, eg., Healy v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 647 (3rd Cir. 1980); Alabama
Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir.
1979); Kidwell ex reL Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273, 1290-92 (9th Cir. 1979); Maldonado v.
Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 792-95 (2d Cir. 1979).
476. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), aff'd in part& rev'd in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
477. 462 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affid in part& rev'd in part, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
478. 462 F. Supp. at 225.
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shareholders is governed by the law of incorporation4 7 9 and that its appli4 80
cability is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.
This is eminently sound. In what circumstances the knowledge of management should be imputed to the corporation is an internal affairs question whose determination under the applicable corporate law should
precede the merits of the 10(b) claim. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed in part in a two-pronged unanimous opinion
4 81
written by Judge Friendly that continued the Schoenbaum tradition.
The first prong stressed the existence of some contacts of the fraud with
the United States.48 2 But if the application of 10(b) in this area is intended to protect United States shareholders of domestic corporations,

the contacts of the fraudulent transactions themselves with the United

States should not have been treated as a key factor. 48 3 The second prong

of his opinion was on more solid ground. It recognized some relevance
to the law of incorporation, but concluded that imposing liability on
American defendants for the benefit of foreign shareholders, on deterrent
or altruistic grounds, in no way offends the legitimate interests of the
484
state of incorporation.

C.

The MultinationalCorporationand the Lex Incorporationis.
The increasing number of multinational corporations active world-

wide and the question of their relationships to the home and the host
nation have provoked extensive and heated discussions in recent years.
The main issues concern the external activities of these corporations and
the reach of the regulatory authority of the various nations of contact
479. Id. at 224 n.35, 225, 226 n.40.
480. Id. at 226.
481. ITT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
482. Id. at 918.
483. For a critique of the approach reflected in this prong, see Comment, The Transnational
Reach of Rule 10-b(5), 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (1973).
484. 619 F.2d at 919-21. It should be noted that in establishing the "materiality" of the nondisclosures in the "constructive fraud" cases, the courts examine the availability of remedies under
the applicable state law, usually that of the state of incorporation. In Goldbergitself, 567 F.2d 209
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978), in which a Panamanian corporation had its principal place of business in New York, the court, per Judge Friendly, found for the plaintiff because an
injunction would have been available under New York law and was not apparently prohibited under
the law of Panama. Id. at 215-20. Recognizing the existence of a "difficult choice-of-law issue,"
Judge Meskill dissented in part, questioning the applicability of New York law under Hausman v.
Buckley, the Reese and Kaufman article, and Santa Fe Indus. v. Green. Id. at 221, 224 n.9 (Meskill,
J., dissenting). Cases applying the law of incorporation on remedies for Goldberg purposes include
Healy v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., 616 F.2d 641, 643, 648, 658 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1980) (Texas law) and
United Canso Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Catawba Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. 99,482 (CCII) (D. Conn. 1983)
(Canadian law). See also Ferrara & Steinberg, The Interplay Between State Corporationand Federal
Securities Law-SantaFe, Singer,Burks, Maldonado, Their Progeny, & Beyond, 7 DEL. J. CoRe. L.
1 (1982).
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under tax, antitrust, labor, investment, foreign exchange, import-export,
anti-corruption, environmental protection, and other other criteria. One
of the perennial problems in these fields-attributing a "nationality" to a
corporation for purposes of controlling, as well as protecting, it in times
of peace and of war-becomes especially difficult where not only its operations and assets but also its direct and indirect ownership and control
are dispersed among many nations.
The question of what law should govern the internal affairs of these
corporations hardly.surfaces at all in these debates. 485 There are plausible explanations for this indifference. First, the typical multinational
corporation does not consist of one corporate entity but of a complex
group of parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates, each of which is incorporated under and identified with the law of one country. Thus, there is no
single internal corporate law governing the entire enterprise; the law applicable to each component unit can be determined under separate
choice-of-law criteria. Second, it is generally assumed that the internal
corporate relationship is of a private nature among the owners and managers of the enterprise and that the public policy objectives of the nations
affected can be best pursued through external regulation and control
rather than internal intervention. To be sure, such regulation and control need not respect the separateness of the legal entities composing the
multinational enterprise. But any "piercing of the corporate veil" in this
context need not, and typically does not, involve interference with the
internal corporate relationship. Third, the effectiveness and practicality
of relying on internal controls as means toward external ends is dubious.
There exists no general rule of international law that imposes an
obligation on nations to recognize the personality of foreign corporations, subject them to any particular internal affairs regime, or permit
them to do business within their territory. The Restatement of the Law
(Second): Foreign RelationsLaw of the United States486 which attributes
a "nationality" to corporations-an important jurisdictional connection
in many external contexts4 87-uses the place of incorporation to deter485. The classical study of international corporate conflict of laws remains BADR, ALIEN CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1953). The few more recent sources where some discussion of
the conflicts issues is undertaken include Peterson, The Law Applicable to MultinationalCorporations
from the Perspectiveof the United States, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL
AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLuTION 173 (N. Hazard & W. Wagner eds., 1974); Baade, Multinational Corporationsand American Conflicts Law, 37 Rabels Zeitschrift 32 (1973) (in German with
English summary); Hadari, supra note 45.
486. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND):

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES (1965).
487. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND): FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 37-40, 171-173 (1965).
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mine such nationality. 488 But the subject matter involves public regula4 9
tory legislation and has no relationship with internal affairs.
Multilateral and bilateral treaties often provide for recognition of the
legal personality of corporations and for their admission on national or
most-favored-nation terms, but are equally silent on the law applicable to
their internal affairs. Indeed, there is no indication that the "multinationalization" of corporate activity has significantly affected the corporate choice-of-law rules and principles applied by the various nations of
the world, including the United States and Europe, to such enterprises.
Nevertheless, the restraints and limitations on a nation's power to
extend its regulatory jurisdiction over foreign persons and events should
apply a fortiori in the private law sphere; conflicts with other nations
should be accommodated on the basis of comity. 490 The host nation of a
subsidiary of a multinational enterprise would normally apply its own
corporate law to the internal affairs of the subsidiary and is in a position
to check the potential abuses of the dominant foreign parent. It could,
for example, impose strict fiduciary obligations on shareholders and
managers and install other appropriate control mechanisms and procedures over affiliated enterprises. The greater the concentration of private
power and the possibilities of evasion, the more stringent need be the
rules. The same holds true for the home nation of the parent in regard to
extraterritorial holdings and activities. When the parent proposes to
enter a nation in its form of a foreign corporation, the local "qualification" or "domestication" statute may impose obligations and controls
488. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND): FOREIGN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 27

(1965). Cf Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir. 1981) (corporation treated as entity);
United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber, 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1032, 1040 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (government asserts extraterritorial application of the gold regulations based on United States incorporation); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, 293 F. Supp. 892, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (although the
foreign country may not be recognized by the United States, its law can still apply to its
corporations).
489. The same is true of the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REviSED) § 216 (Tentative Draft No. 2 1981) which continues the reference to the lex
incorporationis while recognizing some limitations on diplomatic protection. This revision reflects
the holding in the BarcelonaTraction case. 1970 I.C.J 4, 43-45 (holding that Belgium could not sue
Spain for injury to a Canadian corporation even though most of the company's shares were owned
by Belgians). This draft adds a new section, dealing with jurisdiction to control the foreign subsidiaries of United States nationals, in which the law of the place of incorporation is determinative on
certain issues of whether the United States may require or prohibit conduct. See Section 418(4)(a).
For a critical view of this position, see Thompson, US. JurisdictionOver ForeignSubsidiaries: Corporate and InternationalLaw Aspects, 15 LAW & PoL'Y 319, 380-94 (1983).
490. In fact, the "reasonableness" test adopted in Tentative Draft number 2 to reduce conflicting
or overlapping regulation-section 403(l)-is similar and reflects in many respects the "significant
relationship" concept of RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 46, § 6. See REsrATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 403 n.10, at 113-14 (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1981).
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analogous to those suggested for the multistate corporation doing intrastate business within a state of the United States.
This is not to suggest that the development of an international system of controls is improper or inadvisable. The point is that the considerations that support the lex incorporationis domestically are even more
compelling in the multinational context and presently nothing suggests
the possibility of any departure from it. The fact that there is no general
unification of corporate law, or even an agreement on corporate choiceof-law within federations, such as the United States, and within economic communities, such as the European Economic Community
(EEC), indicates the satisfaction with the status quo or at least a lack of
consensus for common action in this field. This observation is corroborated by the fact that neither the 1956 Hague Convention 491 nor even the
EEC Convention on the Recognition of Companies, 492 which have incorporated relatively modest corporate choice-of-law rules, have been ratified as yet.4 93
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Under the Constitution, a state has wide latitude in regulating the
internal affairs of corporations connected with it. First, a state may apply its entire law to corporations incorporated in that state, whatever the
locus of their other contacts, as well as to corporations, particularly
pseudo-foreign ones, having predominant local contacts. The new antitakeover statutes-especially those provisions that control second-tier
actions or impose shareholder approval requirements-and California's
controls over certain foreign corporations probably fall within the ambit
of these powers. Second, a state may require that intrastate operations be
conducted in local corporate form either through domestication or by the
491. See supra note 245.
492. See supra note 246.

493. In a major study on the nationality of the multinational enterprise, Hadari reviewed the
criteria used to subject a multinational corporation or its components to the laws and regulations of
particular states and concluded that "it is impossible to have a single criterion for all purposes."
Hadari, supranote 45, at 36. Hadari articulates three "guidelines" for determining corporate nationality: the needs of a workable international system, the protection of the justified expectations of the
parties-particularly through certainty, predicatability, and non-interference-and the recognition
of the justifiable national interest. Id. at 37-39. Hadari tests the guidelines in the narrower field of
corporate choice-of-law for internal corporate affairs; his conclusions are closely modeled on the
approach of the Restatement (Second)in that a rebuttable presumption in favor of the lex incorporationis is established which can be completely overcome or modified through selective intervention to
vindicate a local interest. Id. at 44-47. He also comments favorably on the features of the draft EEC
Convention which allows local interventionism only by the state or states which have the principal
or a substantial connection with the corporation. Id. In general, these guidelines are sound and the
positions taken in this article are consistent with them.
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formation of a local subsidiary. This represents a major power but has
been scarcely utilized in the past. Third, conventional wisdom holds that
intrastate sales of securities may be subjected to local blue-sky law, including fairness requirements.
At the other end of the spectrum, the full faith and credit clause as
applied in Wolfe and the negative operation of the commerce clause
under Edgar prohibit the states from directly regulating the entire internal affairs of genuinely foreign corporations, even where such corporations have some significant local contacts. The imperative of applying a
single, constant law to the entire bundle of internal rights and obligations
and to corporate governance weighs heavily against any attempts at fragmentation and piecemeal intervention. For example, although a state has
the power to apply its corporate policy concerning resident shareholders,
it may neither burden interstate commerce unduly nor ignore the unity
of the internal corporate relationship in violation of the full faith and
credit clause. In the ordinary case, interference based on shareholder
residence will be constitutionally impermissible except that, given the
centrality of the shareholder connection, the state of residence of all or
almost all the shareholders can make a plausible claim that it is the state
of the predominant contacts and thus assert total internal affairs
authority.
The power of the state in which business is transacted to interfere in
"hard core" internal affairs ordinarily should be minimal. But when it
comes to provisions limiting management prerogatives principally for the
protection of creditors-such as prohibiting distributions impairing capital-the local interest connected to local business is strong, and the imposition of liability does not heavily burden internal affairs. Governance
and structure are not affected, shareholder equality is not compromised,
and compliance is quite practical. Using this kind of analysis, a credible
case can be made that the basic New York controls over the internal
affairs of foreign corporations are valid. For the inspection of corporate
records under local law as provided in New York and California, however, only the practicality argument, an artificial "local asset" characterization, and the presence of some other secondary contacts are available
as justification. This article suggests that, given clearly internal subject
matter, these provisions are of dubious constitutionality.
While a state has unlimited authority to exclude a foreign corporation from intrastate business or local sales of securities and, consequently, to extract conditions as the price of admission, such conditions,
at least when not related to the intrastate connections, may not include
waivers of constitutional rights. Thus, it is quite doubtful that a state
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may condition entry on the subjection of out-of-state operations, transactions, or relationships, including internal corporate affairs, to local rules.
Under the prevailing conflicts practice, neither courts nor legislatures have maximized the imposition of local corporate policy on foreign
corporations but have consistently applied the law of the state of incorporation to the entire gamut of internal corporate affairs. In many cases,
this is a wise, practical, and equitable choice. It serves the vital need for
a single, constant and equal law to avoid the fragmentation of continuing, interdependent internal relationships. The lex incorporationis, unlike the lex loci delicti, is not a rule based merely on the priori concept of
territoriality and on the desirability of avoiding forum-shopping. It validates the autonomy of the parties in a subject where the underlying policy of the law is enabling. It facilitates planning and enhances
predictability. In fields like torts, where the typical dispute involves two
persons and a single or simple one-shot issue and where the common
substantive policy is to spread the loss through compensation and insurance, the preference for forum law and the emphasis on the state interest
in forum residents which are the common denominators of the new conflicts methodologies do not necessarily lead to unacceptable choices. By
contrast, applying local internal affairs law to a foreign corporation just
because it is amenable to process in the forum or because it has some
local shareholders or some other local contact is apt to produce inequalities, intolerable confusion, and uncertainty, and intrude into the domain
of other states that have a superior claim to regulate the same subject
matter. Fortunately, such an intervention would usually be precluded by
constitutional considerations.
In the international context, certain provisions of the federal securities laws that regulate proxy solicitations, disgorgement of insiders' profits, and disclosure of information sufficiently implicate internal corporate
affairs to require a conflicts analysis. While the basic line of demarcation
is properly drawn at the place of incorporation and domestic companies
are always included, the net sometimes catches foreign corporations having a number of shareholders residing in the United States. Under our
previous analysis, this single connection is insufficient to support substantial internal affairs regulation; the only explanation that has some acceptability is that the obligations imposed are limited and directly relate to
the protection of the interests of the local shareholders. Such an explanation is stronger in those instances where majority United States shareholdings or other major contacts are additionally required. The
determination of when a corporation is deceived or defrauded in a securities transaction where management is implicated again involves an internal affairs question and reference should be made to the law of

Vol. 1985:1]

CORPORATE CHOICE OFLAW

99

incorporation. The courts, however, have failed to make the necessary
distinctions and are treating it under the usual criteria of section 10(b)
extraterritoriality which revolve around the place where the conduct
took place or the effects were experienced.
Finally, the multinational corporation has not to date created serious problems in choice of law for internal corporate affairs because it
usually operates through local subsidiaries subject to local corporate law
and because it can easily structure its affairs to be governed by the lex
incorporationis thereby bypassing any other law such as that of the real
seat. The various plans and ideas for the host states to tame the multinationals stress external and not internal controls.

